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11. INTRODUCTION
“It's still fear versus hope; the past versus the future. It's still a choice between sliding
backward and moving forward.”1What Barack Obama said in his speech in Ohio 8th of
September 2010, could be understood as a statement toward fear. Fear opposes, fear has a
temporal and spatial existence, and fear can be chosen. Here fear is made political. It is a
conflict which can be located and which requires committing oneself.
 “37 black boxes with the word ‘Fear’ on them [… ] which spread panic and caused the police
to shut the station for hours and call in the bomb squad, turn out to be the work of Clinton
Boisvert, a 25-year-old freshman at the School of Visual Arts in Manhattan.”2 In this
example the word fear itself became a reason for immediate intervention of authorities of
state, and a cause for panic, behaviour regarded as irrational and harmful both for individuals
and especially in a large group of people. Here the relation between word fear and the fear it
caused, appeared as misunderstanding, but where the reactions and consequences themselves
reflected fear which would be odd to assume to origin from the art work, which as such can
not be understood as any form of threat. It rather reflects some form of uncanny experience
which is framed by the concept of fear in the context of specific event.
What makes the both cases significant in relation to fear is their context. Obama’s speech is a
rhetoric statement under the elections; it is official, planned, strategic and targeted to be
presented in a familiar environment. The case of black boxes is sudden, exceptional,
unplanned and uncontrollable and it appeared in an environment outside art, in a context
where it appeared as uncanny. Fear in this context didn’t appear as unchanging and without
history but as palimpsest. A series of events, writing and rewriting of social reality, had a
fundamental impact on how a sign is read, and to the sign itself.
Fear is one of those things, which define but which can not be defined accurately and
ultimately. It appears as obvious but hidden, biological and philosophical, material and
immaterial, as illness and natural behaviour, psychological and evolutional, and experienced
but still unknown. Some conclusion or more likely hypothesis can be drawn from presented
examples which accuracy is tested in theoretically and empirically within this thesis. Here
1 MarketWatch 2010.
2 Altheide 2003, 40–41.
2politics is understood to exist as a relation between things. To be able to discover political it
has to appear as activity or influence which relates politics to power, the ability to move and
affect or allow and maintain. As a relation it has to happen between two things, which in
their most simply form are the one who acts and the one who is the target of the act. These
are the subject and the object.   When this is related to how the meaning of context is
understood in order and appearance of things a following hypothetical research question can
be formed of their relation to politics.
How does the politics of fear appear as a relation between the subject, the
object and the context?
Locating and timing the fear into relation and context is problematic approach. Different time
theories have various concepts for time which would be the first dilemma to solve before one
could even enter the fear itself. Time escapes us. When this is related to palimpsest it comes
problematic to frame the research without cutting out this element by setting the issue into
one spatial and temporal space. One could try to find the answer from memory, but this
might limit the experience to one individual or group of people and to one generation in one
geographical area. Guy Debord shows that the emergence of linguistics created non-personal
memory, memory of social governance consisting of documents3. This leads us to framing
the research into documentation of an event where the actual focus lies on the representative
power of the research object. Then what should lie in the focus of this representation? Jean
Baudrillard necessitates that the abstractions must be localized into precise point of time and
place, which is the body4. Body on the other hand in the eyes of genealogy is a history of
those powers which invest into it5. The body is the location for fear but also for power and
politics.  To avoid formalization and simplification of the multiplicity of fear attention should
be turned away from “vast unities [… ] to the phenomena of rupture, of discontinuity [… ]
incidence of interruption”6 as Foucault argues in developing archaeological approach to
knowledge. Based on these arguments the research question must concentrate on:
How does the representation process of the body in the context of an event
affect to a formation of the objects of fear?
3 Debord 2005, 122.
4 Baudrillard 1993, 159.
5 Ojakangas 1998, 22.
6 Foucault 1974, 4.
3When these themes are recognized, one should estimate the dynamics of the question without
oversimplifying or loosing its focus and maintaining the research frame. Preserving the
central concepts from genealogy, social representation and archaeology of knowledge, body,
event, process and knowledge, the research question can be drawn as:
How does eventalized body transform into the object of fear?
1.1 ANATOMY
To understand the processes of the embodiment of fear one has to gain knowledge
concerning its structure. In our knowledge fear appears to be organic rather than inanimate
ways in which objects of fear are linked to each other, how they may born, evolve, strengthen
and die. To understand how organism works and what is its condition and quality,
information can be attained by approaching central pieces of it or proceeding to a cell level to
understand the functioning of the basic units which form the organism. Because the whole is
not just the sum of its parts, it has to be also looked as a complete interactive and interrelated
process. In anatomy one has to separate (ana) and to cut open (temnein), to enter the research
object and to understand the complete structure.
The approach to research can be compared to procedure which Ralf Kauranen and Pekka
Rantanen have drawn in their work where their aim is to use both Foucault’s archaeological
and genealogical methods. What they underline in their approach is that there is no clear
foucauldian method but rather an aspect to both research topic and to research making itself.  7
Kauranen and Rantanen note that even Foucault uses historical documents in his work his
main interest lays in the present8. As Foucault notes “if one means by that writing a history of
the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present”9. His
genealogy is strongly connected to Friedrich Nietzsche where the focal points are the body,
the event and the perspective10.
7 Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 217.
8 ibid., 218.
9 Foucault 1991a, 31.
10 Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 221.
4One main reason for using genealogical approach is the concept which Foucault calls
eventalization11. Transformation can be captured in a series of “frozen pictures”12. The event
itself is a construction of multiple processes and other separated events. It allows
understanding an event as singularity but also the palimpsest or layered causality. These
series of events have their order and limits which allows one to discover the continuity
without tiding oneself to presupposing of the origin and evolvement, but a continuity which
is build up from singularities and ruptures.13
Here we come to the critic which Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge presents for
traditional research methods of history. Long periods and continuity, certain aims and tools,
and patterns made between disparate events are something where the attention should be
drawn away and instead approve the importance of ruptures and discontinuity in history14.
This is relevant also in political research because history “organizes the document [… ] orders
it [… ] distinguishes between what it relevant and what it not” which also sets the limits for
knowledge concerning what is political. Even more Foucault claims that history transforms
documents into memory15. This notion is very important because it fits well together with
Debords idea of non-personal memory, memory which should be called as collective or
cultural memory, something which isn’t based on primary and personal experience but in
something which is transformed into document, a form of representation and abstraction.
Although it must be noticed that neither Foucault nor Debord despites individual experience.
On the contrary what collective memory does is processing and of reinstating the experience.
Even though Foucault tempts to problematize structures he also notes that archaeology is not
entirely strange for structural analysis for example in relation to what questions are made and
which analytical tools are used16.
Archaeology can be used and interpret as a method, but as such it is not very clearly drawn.
How this concept is treated within the thesis is an internalized attitude, guiding philosophy of
science which helps one to question petrified models of knowing which are blind spots for
researcher’s analytical eye. More practical approach is used in the selection of case studies
and documents and especially how they are seen as the different aspects and manifestation of
11 Foucault 1991b, 76.
12 Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 226.
13 ibid., 226
14 Foucault 1982, 3–4.
15 ibid., 7.
16 ibid,, 8.
5the same phenomenon. Foucault’s way to describe time and history is found most appealing
and functional in relation to the content of the thesis.
Archaeological method is also followed in the ways in which it understands the discourse as
wide and varying by its nature.  The elements of discursive formations appear as object,
mode of statement, concepts and thematic choices which conditions of existence,
coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance are controlled by the rules of
formation17. The surfaces of emergency are spaces or contexts where some discourses appear
first time 18. In these conditions object doesn’t pre-exist but it appears under the positive
conditions of complex group of relations19. These discursive relations also limit the discourse
by offering the objects of which it can speak and characterize discourse itself as a practice20.
The enunciative modalities express who is speaking, how the institutions affect and how the
position of the subject appears for example as seeing, listening or observing21. The formation
of concepts22 and strategies expresses discourses which are formed on the basis of the same
rules, conditions and where their appearance is identical23. Link points of systematization
present the sub-groups of discourse24. Even though these terms are presented here, they are
not written open in the case study but they are recognized in ways in which the discourse is
understood.
1.2 TOMOGRAPHY
Having a certain level of understanding concerning the anatomy and the capability to choose
the biopsy it is needed to find a proper analytical instrument for the research. Because the
anatomy of fear anticipates a complex system reminding of living organism with inner and
outer organs and regenerating and mutating genome, to be able to penetrate the object and to
understand the supporting processes and mechanisms one needs to have subtle method to
carry out the analysis. Tomography, where tomes stands for part or section and graphy for
writing or presentation on some surface, seems a proper term when it is compared to what is
17 Foucault 1982, 38.
18 ibid., 41.
19 ibid., 45.
20 ibid., 46.
21 ibid., 50–52.
22 ibid., 56.
23 ibid., 65.
24 ibid., 66.
6recognized in relation to anatomy. A method which penetrates the object layer by layer
drawing a presentation of each section used for such sciences as archaeology and biology
would seem proper approach before proceeding to diagnosis.
When one talks about archaeology of knowledge instead of archaeology, genealogy instead
of genes, eventalization and surface of emergency instead of biopsy, and social
representations and discourses instead of writing, Sohail Inayatullah’s Causal layered
analysis (CLA) seems well oriented instrument as a replacement for tomography in social
sciences. Inayatullah calls CLA as a new research theory and method25 where the research
subject is divided into analytical layers and where these layers are understood to have a
causal relation. These four analytical levels are litany, social causes, discourse/worldview,
and myth/metaphor26. CLA doesn’t only appear as multilayered but as a combination of
multiple theoretical approaches27 or even as a methodological framework with a certain
guidelines.
According to Inayatullah CLA integrates empiricist, interpretative and critical modes of
knowing. It is usually related to post-structuralism, macro-history, postcolonial multicultural
theory28 and critical theory, but it is officially listed as a method of Future Studies29. Still it
differs from the usual definition of future studies because it doesn’t concentrate on predicting
the future but in creating transformative spaces for the alternative futures30 and to avoid
superficiality of conventional social science research and forecasting methods because they
often are unable to unpack discourses, worldviews, and ideologies, and exclude often
archetypes, myths and metaphors31. The goals of CLA appear as highly practical and
solution-oriented when it is targeted to develop more effective, deeper, inclusive and longer
term policy32. Within this work the potentiality of CLA is used and estimated as analytical
framework and method in the context of the politics of fear, the capability to conceptualize,
model and interpret it.
25 Inayatullah 2004, 8.
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 ibid., 10.
30 ibid., 8.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
7What is important to knowledge in CLA as a method is that it focuses less on horizontal
spatiality and more on the vertical dimension33. Inayatullah explains this as a thought derived
from Indian philosophy where mind is understood as vertical construction and where the
inward process realises truth. This differs from the mainstream post-structural notion of
alternative horizontal discourses.34
CLA and also the future studies have decisively moved from ontological inquiry to
epistemological concerns about the knowledge35. Post-structuralism within the CLA
framework has not diminished the data-orientation or meaning-oriented research where data
is seen in the context of meanings, within the context of episteme36. What may cause a
problem is Inayatullah’s alignment and notion concerning “knowledge parameters that
structure meanings; for example, class, gender, the interstate system” and “myths and
metaphors that organise the deep beliefs, the traumas and transcendence that over time define
identity”37.  It doesn’t clearly occur how stabile he claims these classification and identities
to be. This is a concern in relation to Foucault’s application of genealogy which Inayatullah
uses as one element in CLA38, because it doesn’t explain phenomena just as a cause of
heritage but also as a process of emergence. Such issues as identity may transform,
politicized or appear and disappear several times. Furthermore one should be careful to lean
knowledge parameters, which are also a forms of discourses and could easily lead to a
situation where the analysis is already limited according to dominating concepts. In this light
also the categorization of different CLA levels should be understood primarily as
methodological tools, not to exist as ontology, but as episteme. Already the reason that these
levels are understood as continuum of each others and a process between these is recognized,
shows that they can not be considerate as closed systems and that no fundamental difference
between these levels exists.
Even a greater problem arises in Inayatulla’s presumption considering politics. He point out
well that “freeing methodology from politics is a never-ending task” but he argues that “it
can be accomplished not by controlling for these variables but by layering them”39. This
assumption seems to presume that politics can be placed for a specific layer and that it is
33 Inayatullah 2004, 8.
34 ibid., 11.
35 ibid., 8–9.
36 ibid., 9.
37 ibid.
38 ibid., 10 - 11.
39 ibid., 9.
8separable from other social phenomena. It looks like returning to sector-politics from
aspectual politics40 which especially in the case of politics of fear appears as much more
suitable approach than trying to place fear into certain layer or sector. Recognizing political
aspect is not the same as layering or categorising it.
A couple of the most influential theorists behind the CLA’s theoretical framework is named
by Inayatullah. First of them is Johan Galtung. According to his civilization theory there are
foundational similarities in terms of codes for example towards nature, others and women,
and also in the macro-historical trajectories. Also CTM syndrome (civilization, trauma and
myth) was developed to enable to reach beyond the visible actions of nations, to the historical
causes of action.41 The other one is Michel Foucault largely through the interpretation of
Michael Shapiro. According to Inayatullah historical frames of knowledge are the key to
understanding how particular nominations of reality becomes naturalised, and genealogy
makes multilayered methodology possible to emerge.42 A notion that “In terms of research,
politics and methodology [… ] are not only institutional but also civilizational”43 is relevant
when it is related to Galtung’s theory, but to speak about something as institution or
civilization makes one to ask why to make statements according to specific structures and not
to talk about discursive formations, practices or genealogical terms as foucauldian approach
would probably reasonably require.
In CLA language is constitutive matter of reality which differs from empirical domain
wherein language is seen as transparent and neutral. A text is an open concept which
recognizes “a movie, a book, a worldview, a person [… ] something or someone that can be
read” as proper material.44 Ways to approach the object of research Inayatullah names
deconstruction, genealogy, distance, alternative pasts and futures and reordering
knowledge.45 Deconstruction is something that well defines the method as such. Genealogy is
understood here as a type of discourse analysis which concentrates on “a history of
paradigms [… ] which discourses have been hegemonic and how the term under study has
travelled through these various discourses”46. On the other hand Inayatullah asks which
40 Linjakumpu 2005, 15– 21.
41 Inayatullah 2004, 10.
42 ibid., 10 - 11.
43 ibid., 10.
44 ibid., 13.
45 ibid.
46 ibid., 14.
9discourses constitute present and how have they travelled through history47. Between these
two statements is a small but important difference which must be acknowledged within the
frame of the thesis in process. In the research the focal point of genealogy is interpret as the
heritage and emergence of phenomenon in different discourses, practices, contexts and
events, not as tracing down how a certain historical heritage as a discourse emergences from
time to time in different surfaces. This is the difference in a way of understanding discourse
not as a stabile but as an organic thing, and this is the main reason not to talk about the
origin, Ursprung but to recognize what is the importance of heritage, Herkunft and
emergence, Entstehung48.
Inayatullah’s idea of distance could be related to Foucault’s eventalization. The meaning of
distance is to recognize scenarios which make the present remarkable, unfamiliar, strange or
denatured49. Here the scenario of the future can be replaced by an event from the past related
to present. This leads us to alternative past and futures, which concerns the problematization
of present. This opens not only the present for analysis but also the past and how the
knowledge of the past can reshape the present and future. Reordering knowledge reminds
Foucault’s archaeological method. Inayatullah compares it to deconstruction and genealogy
in undoing particular categories by disturbing conventional categories, and making them
problematic50.
Where these principles form the guidelines for the analysis the vertical levels are the core of
CLA as a method. More detailed description of each level is given during the first case study
where it is tested in practice. Still some notions are needed to reveal the basic structure. First
of the four levels is the litany characterised as official unquestioned view of reality. It appears
as superficial view to issue in process and represents it as a quick, simplified and emotionally
charged statement. Appealing would be to compare it to a headline of a news or magazine
which aim and importance is to capture one’s attention effectively. Here the information
must appear in simple and easily absorbed form, otherwise it will be bypassed. Inayatullah
remarks that this type of conventional level can create politics of fear in the future research51.
47 Inayatullah 2004, 14.
48 Foucault 1998, 72.
49 Inayatullah 2004, 14.
50 ibid.
51 ibid., 16.
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Peter Bishop has pointed out that the most significant problem in CLA is that the deeper
values are considered ‘better’ than the litany. Inayatullah answers to the critique by placing
the litany in historical and cultural contexts where it appeared as the only truth.52 Why the
litany should be considerate important is most likely the reason that it is usually the level
from where to enter into social and political questions because it is “the most visible and
obvious”53. It can be understood as the surface of emergence for the other levels of CLA.
The second level the social causes is systemic perspective, including quantitative data and it
highlights institutions as information providers and political actors. The data is often
questioned but the used language is not contested, the paradigm within which the issue is
framed remains untouchable.54 In political research this level well presents the field of
institutionalism, where states, institutions and international and governmental organisations
are understood as political actors and the subjects of power. Social status is also something
which could be captured under the social causes.
The third level is the discourse/worldview concerning unconscious presupposing based on
ideology, worldview and discourses. Basis of its analysis is in linguistic and cultural
processes. Compared to the social causes it doesn’t concentrate on who or what are the actors
or the systems.  It investigates how the discourse affects on our framing of the issue.55
The fourth level is the myth/metaphor. Because this dimension of knowledge is understood as
unconscious and emotive,56 it requires commitment from the researcher on how one
comprehends the relation of emotions, rationality and activity. Inayatullah lists the access to
myths and metaphors via the deep stories, the collective archetypes, and the unconscious and
emotive dimensions57. These seem to be some possible ways to approach and not the specific
requirements from the method. At first sigh they seem quite strange for the political science
but they can be equated to narratives, identity politics and politics of emotions.
Two forthcoming arguments are the most crucial in relation to the study in process and they
concern the research object and concept of time. In the myth/metaphor level the language is
52 Inayatullah 2004, 15.
53 ibid., 16.
54 ibid., 8, 17.
55 ibid.
56 ibid., 8.
57 ibid., 17.
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less specific and more concerned with evoking visual images58. This notion of visual
approach should be regarded in choosing the document under analysis. It doesn’t require only
use of textual material but as well drawings or photographs. The second argument concerns
the different concepts of time which is crucial in future studies which theorize time.  These
vary from divine guidance to organic being and chaotic state59. The understanding of time
has an affect to the ways in witch surrounding reality and one’s own possibility to affect to it
exists. This is something that doesn’t appear as politically neutral and culturally
unchangeable and by then it is also inseparably linked to the formation of the objects of fear.
1.3 DIAGNOSIS
What is drawn from the anatomy via tomography is then interpret dia gnosis, through
knowledge. In diagnosis the objective is to supplement the interpretative framework with
theoretical and methodological knowledge. This is done to fill the possible caps and to
answer questions which have remained unknown. The aim is to improve the CLA-method by
offering some other analytical concepts to clarify also the importance to recognize the
differences between its levels and by then make it meet the requirements of answering to the
research question.
Inayatullah doesn’t clearly tell how the different levels should be deconstructed and
analysed. Probably the myth/metaphor level appears to be the most complicated where the
others are more clearly related to linguistics like discourse and rhetoric. What can be
understood from Inayatullah’s work and how its importance is understood within the thesis is
that it can and should be used as a methodological framework for different separate
approaches. To gain knowledge of fear in a context of myths and to be able to systematise
metaphors, it is done by using structural anthropology and semiotics. Furthermore to
understand their role in the interactive process in the context of event their dramaturgy and
representative nature is estimated.
The semiotic analysis is done according to Umberto Eco’s theory of semiotics. Eco has very
practical approach in his work which also combines many earlier traditions of semiotics and
58 Inayatullah 2004, 18.
59 ibid.
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famous writers such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles S. Peirce60. Eco notes that
“semiotics studies all cultural processes as processes of communication”61 which is one
approach to semiotic research. Eco underlines that even everyday life is full of signs it is
incorrect to say that every act of inference should be understood as semiotic act. Act should
be understood as semiotic when the association is culturally recognized and systematically
coded.62  Eco presents the two competing hypothesis of the nature of semiotic research which
are “the whole of culture must be studied as a semiotic phenomenon” and “all aspects of a
culture can be studied as the contents of a semiotic activity”63. Here the latter is more proper
because it doesn’t understand semiotics as fundamental but more as an aspect. Approaching
social sciences as purely semiotic phenomenon could lead to serious distortions where all the
activity would be understood only as process of signs.
Foucault draws a wide picture of historical knowledge concerning signs in his work The
Order of Things. They have been understood as something placed upon things or as
something that can be constituted only by an act of knowing64. An important remark is that
the analysis is what brings to the sign apparent65; without analysis the sign doesn’t exist. The
artificial or man-made signs owe their power to their natural signs and transform imagination
into memory, attention into reflection, and instinct into knowledge66. There exists also
separation between what is understood as the signifying element and the sign. Signifying
element can become a sign only on condition that it manifests, and relation that links it to
what it signifies.67
Anthropology allows understanding how the semiotics appears in cultural practices. Claude
Lévi-Strauss understands myths as explanatory, ordering and describing entities which, as
science, theorize reality68. He argues that if there is a meaning in mythology, it resides only
as a combination of elements not as isolated units69. Also in language certain sequences of
sounds define meaning but their content may be completely different in other language,
60 Eco 1979, 14–16.
61 ibid., 8.
62 ibid., 17.
63 ibid., 22.
64 Foucault 1980a, 59.
65 ibid., 61.
66 ibid., 61–62.
67 ibid., 64.
68 Lévi-Strauss 1989.
69 Lévi-Strauss 1972, 210.
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which shows that it is the combination of sounds which provide the significant data70. Still
myths withhold more complex information than any other linguistic expression71. According
to Lévi-Strauss myths can be discovered and analysed in higher levels than for example
distinctive features so that they could be separated from other kind of speech72.
Serge Moscovici presents the view that knowledge is never a simple description or a copy of
a state of affairs but produced through interaction and communication which is always linked
to human interest73. Social representations are related to social relations, the objects produced
and consumed and the exchange of communication74. Moscovici believes in the variation and
diversity of collective ideas which greatly differs from Émile Durkheim who considers
collective representations as a stabile form of understanding75. This can be seen as a link
between Foucault’s approach and Moscovici’s theory. Moscovici claims that something
visual may appear as invisible to us because pre-established models and classifications affect
to the ways how we interpret the information which our eyes capture76. The representation
constitutes a social reality sui generis77. According to Moscovici “Social representations
should be seen as a specific way of understanding, and communicating, what we know
already”78. They are specific to our society79 and their purpose is to make something
unfamiliar to familiar80. At first this claim seems to be something to disagree with because it
seems to argue that all representations are understandable and that they even would have
some kind of mission. Moscovici specifies his argument by explaining that this important
quality of representations is an awareness of what is unusual and abnormal and enables to
process this information by comparing it to what is understood as familiar.
Another question of CLA concerns the time span of different layers in relation how they may
transform. Here one should look to the Foucault’s definition of the structure of discursive
formations. Foucault argues that these formations can not be deconstructed and constructed
in a single moment. Related to CLA the changes appear first in the litany where they can be
70 Lévi-Strauss 1972, 208.
71 ibid., 210.
72 ibid., 211.
73 Duveen 2000, 2.
74 ibid., 3.
75 ibid., 7.
76 Moscovici 2000, 19.
77 ibid., 27.
78 ibid., 31.
79 ibid., 36
80 ibid., 37.
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discovered. Myths change and disappear slower. This would also mean that what appears in
the litany might be overcome in short time and appear as singular exception, which
importance would be revealed only in the case where it would appear again. Transformations
in myth level would be rare but also more fundamental in the case where they appear as
radical.
How then this kind of transformation might occur? Can new myths be born? Levi-Strauss
claims that a myth always refers to a distant event but which operational value is timeless.
When this is related to archaeological method a following hypothesis can be presented: An
emergence of sudden and dramatic event, which appears as chaotic within the system, and is
experienced as rupture in reality, requires explanatory model and by then enables a
formation of myth. Again, one should be careful not to claim this to be the origin of the myth
but rather a transformation which reconstructs the already existing reality.
Also the role of agency or where Inayatullah uses word stakeholders81 is a detail to pay some
attention. Kauranen and Rantanen interpret Foucault by saying that a certain actor is not
responsible of emergence of phenomenon but they are caused by different relations and
processes82. This is also the way how phenomena are approached in this thesis. For
Inayatullah stakeholders seems to play quite important role, but not so much in the deeper
levels of CLA. This is a valid notion from him, which should also be understood in relation
to the practical problem solving aspect of his work.
Genealogy offers one very important element for a dynamic research. This is a disposition
which allows adopting a new approach which evolves through the analysis. Disposition has a
central role in answering to a certain question where it exists primary as strategic function83.
Description of the events and dispositions is the genealogical way to approach research.
Finding similarities between the elements makes it possible to recognize relations between
different practices84 and most importantly to locate power relations and make them visible.
* * *
81 Inayatullah 2004, 8, 20, 29.
82 Kauranen and Rantanen 2005, 224.
83 ibid.
84 ibid., 225.
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The traditional concepts and categorizations are put under doubt but not completely
abandoned partly for methodological reasons and their use in comparative literature. Such
things as punishment, torture, racism, criminality, terrorism, dictatorship, genocide and war
are approached by using different articulations. In the case study these phenomena are set
under the concepts of symbolic violence, the silence, breach in social reality, and trauma.
The content of these terms is not totally different but more likely the same elements occur in
each of them. They all present a different emphasis of the same phenomenon of the politics
of fear and only by separating them and bringing them together their function can be
understood.
Inayatullah characterises the terms of the approach to research as patterned and chaotic,
known and yet unknown, or explained but not accurately predicted, ‘both–and’ perspective
where we should not try to discover a theory of everything but rather we must include many
variables and many ways of knowing85. What might be gained here may not appear as
compact and clear but it allows one to enter the complex and chaotic phenomenon and at the
same time have knowledge and understanding and multiplicity of socio-political nature of the
politics of fear.
2. RATIO, PASSIO, ACTIO, POLITIKA
If it is still fear vs. hope, what is opposed when one talks about politics of fear? With which
phenomenon or system fear can be related? Fear could be recognized as a basic emotion.
This on the other hand is not a conclusion of the nature of fear but a beginning for a long
tradition of philosophical debates. If these debates are connected to politics, the main
question would lie in the division between rationality and emotions, and furthermore how
this affects to political acts and behaviour. How our knowledge concerning the dichotomy of
rationality and emotions is formed? In framing the research one has to make short
archaeological excavation into emotions.
The etymology of emotion, Latin emovere, expresses moving something which moves us or
engulfs us.  Similar bodily location of emotions appears in English word to feel and feeling.
85 Inayatullah 2004, 11.
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Latin verb afficere expresses to affect and affection which relates emotions to activity.86
Etymology reveals that emotions are related in system of language into physical censors
which can captivate us and lead our actions. They appear almost as reflects, innate or leaned
form of muscle memory.  Partly compatible to this finding, classical understanding shows
them opposite to action, Latin action is opposite to emotions as passive, pathos (a disease)
and pati (suffering).87 Interesting etymology of passive is also a position of the word
empathy88, where one sets oneself into the position of other, which describes emotion as a
social phenomenon, something which can happen between to persons and affect to their
actions. Here emotions are something else than passive. They may be closed outside from
active decision making, but not outside social activity.
A.J Greimas’ semiotic school started using term modality instead of emotions where
existentialists inspired by Sartre considered them as evaluations and talked about the logic of
emotions. Cognitivism similarly interprets emotions as a linking believes between us and the
world but does not recognize them as logic but cultural and social constructions. These
theories present emotions much more as immaterial, something that lies for example in
language but which doesn’t focus on the bodily reactions. Physiological approach sees
emotions only as physical changes and reactions, or as temporal or stabile patterns of
behaviour as behaviourists like Gilber Ryle calls them. Furthermore in physiological
approach these reactions are reflected into mind as emotions which makes the process vice
versa; we do not have certain physical reaction because of emotions but our emotions are
activated by certain physical reactions.89 Psychological approach sees this relation as
bidirectional interaction. Also Baruch Spinoza considered emotion as something which
appears as a bodily condition but where conscious experiences existed. Emotion is an affect
which moves both mind and body.90
Strong and fundamental difference is traditionally seen to exist between emotions and
rationality which is also one of the central dogmas of the Western philosophy. As hardly any
knowledge can be claimed to be objective, also the philosophical debates reflect a strong
differences in evaluating these concepts into good and bad, and not only to discuss about
86 Niiniluoto 1996, 7.
87 ibid.
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89 ibid., 9.
90 Pietarinen 1996, 46.
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their structure, manifestations or existence. Either rationality is considered as good where the
emotions appear as irrational uncontrollable affects, or then rationality is dangerous and
ruthless when the emotions are humane and safe. Such authors as David Hume and Sigmund
Freud considered the rational mind to be enslaved by passions.91 It can be claimed that Hume
saw the importance of emotions quite marginal because he argued that emotions do not
contain any information and are irrational.
Augustine of Hippo’s approach to the question can be defined as philosophic-theological
psychology where he shared some principles with Plato-stoics philosophy. He argued that
emotions are spontaneous cognitive-affective conditions which direct one to certain kind of
action, a suggestion which can be rejected or end up to consensus when the emotional
impulse transforms into intention. Thomas Aquinas relied to Aristotle’s opinions where the
emotion is divided into cognitive-evaluative part and experienced psychophysical change
affective part, which directs the person to act according to certain operational paradigm.92
René Descartes didn’t believe in Plato’s radical substance-dualism but to a combination of
mind and body as Aristotle understood it93. Passions where psychological and mental
conditions, which differed from thoughts because of their unclear and confusing appearance.
He assumed them to be physiological phenomena which where supposed to inform mind of
the state of the body and its needs. This also meant that emotions evaluated the importance of
all the beings and object outside one’s own body.94 This means that even emotions and sense
perception are different from thoughts they are all elements of thinking95.  Still Descartes
kept in his work crucial to maintain the division between actions and passions where the goal
was to overcome the effect of passions.96 Emotions he claimed to be most moving and
shocking of all forms of thinking. His notions of the connection between mind and body as a
process where memory reawakens via certain bodily experiences and on the other hand
where memory affects to bodily functions97 reminds later experiments of Ivan Pavlov and his
theory of the conditioned reflexes.
91 Niiniluoto 1996, 109.
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93 Alanen 1996, 25.
94 ibid., 26.
95 ibid., 27.
96 ibid., 30.
97 ibid., 33.
18
*  *  *
While questioning the dichotomy between emotions and rationality one should look the
theories which, if do not make these categorizations disappear, tries to find interaction
between emotions and knowledge. In cognitive theory of emotions, emotions are
information. Double-aspect theory sees that in conditions of consciousness it is related to
both cognitive and emotional aspects.98 Irrationality exists only in situations where emotions
are in conflict with rationality by offering incompatible believes and models of action. These
models and believes as emotions are something which psychologies argues to be social
constructions produced by cognitive processes99.
Emotions require cognitive factors as perception, believe or information100. If the emotions
appear as similar to beliefs they can be considered as rational but this doesn’t classify them
as true or untrue.  Martha Nussbaum believes that also emotions are directed to certain
objects. This orientation is not internal and independent to emotion but the emotions inherit it
from beliefs. This separates bodily experiences like hunger from emotions which have only
causal relation to world without orientation. Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuter oppose this
claim by pointing out that intentionality can appear in emotions without existing only in
relations to belief.101 Here they refer to Maurice Merleau-Pont’s approach where he explains
the relation between bodily sensation and emotions by using the concept of the body-subject
where by body is not meant purely physiological appearance of human. Orientation or
intentionality is dependent on the position of the body-subject in relation to surrounding
environment. The difference between what is seen as bodily sensation or emotion is not
based on the intentionality but on the quality of the object.102
Merleau-Pont criticises both cognitive theory and psychology from trying to understand
world as clear field of phenomena where the obscurity of world is only seen as confused state
of mind. He claims that the world in itself is obscure which is denied in theories which try to
narrow down the diversity of experiences into abstractions made for scientific needs.103 He
also argues that sensations, moods and emotions are part of the same continuum. Here
98 Niiniluoto 1996, 110.
99 ibid., 111.
100 Heinämaa and Reuter 1996, 136.
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103 ibid., 141–142.
19
emotions which are related to specific object change in time being into moods which do not
appear only in relation to certain object. Merleau-Pont refers to Martin Heidegger’s
hypothesis that all the emotional conditions are related to holistic understanding of world
instead of separate beings.104
*  *  *
Aristotle named fear as one of the emotions which all are connected either to pleasure or
suffering. Emotions exist as motivational factors which are the source for activities and make
to avoid things which endanger one’s existence.105 Hobbes divided emotions into direct and
indirect emotions where fear was classified as one of the eight direct emotions. O. Harvey
Green argued that all the other emotions where made of these basic emotions. 106
For Descartes affect of fear is followed by certain physiological changes which prepare body
for action. Affect is not awakened by rational consideration of threat. The physiological
consequences happen because of automatic response to perception of the source of threat.
These changes are then experienced as emotion107. Fear is a form of knowledge considering
one’s own condition.
While estimating the relation between emotion and action, Olli Koistinen presents one
possible hypothesis where a combination of desire and belief are the causal preconditions for
fear. Koistinen describes this as a process where the subject has a certain desire but the
conflicting signs of obstacles to reach the object of desire make the subject to fear the
signs.108 If the desire would vanish, also the object would disappear and beliefs as conflicting
signs would loose their importance.
Ilkka Niiniluoto highlights that in the formation of theory of emotions one should look to all
these approaches. He also makes one important notion considering the connection between
body and emotions which do not appear as pure thought. Appreciation is given to
phenomenology and feministic philosophy which have claimed that the philosophy of
104 Heinämaa and Reuter 1996, 142.
105 Sajama 1996, 258.
106 Oksanen M. 1996, 77.
107 Alanen 1996, 36.
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emotions is the philosophy of human body. 109 Early description of this connection made
already Plato who divided soul in three parts and located it into head, chest and stomach110.
This should be recognized especially in relation to genealogical analysis where the body and
the mentality considering the body is in focus111 and   furthermore where it is not relevant to
find only what can be recognize as truth but also to recognize all those mistakes and falsified
claims which have affected to what exists now and how things are valuated112. This emerges
as central statement when one looks to the dichotomy of emotions and rationality.
*  *  *
How are emotions related to politics? In the field of politics and international relations
emotions are often marginalized and disdained phenomenon. Politics is commonly
understood only as rational and strategic activity where the emotions are considerate as
problems which need to be solved.113 Rationality is dominant compared to emotions and
good political decisions are based on logic where the emotions present irrational
malfunctions114 not something with which power is involved115.
Thomas Hobbes estimated the relation between emotions and power. In his work On Man
Hobbes presented emotions as disordered state of mind116. In the case of fear this could either
be seen in constructivist aspect as something which makes the people to obey law and order,
where on the other hand in analytical approach it is a source of problems117. Emotions,
especially fear has traditionally held an interest among realism118.
Aini Linjakumpu presents an opposing view to marginalization of emotions by referring to
Ian Burkitt’s argument that any analysis concerning power, governance and politics which
doesn’t recognize emotions is failing119. Jonathan Mercer argues that without emotions there
is no motivation, orientation or creativity. Emotions function as evaluations of norms and
109 Niiniluoto 1996, 9.
110 ibid., 8.
111 Ojakangas 1998, 22.
112 Foucault 1998, 74.
113 Linjakumpu 2007, 77.
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ideals120. There are also disagreements if the emotions appear only in individual level as
Theodore Kemper argues or if they should be considered as collective. David Ost connects
the debate to Carl Schmitt by arguing that anger is central to normal politics as well, not only
in violent bursts121. Linjakumpu points out that emotions locate in social relations where they
appear as part of interaction, strengthens in a group and also affect to ways in which one
response and orientates one self to own emotions and reactions.122
In her own work Linjakumpu relates politics to terrorism and to the acts of al-Qaeda.
According to her analysis politicized emotions lead to state which is out of negotiations and
consensus. They also partly construct the group identity.123 This way emotionally charged
beings or objects can be also targeted in order to cause suffering among the group124. Andrew
A. G. Ross also recognizes the importance of emotions in relation to norms and identity
which he sees as a serious lack among constructivists who have otherwise well oriented to
these phenomena125.  Politicizing past is also a key to reawaken and construct emotional
conditions which may then appear as motivational sources for political activity126.
Linjakumpu’s hypothesis is that collectively expressed emotions orientate and affect to
political activity including terrorism. She also highlights that even though al-Qaeda is related
to emotions this doesn’t make it irrational actor.127
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Aristotle explains in his work Rhetoric that “fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due
to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future”128. A new release from
Jussi Viitala concerning human brain research, it is pointed out that fear is a quality which
decreases rationality and increases authoritarianism129. Both definitions emphasizes different
context. Where Aristotle’s description is based on individual experience, Viitala’s approach
120 Linjakumpu 2007, 78.
121 Ost 2004, 229.
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concentrates more in social interaction. This might be the actual reason which makes fear
such a difficult phenomena to understand and manage.
The literature review is not clearly divided into different named sections. This is because the
topics are mostly overlapping. Still a clear storyline can be found. The review starts with
classical writers and theories which present mostly realism, rationalism and normative
approach. Following section shows some new approaches based on the same models of
politics. Next section concentrates on memory and direct violence. Further sections deals first
with risk and uncertainty and largely with social and cultural constructions such as identity,
discourse and representation. Before that last part that presents field exams and behaviour
psychological theories, some of the most vital parallel terms and theories for politics of fear
are listed and shortly described. The aim is to form a large overview about the terminology
and different contexts where fear has been traditionally or experimentally connected.
3.1 POLITICS OF FEAR
Daniel Béland analyses Corin Robin’s work Fear: The History of a Political Idea. Corin is
arguing that political fear operates in two ways by defining what they feel to be the public’s
main object of concern and by dividing any group or society in to different hierarchies. Fear
is seen as political tactics that makes one group maintain power at the expense of another
group. Fear is shaped by political and cultural elites and these dangers require a society to
mobilize against the threat on behalf of its political values.130
Béland concentrates in Robin’s analysis also to the tradition of international relations classics
Hobbes, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Arendt and reconstructs the history of the idea of
fear in modern political theory. According to Robin Hobbes “theorized fear as a central
aspect of politics that state and civil society institutions can shape and reshape in order to
serve the sovereign’s needs” and “as something persisting in politics and society, within and
beyond the state of nature”. For Hobbes fear is a tool of political order, serving ruler and
ruled alike and essential to the maintenance of political and social order. 131
130 Ginsberg and Lyche 2008, 14–15.
131 Béland 2005, 1–2.
23
In his later work Behemoth Thomas Hobbes argues that all civil order depends on a
motivational balance of fear and hope. He also claims that fears that is based on sub- or
supranational enemy has to be transferred to an abstract conception of individual human
beings as equally dangerous and endangered. The new fear of human beings must be
balanced by a new hope in the efficacy of depersonalized political institutions. When fear is
individualized and internalized, hope must be systematized or institutionalized. “The new
fear alone would produce shallow, vituperative cynicism”132. This can be compared to
Francis Bacon idea of balance between the fear of punishment against the hope of pleasure.
According to Hobbes too much fear is paralyzing, rendering subjects useless to themselves
and others.133
The object of fear will differ depending on an individual’s physical constitution, education,
and experience. For example fear of death may lead to peace, but fear of dishonour or
damnation can overcome it. In his terminology sovereignty by acquisition is an immediate,
unreflective fear of violence causing individuals to subject themselves to the one whose
power they fear. It is a natural but relatively unstable response to external physical threats.
Sovereignty by institution is a fear of all individuals, understood as equally dangerous and
endangered. It can be described as artificial, internal, and relatively constant state of mind.134
Montesquieu doesn’t consider fear as a part of political system but as a political weapon of
despots. The fear of despotic terror is the foundation for the liberal political order and
security. It also justifies the division of power presented in The Spirit of the Laws. For Alexis
de Tocqueville a danger of the tyranny is grounded in a personal anxiety which is caused by
the lack of traditional authority and integrative structures that characterize democratic
modernity. This modern anxiety as a new type of fear could lead to a tyranny of the
majority.135
In Arendt’s work Robin concentrates on totalitarianism. The Origins of Totalitarianism
argues that ideology and mass anxiety favours the emergence of totalitarian terror. Eichmann
in Jerusalem on the other hand expresses that fear is rooted in the idea that mundane
behaviour and personal ambition can feed terror. Judith Shklar turns terror to negative
132 Abosch 2009, 26.
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foundation for liberal institutions, which are legitimate because they protect citizens against
this threat. Robin interprets that depicting terrorism as an external source of political fear
legitimizes institutions which actually constantly generate fear themselves.136
*  *  *
Rick Ginsberg and Bruce S. Cooper connect the term politics of fear with political
campaigning and as a way to appeal to voters and to denigrate political opponents. Even
though they find examples from the past, fear has become commonplace which at some parts
is connected to wider audience via media in United States.137 They also consider fear as the
political climate of educational politics and it covers all its fields from students’ fear of
failing tests or being bullied to teachers and school leaders to be unable to reach their
standards and to loose the whole concept of public education. The authors find fear as a
useful pivot to show changes in political processes, forces, actors and also weaknesses and
vulnerability.138 Politics is understood as a “system for resolving conflicts and differences
within a democratic, legal, standardized system”139 which I see as too narrow approach to
understand such a complex social structure as politics of fear only through institutions and
democracy.
Rick Ginsberg and Leif Frederick Lyche refer to “hostile myths” when they describe the
present educational landscape.140 It could be understood as a shift from direct hostility
between states in to economical competing between nations which also includes the level of
education and knowledge of its people. They also refer to Barry Glassner’s culture of fear
which appoints how misplaced fear “has gripped the American psyche and underlies the
politics of education”141 and how instead of “single defining event [… ] a constant promotion
of culture of fear”142 can be seen in the education policy. The authors view to politics is about
gathering support and diminishing the support of opponents in order to control and conflict
centric143. Glassner’s culture of fear -theory sees the fears in American society as false and
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overblown and the media, monetary and political power as responsible for this as they try to
affect to agenda setting and shaping public opinion. This comes close to propaganda144.
*  *  *
Christy Newman and Asha Persson recognize the connection between fear and cultural
memory. They refer to Australian three weeks lasting The Grim Reaper campaign
advertisement against HIV/AIDS in television which audience responded whit fear145 and
after two years over 70 percent of the viewers could still remember it. It seems that the
campaign is remembered much more widely than its original scope, which is possible
because of a continuous and active process of public reflection.146 This could be seen as an
example of shared collective experience or trauma. The authors refer to Paul Kidd who
describes the ad campaign as fear tactics.  In this context fear is seen as a strategic instrument
to solve problems but it also seems to have negative side effects like culture of blame and
demonizing147 particular groups and as one presented example shows, unfounded fear which
could lead even to mental breakdown and suicide148.
For Beatrice Mtetwa the “cycle of fear” is something much more concrete than fear’s role in
communication. For her fear means a constant threat for people who are part of media,
juridical organizations or anyone who opposes those in rule in Zimbabwe. She describes how
the violence against journalists have had “a chilling effect”and how independent newspapers
are consciously or unconsciously doing self-censorship because of the “fear of prosecution”.
Police, judges and Magistrales are also “afraid for their own safety” which leads to the
situation where “nobody is safe”. This vicious cycle of fear as she calls it means that the
basic freedoms, which are seen as something that has nothing to do with politics, are
unreachable to Zimbabweans in the present situation.149
Jane A. Margold notices that state terror has got wider recognition in international relations
and can be known as bureaucracies of death, killing fields, dirty wars, ethnocide,
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disappearances and everyday violence.150 Michael Taussig calls these phenomenons as
notions of a culture of terror or culture of fear as it is written in more recent texts. It can be
defined as “a relentless assault upon a civilian population in which menace, torture, forced
labor and imprisonment become endemic forms of socio-political control”151.
Fear is totalizing conditions that affect all the activities of daily life. For the victims the
world is chaotic and irrational. Hypothetical presumption is that terrorized are not only
victims but that they also are implicated in sustaining violence as a way of life.152 Because
fear is assumed to be equated with culture it seems impossible to form a clear idea how
resistance can emerge or does the intensity of repressing atmosphere vary.153
Rosemary Barbera links fear with the collective memory. Her research concerning Chilean
society after dictatorship shows that the memory of fear creates sense of vulnerability and
distrust in people which also limits political activity. Fear limits self expression and the
ability to give things meaning. Barbera also refers to Cathy Schneider’s discovery that
according to Chilean psychologists living under constant threat has lead to a state of
numbness which causes isolation and heightened anxiety.154 The idea of numbness reveals an
interesting counter embodiment of fear compared to the concept of spectacle. It also draws
together some of the most important arguments from Mtetwa, Margold and also from
Newman and Persson in one concrete example.
*  *  *
Analysing uncertainty in the case of conflict solution shows that when the intentions of other
side are unclear it is more likely that fear will start to control the future sight. Erik Melander
claims that fear rises from what is known but also from uncertainty. He comes to a
conclusion that open and transparent societies are less uncertain and also less fearful.
Melander’s approach also highlights the importance of institutions by expressing that in
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democratic societies they lead to peaceful articulation and regulation.155 This relates to the
central ideas of institutionalism’s theoretical aspect.
For Peter Gale the politics of fear focuses on racism which in Australia has become part of
the media debate and political discourse during the last decade. According to Gale the fear is
not just vital for building and keeping up identities and otherness but also for the institutional
structures and practices. These present the Australian culture and identity which is based on
disadvantage of indigenous people and ethnic minorities and privileges of white Australians.
Because racism is vital part of the constructed system, getting rid of it causes fear and threats
concerning the social order.156 It seems that fear has a double role but in single context. On
the one hand it is fear between groups and on the other it is fear of disorder. In both cases
fear is something productive and maintaining.
Barbara Hudson claims that the sense of shared risk and shared responsibility has
disappeared. Constant scanning of social environment is needed to be able to recognize
whether or not they pose a threat by adopting stereotypes of safe and risky people.157 This
comes close to the other examples considering fear of crimes and racism.
Arun Kundnani argues that to be able to maintain its security United States feels that it has to
have full spectrum dominance across the globe. Neo-conservative approach appeal to concept
of asymmetric warfare which claims that military might is vulnerability because it highlights
its position and makes it the primary target. This conclusion is based on the end of Cold War
and unanticipated technological developments combined to fear which leads to a situation
where unknown future and unknown present forms a threat. The new enemy is unknown,
uncertain, unseen, and unexpected. 158 Kundnani also talks about the new ways in which the
home front is taking part to the warfare. The American population has become the imagined
frontline of the hidden war. The war on terror doesn’t happen on international or national
level. It has become personal.159
*  *  *
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Peter Shirlow and Rachel Pain claim that fear has been constructed. It is formed around
certain groups to certain political interests. Examples like stranger danger for children,
disorderly and dangerous young people, racial minorities, travellers and homeless people are
part of this discourse160 Demonised groups are actually more likely to be victims than
perpetrators of crime, but most policymakers have ignored such findings.161
They also seem to criticize the ways in which rational debate considering terrorism is
obscured via media. Organised violence is presented in political platform and there seems to
be no explanation for terrorist acts. Shirlow and Pain claim that the individuals who executed
the suicide attacks feel invulnerable because they embrace their very own destruction. Death
becomes a symbolic intent and a weapon to control those who fear them most.162 The authors
also recognize a link between group-based violence and western domination in post-colonial
world. Bali bombings demonstrated mobilized despair as a political weapon to stimulate
western fears and to oppose hope as a political programme. In this process fears and despairs
of non-westerners are transformed into violent acts.163
Governments use discourses of fear of crime to control and containment through punitive
crime control policies. Even though fear is not known or wholly measurable and that’s why it
differs from risk Shirlow and Pain criticise that it should not be simply dismissed as an
irrational response to a threat. It is also usually presented by geographers to be only limited
to particular spaces and places.  The authors see this as a false claim and they see the fear of
crime as diverse, dynamic and open to interpretation.164
They also give critique to Chris Hale’s categorisation of fear as a product of victimisation,
individual ability to exercise control and prevent victimisation, and as a product of
environment. These approaches are individualistic and deterministic and don’t recognize the
social structures and power relations between offenders, victims and those who fear crime.165
Shirlow and Pain write that fear works in a different levels. In territorial politics fear divides
160 Shirlow and Pain 2003, 17.
161 ibid., 20.
162 ibid., 17–18.
163 ibid., 18.
164 ibid., 18–19.
165 ibid., 20.
29
communities from nation and in social politics it separates gender, age, ethnicity, race,
sexuality, ability and class.166
Fear of crime is used in the exercise of power and not to question its hegemony, but it also
has an affect to the politics of resistance. Individuals and communities create different
strategies in response to fear. Because the geographies of fear are clearly bound together with
the politics of marginalisation and dispossession these strategies might be damaging to some
members of communities.167
Shirlow’s and Pain’s approach to political aspect of crime of fear is appealing because they
recognise the complex and situated power relations and their reflections in the social reality.
On the other hand they express their concern how “powerful groups use this association
between fear and place in order to dominate via the threat of violence, harassment,
surveillance and other means of exerting power over the spaces of others”168 but they also
emphasise how this is constructed through the patterns of fear and how it can be seen in the
historical, political, social and economical circumstances which different places reflect.169
This expresses that politics of fear is exercised through political actors but also via societal
and cultural structures and practises.
Comprehensive part of Hille Koskela’s work on fear concerns urban city space and
criminology. She claims that the urban security politics is related to politicization of fear170
but also notices that the link to fear is not simple and direct171. The fields of this policy are
authorities, security design and technologies, security companies, marketing and media, and
everyday practices172. Koskela refers to Mike Davis’s argument that fear doesn’t grow from
violence as much as it grows from the acts done in the name of security173. She also refers to
Nan Ellin who claims that city planning and housing construction are related to post modern
fear where the fast changes of modern time strengthens the uncertainty and insecurity which
could be seen in the architecture of that time but which now have been noticed and shifted to
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less frightening architecture174.  According to Koskela the main source where the fear origin
is hate175 and the culture of prejudices can be overcome only by the culture of tolerance176.
To a question if the fear is real or false in relation to it’s source and justification Koskela
gives a crucial aspect by arguing that  the most essential thing in fear is that it is real for the
one who experiences it177. Fear is a hermeneutic variable.
Douglas Kellner gives a strong critic to media, how it failed to produce coherent picture of
9/11 attacks. Instead of speaking of politics of fear he uses terms connected to identity
politics and discourse analysis and how they are constructed by each other. Kellner defines
the nature of discourse which George W. Bush used while speaking of the war against
terrorism as Manichean which is usually understood as a struggle between a good spiritual
world of light and an evil material world of darkness. It means a strong dichotomy which
limits and narrows the way in which situation can be presented and understood. The evil
Other is not only constructing the enemy but also creating a hero image and the identity of us
which legitimates and defines the means for resistance against the enemy. Kellner refers to
Michael Moore’s films argument how symbolic Other is vital for American way of exploiting
fear and dramatization of threats from within everyday life. In the case of 9/11 discourse via
media led to war hysteria and to a military solution to solve the problem of global
terrorism.178
Fear can also be found in cultural practices like religion. Jason Bivins has observed the
intersection of socio-political conservatism and Evangelical Protestantism and has noticed
that since the 1960s Conservative Evangelicals have moved from the margins to a central
place. Religious fear talk promotes an image of an American culture in decline due to
demonological influence and moral permissiveness. Religious horror has come to
characterize the political discourse of the New Christian Right and mixes religion, politics,
and media.179
Richard Jackson highlights the use of a rhetorical trope of good and evil in the construction
of identity and discourse. The strength of this kind of rhetoric is based on American
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traditions and religious life. In the case of terrorism the opponent becomes a part of
civilization-barbarism meta-narrative and is presented as satanic in immoral being.180  De-
contextualizing, de-historicizing and de-humanizing the actions of the opponent181 can be
seen as part of construction of discourse of fear.
David Altheide has also similar kind of findings concerning discourse of fear, cultural
believes and identity but he draws a picture of politics of fear more clearly. In his analysis
fear doesn’t concentrate so strongly only to certain events and actors but he also aims to
describe the nature of fear. According to Altheide “fear is cumulatively integrated into topics
over time, and indeed, becomes so strongly associated with certain topics that, upon
repetition, is joined with that term— as with an invisible hyphen— and eventually the term
fear is no longer stated, but is simply implied”182. The politics of fear is claimed to be an
instrument for decision-makers to use audience’s fears to achieve their goals.183 He also
approves a definition of terrorism by George Lopez and Michael Stohl as a “purposeful act or
threat of violence to create fear and or compliant behaviour in a victim and or audience of the
act or threat”184.
Social constructionists argue how mass media accounts of crime, violence and victimization
are simplistic and often de-contextualize complex events to reflect narratives that demonize
and involve state intervention185. Altheide connects the victimization to the process of
politics of fear by claiming that “Victims are a by-product of fear and the discourse of
fear”186. Being a victim has become a status or a position to people who live in a symbolic
environment marked by the discourse of fear187. Victims also need a protector from crime
and terrorism which ads police and military forces to the construction of fear as a symbolical
protectors188. Altheide’s quantitative study considering news reports revealed that after 9/11
terrorism and crime are linked very closely with the expanding use of fear and large increase
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in linking terrorism to victims189. Still Altheide clearly highlights the fact that the politics of
fear did not begin after 9/11 but it already had a long history associating fear with crime190.
For Altheide the politics of fear has an ability to transform terrorism to a world condition. He
also refers to Henry A.Giroux suggestion that “the rhetoric of terrorism is important because
it operates on many registers to both address and inflict human misery”.191 His arguments are
best drawn in his statements “The politics of fear resides not in an immediate threat from an
individual leader but in the public discourse that characterizes social life as dangerous,
fearful, and filled with actual or potential victims” and “This symbolic order invites
protection, policing, and intervention to prevent further victimization”.192
Altheide’s article also has a normative approach. The politics of fear doesn’t only promote
attacking a target and victimatize but it also curtails civil liberties and stifles dissents. The
Homeland Security Office’s advice to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting for chemical
protection193 also expresses how politics of fear has become part of everyday life activities.
This kind of reactions can’t only be explained by irrational behavioural but more likely as a
placebo effect. When people try to protect themselves against some threat like disease they
are given a false medicine which makes them feel more healthy and secured even though it
has no actual effect, only in one’s imagination. But in the same time as it produces a feeling
of being secured the “medicine” also presents an existence of threat and a need for
protection.
*  *  *
As simply as it may sound when one tries to define fear the attempt meets some great
difficulties. This is probably because it can be found from common talk to scientific debates.
This makes its variations wider than usual and a difference between the contexts where it is
presented. Even though it is a great challenge John R. Gold and George Revill have done a
good work by trying to find an answer while they are exploring landscapes of fear.
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Fear can be seen as irrational dreads, reverences and superstitions of the pre-modern world
based on mythologies, beliefs and rituals that explain surrounding phenomena. In a modern
world context according to sociologists, fear dominates and operates at every scale from the
level of the individual to that of the global economic system. This could be seen as a product
of the increasing rationalisation and secularisation of modern westernised societies.194
Gold and Revill have also listed academic writings and approaches which refers to fear but
have some different emphasis. Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash write about anxiety which
can be seen as a commodification of personal insecurity in a world of individualism. Neo-
Heideggerian approach awe is connected to religious and aesthetic sensibilities. Phobia on
the other hand is the secularised and medicalised version of the religious concepts of guilt
and shame in which for example Michel Foucault refers. Insecurity and uncertainty is linked
to debates about Ulrich Beck’s risk theory. In this case a source for fear is a perceived or
actual lack of control concerning events and resources and coping with this social mistrust.
Threat for Edward Bryant and D. M. Chapman is a behavioural response to perceived
hazards or other environmental stimuli and fear is concerning the rationality and irrationality
of decision-making. According to Michael Ignatieff hate is generally treated as an atavistic
throwback to pre-civilised societies and fear becomes linked to debate over the nature of
social progress. In the theories of post-colonialism loathing and fear connects with
anthropologies of purity and impurity and the concept of otherness. For Susan Sontag and
Wolfgang Schivelbusch trauma explores the cyclical, crisis ridden economic relations and
technologically driven stimulus overload experienced by people in capitalist modernity.195
Besides connecting fear to phobia as medical terminology Foucault also connected fear,
danger and security to liberalism and liberal state. In his lecture concerning biopolitics
Foucault explained the problem of security where the interests of individual, collective and
enterprises are in continuing conflict because they have to protect their liberties in relation to
others. Individual’s life where it appears as illness or old age must not endanger either the
individuals or the society. The economy of power is interplay of freedom and security. In
liberalism one is constantly exposed to danger or experience of danger. Stimulation of the
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fear of danger is the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism where there
doesn’t exist liberalism without a culture of danger.196
Deborah Lupton and John Tulloch in their approach deny dichotomy of real threats and
imagined fears which is similar to Koskela’s notion. They also don’t accept that fear is
immaterial social construction as such but they refer to Richard Sparks’ discoursive
approach. He opposes the idea that fear has been caused by a specific event nor to examine
fearfulness solely in terms of the objects to which it is attached. Peoples’ fears have serious
effects because they constitute the worldview and decisions making. Gold and Revill support
the way how Lupton and Tulloch question the rhetoric of legitimation linked the concept of
fear, which is alternately framed as rational and irrational.197 Fear is not only a product or
stimulus but also an arena of conflict.198
Gold and Revill connect fear and spectacle when they are defining relations between
landscape and fear. Spectacle forms a medium by which cultural representations of threat are
reinforced and remade in the social memory. Spectacle is created by “consciously
manipulating space, landscape or objects to produce displays that draw a powerful emotional
response from spectators, whose participation is part of the experience of spectacle”.199
The authors argue that the politics of fear has a double role. It works between nature and
culture and also emotion and rationality. They feel there is a need for research rhetoric, social
practices, particular uses of the concept of fear and also social and institutional interests.
These are connected to both aesthetic and material practices of landscape where fear works
and affects through specific historical and geographical circumstances.200
*  *  *
A National Field Experiment which used the appraisal- tendency theory from Jennifer Lerner
and Dacher Keltner has found out that anger triggered in one situation evokes more
optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices in unrelated situations and that fear does
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the opposite, evoking pessimistic estimates and risk-averse choices.201 The field experiment
had similar results when it scaled both the terror and non-terror related risks. According to
the authors examining, specific emotions can be seen even more relevant than estimating
global moods.202 The research and the theory it uses draws a picture of fear as a phenomena
which paralyzes and leads to passivity which in this case is seen as pessimism. It also rises up
the importance of individual level and also how the moods can reflect to wider public
opinion. This shows that as an experiment it doesn’t have just psychological but also political
value.
Darrell M. West and Marion Orr have made a research study considering peoples fear of
urban terrorism. They claim that emotion are usually ignored or thought to be dangerous to
democratic polities. Voters decisions based on fear or anger are seen as unreasonable or
unfair reactions based on affective instead of cognitive reasoning.203 Their experiment shows
that there might be a connection between local officials’ actions and elevation of reasoned
discourse. If the officials can stimulate conversation and deliberation considering volatile
subjects it will diminish negative emotions and help reasonably thinking. Opposite to this is
television which is described to be “a major stimulant to raising feelings such as anger and
anxiety in public life”.204 Emotions are identified as unreasonable or irrational thinking and
behaving.
Yair Neuman and Mor Levi define fear appeal as “a tactic of persuasion [… ] an attempt to
influence the attitudes or the behavior of a person by presenting him with the threatening
consequences of a refusal to accept a suggested attitude or behaviour”.205 They also claim
that fear appeal is a common rhetorical strategy in political, religious, and military context.206
They bring out three different kinds of traditions in fear research from I. L Janis, Howard
Leventhal and R.W. Rogers.
I. L.  Janis’s Drive Model suggests that fear is a negative drive, which a subject
is motivated to reduce. The level of drive is proportional to the level of fear,
and change of attitudes is positively associated with the level of fear. However,
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the model suggests that the function associating fear and change in attitudes is
not a positive linear function. That is, a low manipulation of fear is not
effectual enough to evoke the drive to reduce it. On the other hand, a very
powerful manipulation of fear might result in a defensive avoidance, known as
the “boomerang effect.” In this case, the subject might ignore the message.207
In Janis’s model the biggest unsolved problem is how the strong manipulation of fear can be
measured. Howard Leventhal conceptualizes fear appeal in his Parallel Response Theory.
[… ] when a subject encounters a threatening stimulus, he is cognitively
evaluating the threatening event. This evaluation results in emotional arousal
and behavioral response. The emotional response is produced by fear control,
a process in which the subject becomes aware of his emotional response to the
threatening event. This process causes the subject to take control over the
fearful event [… ] The behavioural response involves danger control, a
decision-making process in which the subject gathers information from the
environment and chooses the best response to take control over the threat.208
For Leventhal controlling threat is control over danger and feelings. Changes in behaviour
are linear to the rate of fear so the more the subject is afraid the more the subject is willing to
change behaviour or attitudes.209 R. W. Rogers has similar approach but it concentrates more
to cognitive processes that mediate persuasion through fear appeal in Protection Motivation
Theory.
It assumes that fear can be manipulated if the given information includes three
components.(a) the seriousness of the expected consequences, (b) the
probability that the undesired consequences will take place, and (c) the
usefulness of the action the message recommends in order to avoid the threat.
These components create three corresponding cognitive processes: (a) the
appraisal severity, (b) expectancy of exposure, and (c) belief in the efficacy of
coping responses.210
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Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate consentrate mostly on the modes of communication
between institutions and individuals. “Instead of appealing to collective desires for the good
life, the language of politics increasingly taps into individualized insecurities and fears”211.
By these institutional practices security duties that are traditionally connected to state are
suddenly shifting to responsibilities of citizens which process the authors call
responsibilization212. Murray Lee uses Foucaultian methods governmentality and genealogy
in his analysis which has similar results compared to the concept of responsibilization. For
Lee fear is used as a tactic of governance because an individual has to govern one’s risk of
becoming a victim. Via self-governance individual becomes shaped by pictures and
narratives which eventually leads to fearing subject.213
Anxiety toward terrorism is constructed via cultural and linguistic interactions and it
becomes real through physiological and psychological processes. According to Andrew
Tudor fear is a macro and a micro response. Macro response consists of everyday habitat,
cultural practices and social structures and the micro level considers bodies, personalities and
social subjects. If the nature of fear is wanted to be analysed properly it is vital to understand
the cultural networks through which fears is constructed and actualized and how it works in
relations to self-resources, individual experiences and the formation of coping strategies.214
3.2 DETERRENCE POLICY
When the concept of politics of fear is tried to be clarified it comes to a question what is
deterrence policy and does it in some ways differ from it. If fear works as a deterrent, should
they be separated or spoken as one phenomenon? Do these two concepts share the same field
of study, participate the same debates and same methodological and theoretical approaches?
These questions will be estimated based on the latest discussion among the published
literature of deterrence policy.
Classical deterrence theory can be divided into structural and decision-theoretic theory. The
literature focuses on different units of analysis but the assumptions, conclusions and the
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policy prescriptions are essentially the same. In structural deterrence theory the international
system constitutes the principal unit of analysis. This self-help system is anarchic and the
nature of its units is rational and egotistical. According to Hans Morgenthau units are driven
to maximize power. For Kenneth Waltz their goal is to reach maximized security.215
Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider and Marc L. Hutchison concentrate on arms races and
strategic rivalry. They refer to Morgenthau’s traditional international relations theory which
sees the deterrence as a show of strength which causes tense but peaceful relations between
the political parties.216 A successful deterrence leads to a peaceful state in world politics. The
authors use the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States as an
example of possible reason for Cold War peace but also acknowledge that even small
changes are a risk and might have lead to a failed deterrence217. Simon J. Davies refers also
to similar findings which claim that fear of nuclear escalation prevented the outbreak of war
between India and Pakistan during the 1990 Kashmir crisis218. The image given of deterrence
here is a type of balance of power, which aims into positive results in preventing conflicts. It
is a shared logic between political actors which are primary states.
Also Ursula Japser and Clara Portela share some of these same elements in relation to
descriptions of deterrence policy.  They strongly connect the deterrence policy into nuclear
deterrence where the subjects and targets for the deterrence are nation-states and their
regional defence.219 Frank C. Zagare notes that early decision-theoretic deterrence theorists’
conclusion of structural deterrence theory was that war in the nuclear age is irrational220.
These claims are based on traditional approaches and a geopolitically oriented worldview.
Compared to politics of fear the political concept of political actors and environment are very
different in deterrence policy. Politics of fear can have similar functions as forming borders
between different actors and to limit their freedom to act but it doesn’t theoretically or
methodologically limit itself to questions concerning geographical borders or threats formed
by certain weapon technologies. This kind of debate doesn’t concentrate on such phenomena
as terrorism, international criminality or state terror and it follows the traditional model of
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international system where the non-governmental organisations, civil society and individuals
are not recognized.
Patrick M. Morgan examines a special case where the deterrence is not created by single state
but produced by collective-actor. He claims that this type of deterrence credibility is more
suspect than that of national governments and that the credibility is based on the
institutionalized nature of the actors. Its effectiveness also consists of general security
management and threats to fight instead of retaliate.221 Morgan’s approach recognizes more
complicated system of international relations than just self-help, but it is fundamentally based
on institutionalism. Even politics of fear can be linked to institutions; they do not form a
fundamental base on the research.
Jeffrey D. Berejikian criticizes the assumption of the rational nature of states based on
empirical research of decision-making222. He also claims that the academic literature on
deterrence is large, but the number of core arguments remains small223. Findings of cognitive
psychology oppose international relations theory and call for new models of international
politics grounded in the capacities of actual decision-makers224. Based on his theory
Berejikian classifies deterrence into three types: mutual deterrence, unilateral deterrence and
extended deterrence225. In mutual deterrence states confront a choice between selecting the
known benefits of the status quo or pursuing a gamble intended to further improve their
position through defection226. In unilateral deterrence one state is satisfied with the status quo
and another is not227 where in the extended deterrence involves a state to defend an ally
against aggression228. Threat credibility lies in rival perceptions about the hidden costs of
action where the lower hidden costs cause greater actual strength of a state and willingness to
implement threats. To maintain credibility is to manipulate rival perceptions about hidden
costs. 229 These notifications present the system of deterrence as a type of game theory, which
the states participate and where the analysis concentrates on the examination of rules. This
kind of work aims to build a model which would explain the relation between deterrence and
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decision making but it seems to understand these as non-historical activity. This approach
could be criticised, as stabile mathematical and behavioural model, to be also apolitical.
The research of deterrence policy searches an answer to question in what kind of
circumstances does conflicts escalate230 where the nature of deterrence is as military
deterrence231. The way how deterrence policy and politics of fear select and approach their
research is quite different. The conclusion is that these concepts can and should be kept
separately from each other based on their different tradition in pre-assumptions of theory,
methodology and the setting of research problem. Understanding of spatiality, temporality
and agency in mainstream is fundamentally different and the interest of research doesn’t
express strongly a need for a combining these two concepts.
3.3 SECURITIZATION
When one talks about the politics of fear it is easily related to securitization theory. Is this
just a way to speak about the same phenomenon with two different concepts, which would
look in one’s eyes as intellectually dishonest? Securitization theories have also variations
within their tradition but they are mostly based on the hypotheses of Copenhagen School, so
the comparison between securitization and the politics of fear is made mostly based on the
traditional mainstream approaches.
Andrew W. Neal bases his analysis of securitization on theory of Ole Wæver232. It argues
that security is a process where issues are securitized by security elites and state agents
through speech acts233. These securitizing actors may be states, international organizations,
non-governmental organisation or other similar actors234. Jocelyn Vaughn adds that the
framework of securitization is to answer why some of the issues are treated in the security
agenda and some are not which also dependents of the target audience235. Because
securitization can’t be simply imposed argumentation is needed236 to convince the audience
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of the issue as security problem and threat to cause social and political mobilization237.
Usually these issues are claimed to be urgent and exceptional238. Paul Roe points out also an
important part of the process witch are the legitimacy to deal with the threat239.
Neal argues that these features highlight the discursive, strategic and socio-political nature of
security and doesn’t see it as a metaphysical phenomenon which means that any events or
issues can be treated us such240. Nicole J. Jackson refers to similarly of the nature of security
as constructivist/realist approach where security is defined as non-objective condition of
specific social process241.  A threat is presented as existential by its nature but the theory
itself doesn’t concentrate on what is security but how something is presented and
successfully recognized as a threat242.
According to Neal state is usually the political actor that securitizes.  Such authors as Barry
Buzan and Jaap de Wilde including Wæver claim that securitization is not limited to the
states. Olav Knudsen argues that the Copenhagen School has actually tried to shift the
security apart from the states and the study of war and that Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde
consider the military core as something to be avoided243. Joselyn Vaughn criticises them by
breaking this rule by referring to political action which they in their own applications
privilege to a state-dominated reading of security. Even if security is not directly related to
state it is still tightly connected to governmental institutions or intergovernmental
organizations.244 Even the non-governmental organizations are build on and act according to
international law and politics produced by states. Claire Wilkinson describe this as
Westphalian straightjacket which sets the frames of the nation-state for theoretical and
empirical securitization research even when one talks about societal security and identity
threats245. Jackson claims that state-centrism exists probably because the act of securitizing is
generally understood to be the responsibility of the state246.
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Vaughn blames the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework from not paying enough
attention or providing proper analytical tools for researching the audience247. This leaves the
analysis torso. Jackson supports this criticism from another perspective where he doesn’t
concentrate directly on recognizing the right audience but the problem of having a narrow
understanding of political communication beyond the speech-act248. Furthermore Neal finds
the way how securitization treats discourse problematic in relation to constructivism.
Formalising the discursive process in certain frames makes security a special category which
at the same time distinguishes it from politics. 249
If we now take a look of these findings, we can see several reasons to keep the concepts of
the securitization theory and the politics of fear as separated categories. Discursive nature,
the audience and a formation of objects as a socio-political process are examples of
approaches which these two concepts can hypothetically share. On the other hand the critique
given to the securitization should be avoided in the conceptualization of the politics of fear
which at the present political debate has remained still quite unclear and loose. Still at this
state of research following arguments can be formed. Security as a concept already is related
to state and security organizations such as police, army and private security actors. Security
expresses rather a condition of the object instead of experience or emotion. It is rather
quantitative than qualitative term even thought securitization theory as such do not lay on
existentialism of security. As an emotion, fear doesn’t necessary has to be related to the fact
of being safe or secured. Fear can exist in spaces where security can not, which also closes
the possibility for securitization out. Politics of fear doesn’t have to emerge in relation to
legitimacy because it can exist as a form of oppression without any legality or ethical norms.
In some cases the politics of fear could be understood as a precondition for securitising.
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4. HISTORIES OF VIOLENCE
History of the body is inseparable from the history of violence. Violence has been described
to have many varying forms. It has been examined for example as direct, structural,
cultural250 or sexual violence. In the context of some events violence appear as exaggerating,
brutal and unreasonable where also the following responses have appeared as obscure and
uncanny. These events and acts of violence seems something which can not be understood or
explained but which as such are something central the formation of the objects of fear.
The forms of uncanny violence under different methodological and theoretical headlines are
set in this research and following case studies under the concept of the symbolic violence. It
is understood here as something which doesn’t only understand the act of violence and it’s
representation as direct violence and its documentation. The symbolic violence is a form of
violence which works and affects in the symbolic level, a violence which do not only affect
to our body but to our knowledge of the body. It should rather be linked to the body politics
where the body is turned into object of knowledge251. Histories of violence trace how the
concept of body is transformed by violence into an object of fear.
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4.1 VULNERABLE US
Picture I Picture II                 Picture III
In 1996 Osama bin Laden stated that a death of one American in Mogadishu led to
withdrawal of United States from the peacekeeping operation, which more importantly,
revealed their impotence and weakness. He referred to the case of U.S. Staff Sgt. William
David Cleveland who was killed during the fights in Mogadishu and the immediate decision
of US president Bill Clinton to abandon the mission of the pursuit of General Mohamed Ali
Farrah Aidid and to withdraw from Somalia by March 31, 1994.252 This claim would seem
unreasonable if one would compare it for example to the casualties of US troops in The
Vietnam War which makes one to ask, what made this case different.   What caused the
transformation of a single body of a soldier into an object of vulnerability and death, and its
appearance as unbearable in presented political context?
The answer lies somewhere in the three Pulitzer Prized photographs taken from the event by
Canadian photographer Paul Watson253. It is a question of the representation of the event
with the extension of global audience, a process where a set of photographs affected
collective knowledge, emerging as a rupture in what is understood as continuity in history.
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The content of these pictures are something which Judith Butler could point out as something
which “brings us close to an understanding of the fragility and mortality of human life, the
stakes of death in the scene of politics”254.
Based on the assumed political effect and exceptionality related to violence and collective
consciousness, the case of Mogadishu is set under analysis in relation to its representation.
The documents used are Paul Watson’s three photographs255. In the analysis to avoid
confusion it is important to note that the word body is used to express both a living and a
dead body. Word corps is only used in the case where it is essential to draw a clear line
between the state of life and death, and the transformation from one to another.
Before the analysis is started, it is also important to acknowledge what is meant by the
Western aspect or perspective. There is a great variation how this group or socially oriented
perspective is formed and what kind of material it holds inside, but some main principles can
be stated at least in methodological sense. The perspective formation is not based on short
term interest and daily politics but it is similar to “socio-cultural code of civilization”256 as
Galtung has named them in his Civilization Theory which divides cultural spheres into six
cosmologies. The cosmology of a civilization is the collectively held subconscious ideas
about what constitutes normal and natural reality, where the subconscious mean shared
assumptions of reality. Here the Western sphere comes closest to the cosmologies Occident I
and Occident II, where the focus lies mostly in the first one as Greco-Roman and modern
sphere. In the case of Mogadishu according to these cosmologies there doesn’t exist a
conflict between two civilizations because the both Occidents share the same Semitic-
Abrahamitic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam.257 Galtung notes that cosmologies
present broad view and characterize macro-cultures258 which mean that they don’t necessary
explain well all the socio-cultural phenomena.
* * *
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The litany level of the three photographs is challenging to catch because it only includes
visible and obvious messages and it excludes highly analytical capability259. It can also be
found as momentary and quickly chancing from its temporal nature which requires a
different approach than the latter levels which are more stabile. To be able to catch the
essence of the litany it is divided into statement based on a set of visible characterizations,
rising emotions and projected actions.
The statement for the event can be drawn as our soldier has been killed and his body has
been brutally mistreated by the African enemy. The statement expresses the perspective to the
event and defines it in a simple stereotypical form of ‘us’ and ‘the other’260 and a causal
relation between the event and these two parties. It also valued the nature and ethics of the
actions including to the event and refers indirectly to its spatial location. Temporality on the
other hand is rare in the litany because the event is usually seen as discontinuous261 and the
event is taking place in its own separated cluster in time.
The emotions which easily rise are disgust, anxiety and fear which are followed by
confusion, distrust and hate. The first reactions are caused by the unpleasant sight of the body
and the second one is mostly based on the actions done by the ‘other’. Confusion is also
caused by the two conflicting messages from the ‘other’ in the same context, hostility and
celebration. This leads to a situation where the ‘other’ seems unpredictable which leads to
uncontrollability and furthermore distrust in the interactive relations.
The risen emotions are mostly negative because they can be seen causing stress,
aggressiveness and deconstructive atmosphere in relation to the ‘others’. This can lead either
to direct conflict or active isolation. Projected actions in the context of peacekeeping could
mean an authorisation for wider scale of use of military power to be able to answer to the
threat caused by the enemy or retreat from the conflict area to secure the lives of own
military staff. Even in the surface level like the litany lie already signs of interruption in
temporal dimension, a historical discontinuity in discursive constructions. The conclusions
drawn from the event are that we can be killed by the enemy and we are not safe anymore.
This leads to the awareness of violence and vulnerability which manifests in the dead body.
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* * *
The analysis of the social causes level concentrates on questions of status, institutions and
aims. ‘Us’ of the litany level is defined here more carefully and projected to social context,
which then is transformed into social and political status. The identification of the ‘other’
comes also central in this level but no clear status is recognized or expressed. The institutions
contain similar qualities as status put in more formal, public and legislated appearance, but
the main difference is the authorization. The aims describe the ongoing political movement
for a certain cause which is strongly based on the dominating discourse and worldview, but
which has a strong manifestation on the social causes.
The status of the person can be shortly defined as a member of the Western military
personnel (or a soldier) and a peacekeeper. This status embodies dominance, protection and
stability and creates human shield to protect itself and the others and furthermore, to protect
the other from each other. The last one is especially significant in the status of peacekeeper
and separates it from soldier. The photos break the social order in the event and the protector
becomes a victim and the ones who need to be either protected or blocked become violators
of the order. Social causes for ‘us’ is that our present status doesn’t guarantee our safety.
Africa(ns) in the role of the ‘other’ gets the form of uncontrollable power and danger for
themselves and others.
The uncertainty that is expressed toward the status has inevitable effect to institutions.
Institution authorizes and gives the status for the individual who becomes the representative
of the institutional power. The event shatters images of such highly valuated and recognized
institutions as US army and United Nations as monolithic, invulnerable and irresistible
powers. In social level the institutions are usually seen as the main or only capable actors to
solve different situations and problems. The event shows them as disabled in their mission
and even as targets for the violence, the power which they should be able to monopolize,
control and use to reach their collective aims. Institutes are in terms of philosophy of law
father substitutes which are understood as protectors and authorities and share the same
category as parents in family and god(s) in religion. A threat for institution can be seen as
more threatening than direct threat for individual because it presents a danger for both the
individual and to the collective, the socially constructive core of the individual.
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Social reasons and the effort to reach vital aims are not guaranteed and their foundation
seems fragile. To prevent killing has turned into to be killed. The casualties doesn’t necessary
have to mean a failure of the mission in the eyes of social community, but it is a matter of
symbolic exchange and the event can be successfully transformed into energy as Jean
Baudrillard argues262. If the death person and the death itself can be presented as a
meaningful sacrifice for the community’s aims and values, they can be experienced as
“socially symbolic events”263. This process seems most likely failed because publishing
photographs seemed to have an important role in the change of public opinion against
keeping the US forces in Somalia264. Failing in the glorification of the casualty is most likely
based on the presented reaction of the crowd, which celebrates the death and does not appear
as something vulnerable and protectable, and makes the event of death at the same time
meaningless, unreasonable and horrifyingly performed.
*  *  *
When the discourse/worldview level is under analysis it is crucial to question the dominating,
controlling and leading representative practices. In the case of news pictures a deeper
understanding of the essence of photographing is needed. Furthermore the recognition of the
discursive practices in photographs, a worldview which sets the aspect for the analysis of the
event behind the photographs is needed. Both are important in acknowledging the processes
which lead to the representation of visual signs, and on the other hand the processes of how
these signs are read and understood.
The main questions can be drawn to the informative nature of the photograph in relation to
our cognition and to the participation of the photographer how this knowledge and
understanding is formed. Judith Butler disagrees with Susan Sontag’s view that photographs
can affect us but not provide understanding265.  For Sontag the photographs are only small
fragments of reality and may shock us and cause emotional reactions but they are not itself
interpretations or informing and moving us politically266. Butler argues that there lies “a
262 Baudrillard 1993, 165.
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266 ibid., 66–69.
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persistent split between being affected and being able to think and understand”267 in Sontag’s
writings which seems to reflect a wider debate with long philosophical tradition concerning
the different ontological nature of emotions and rationality questioned in the introduction. It
seems quite confusing to claim that ability for empathy or sympathy would be unable to
mobilize politically or acknowledge the event from subjective perspective via simulated
experience.
Butler questions Sontag’s argument that narratives are more effective instrument to affect
people’s mind and behaviour than photographs and she also criticises Sontag’s way to accept
the evidential nature of the photographs268. Her critic is based on the idea of interpretative
nature of photographs269 or as she formulates it “The photograph is not merely a visual image
awaiting interpretation; it is itself actively interpreting, sometimes forcibly so”270. A frame
and framing seems to be the central act which produces and reveals the interpretation
according to Butler’s arguments. All the images are framed and not without a purpose271
because the act of photographing doesn’t happen in a socio-political vacuum. For André
Bazin a photographic image is rooted in reality but one needs to ask what lies beyond the
image272. As in Jacques Lacan’s analysis of gaze and voice, object petit a, in the picture can
not be placed to the subject but rather to the object. Gaze is a place in the picture where the
object is looking at you; the frame of the aspect of gaze is already coded into the content of
the picture.273 Misjudgement can be easily done if the process of representation is artificially
separated from the world of cultural phenomena and sign systems. The argument considering
the political nature of photograph is based on the role of photographer as an actor choosing
the techniques of representation and the discursively orientated practices how this can be
done.
Even the fragmented reality which is produced by photographs as Sontag claims can have a
similar effect as narrative via montage. Russian film director Sergei Eisenstein is widely
considered as the creator of montage theory. Montage’s expressional strength is based on the
low density and strong contrast between the structuring elements which is opposite to clear
267 Butler 2009, 70.
268 ibid., 69–70.
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continuity which is the basic principle in narrative. To be able to maintain the causality and
the logic of what is seen, this “empty space” is filled with the material from the viewers
mind, based on one’s own thoughts, cultural connections and worldview. This ultimately
changes the nature of what is seen. Instead of a monologue the relation between
representation and the viewer becomes interactive. The viewer transforms into participator
and from passive to active constructing element of the representation. Montage technique
creates a strong experience and illusion of reality. Hardly any other technique can manipulate
and preserve the experiential space so effectively.274 As Kari Pirilä and Erkki Kivi concludes
the essence of montage, in the film take one and take two are not a sum of the two but a third
expressional reality275. Notions made considering the montage theory have similarities to
Sontag’s view about photographs. She claims that the sentiment forms around the
photographic image instead the actual event and structures memory more effectively than
understanding or narrative276. This comes close to the notions of manipulative and preserving
nature of image production of montage technique.
As the viewer becomes the one who makes the interpretation and at the same time he/she
becomes part of the process as a participator of the representation, not a separate objective
party, it comes crucial to ask how or who selects and produces the fragments that are used.
As Butler buts it, we cannot only concentrate on the content but also what is left outside and
how this is done in silence without clear recognizable visual sign277. Also montage creates
order and structure into chaos by leaving out elements which are unimportant for the ability
to form a bigger picture278. This argument  clearly shows the importance of selectivity and
that things that are seen as unimportant and less valuable are left outside because they are not
useful (or maybe even harmful) for the image which is under construction process. To be
able to understand the interests, values and power relations which lead to certain kind of
selections, it is crucial to recognizing the elements which for some reason are left outside. A
simple conclusion from the process which leads to montage is not coherent because the
reasons are not formed from one clearly definable phenomenon. Decisions can be made
unconsciously without a clear reason which is based on dominating practices and ways of
thinking and not because of individual or group interests. Something that is left outside as
274 Pirilä and Kivi 2005, 11–12.
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unimportant is more difficult to recognize and acknowledge than what elements are included
to montage.
If what is said about interpretation, framing and montage is put into practice in analysis of
the three photographs, some remarks or more likely questions can be drawn. At this point it is
important to notice that a montage can be inside a take (single photograph) and between the
takes (a set of photographs or a film) which means that the analysis of framing needs to be
done inside them separately and together. The actual questions would be then what is
actually seen and what is presumed to exist outside the frame; how does the order of the
pictures change the dramaturgy of the documented event; what happens before, after and
between the pictures; who is there behind the objective and all together what kind of
causality this constructs.
The framing of the pictures sets the body in the centre of the picture which draws the
attention to it and makes it the dominating element of the documented event. The event is
about the body and the surroundings of the body. The framing also sets the photographer in
the middle of the event and heightens the feeling of being there. The actual physical distance
might have been different but the “zooming in” to the body draws the perspective in the
immediate proximity of the heart of the event. Close framing also leaves the exact place and
participators of the event unclear. Depending of the chosen picture the estimated number of
people varies between 20 and 30 persons and only about one third can be presumably
identified. The framing closes some people outside the picture which doesn’t necessarily
diminish the size of the crowd but together with the close distance creates impression of
being surrounded by the crowd which enlarger the location (and the assumed number) of the
crowd from less than 180° to 360° around the standpoint of the photographer.
In montage the elements can appear at the same time or follow each other. Constantly
chancing harmonic and conflict, dominating and diminishing, power and counter power
relations are constructing the dramaturgy in the event.279 Also the impression of the event
may vary depending on the structure of the representation. The three photographs are the
variable elements which create the montage in relations to which pictures are used and in
which order. The montage elements inside the pictures are analysed later in the semiotic
279 Pirilä and Kivi 2005, 21.
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analysis of metaphors. The first photograph shows a close picture which emphasizes the
nudity. The second photograph gives the clearest overview of the event because the framing
is the most distant from the body. Third one expresses most efficiently the different
emotional conditions of the people. Choosing between these highlights a certain quality and
aspect to the event. Butler also refers to the meaning of changing context and that there are
always selections made in relation to what is shown and how it is shown for example
considering the size of the imprinted pictures280.
What is unknown for the viewer of the photographs is what happens between milliseconds
that it takes from the camera’s objective to close and capture a moment on the film. The three
photographs present estimated one second of the events timeline, which reveals a great cab in
the idea how long the actual event lasts. Also what has happened before the pictures which
would mean the actual act of killing and moment of dying remains unknown.  Furthermore
documents do not show what happened to the body after the photographing. The situation
which led to the death is incomplete and leads opportunities to give varying answers without
real validity to estimate their coherency.
Similar findings that Butler makes considering the embedded reporting281 which also means
involvement from outside the actual reporting can be found in the case of Mogadishu. The
Time magazine decided to cover up the soldier’s exposed genitals when they published the
photograph282. For some reason the sexual elements were considerate more harmful for the
public audience than the presented violence. This reflects a dominating sexually oriented
normative discourse which affected to the principles of what can be shown.
Next step in the analytical focus of discourse and worldview is to capture the discursive
supporting framework on how the pictures are read through Western perspective and what
kind of interpretative models it includes. Sarah Ahmed argues that we can locate the origins
of fear to the past narratives which are connected to the present283. Also Foucauldian view
can be seen supporting her in the context of archaeological method. Foucault claims that
discursive formations can not be interrupted and reconstituted in a single moment284, which
280 Butler 2009, 80.
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means that the past knowledge is affecting to the present thinking. Instead of archaeology
Reinhart Koselleck uses layers from geology as a metaphor for the analysis of time. These
time layers consist of events which are separated from each other based on their
unpredictability. The accumulation of experience leads to a situation where one estimates and
concentrates on events which possibly will appear again. Events can produce innovation but
the worldview consisting of magical, religious or philosophical presumptions and attitudes
can not change immediately, because the language doesn’t transform or disappear.
Describing new phenomena is done by using old words which leads to the existence of long-
term pre-condition, Vorgaben.285
The presumptions of the ‘other’ are build on Vorgaben, old discursive formations which can
be shortly named as negro/necro discourse. This term carries two meanings which are black
and death. Describing Africa as black area doesn’t necessary mean a visual sign referring to
the skin colour but also and most likely the presumed state of the geographical and cultural
area286 based on all the historical knowledge, events, assumption, misunderstandings and
debates. Black in this context expresses primitivism, immorality and instability, a cultural
blackout. Culture defines humanity which makes ‘Africans’ less humans and their lives less
recognizable as grievable and precarious287.
Necro as a word for death expresses uncertainty and untrustworthiness. Continent with
unknown areas, wild life and lethal diseases seems uncontrollable culture of death, a necro
culture. Colonialism, ethic conflicts, civil wars and humanitarian crises constructs the image
of the area as violent and a great danger for the life of others, and even to itself. The meaning
of death has also a metaphysical dimension when it is set into religious context. Historical
idea of unchristian Africa before the Christian missionary, which has later on transformed
partly to Islamic Africa, means fundamental difference not only in physical appearance but
also the difference as spiritual being. In necro culture death dominates life, and life exists
only in the context of dying, precondition of death. Without salvation and eternal life the
culture of death leads to damnation of immortal soul, death of the spiritual being. Hobbes’s
claims, that it is impossible to have a covenant with brute beasts because they can not
285 Koselleck, Narr and Palonen 2000, 28–29.
286 The way of talking about ‘Africa’ as one homogenous being is already a discursive formation which
oversimplifies and defines a continent and its people via stereotypes.
287 Grievable and precarious are terms which Judith Butler uses in her book Frames of War: When Is Life
Griefable? (2009).
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understand our speech and accept any translation of rights288 describes this fundamental
difference existing in negro/necro discourse. The destruction and casualties that the black
death causes, needs to be limited to a certain areas and with certain means.
One very appealing example of affective politics of fear which Ahmed presents is a fear
fantasy of a Western child which is named in the context of race and racism as Cannibal
Negro289. This term describes well the essence of negro/necro discourse because it expresses
in two words primitive behaviour, violence, break of moral norm and taboo, non-human,
threat to life and ethnicity via skin colour. In the fear fantasy a human transforms into a beast
which aims and nature of behaviour is to cause death. In the discursive formation a Negro is
categorized in to the same group with creatures like trolls and wolfs in fairytales, where the
other is human-like creature with qualities of a beast and the other is beast with human
abilities. What makes these creatures extremely dangerous is that their visual appearance
does not carry the meaning of humane behaviour but the immorality of beast. Still they carry
the capability of human action like making strategies (even they are less intelligent than
humans) and using tools which makes them more threatening. Also ‘our’ inability to
recognize and separate a human being from a human beast makes us more vulnerable to their
attack. A Negro is unusually dangerous because it reminds us but is not one of us.
A Negro differs from us because it presents the savage life which is defined as similar to
animal life. According to Arend, the savages where understood to be as human beings but
they are lacking the human character and the human reality, because they are part of nature
which is their only sovereign. In our understanding this kind of half-humans or human
formed beasts are seen as unreal and ghostlike which leads to horrifying and alien experience
beyond imagination.290 What can be concluded here is that the politics of fear is constructed
from clearly indefinable objects, which appear as frightening because their true nature
remains partly hidden.
*  *  *
288 Hobbes 1962, 109.
289 Ahmed 2003, 191.
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Without the textual supporting context the series of pictures seems to carry a small amount of
information. The litany, the social causes and the discourse/worldview levels are more likely
constructed from elements outside the pictures, a group of predominant assumptions. When
the series of pictures are taken to a closer and deeper semiotic structural analysis, different
signs and their relation can be discovered.
To describe the relations inside the picture each of them is divided to three main roles. These
are the subject, the object and the viewer. The subject is active, dominant, participating,
visible and connected to the object which is passive, dominated but can be also involving and
visible. What needs to be immediately clarified is that these roles are not stabile or clearly
separated from each other. For example the third and usually the most complicated role the
viewer can have both remaining roles but it also may just appear as passive audience for the
event. The viewer is the one who reveals the context and gives the physical perspective which
is crucial in understanding the aspect which it produces.  The pictures are divided into four
analytical units: death, nudity, violence and emotional expressions.
The body in the pictures is non-responsive. Pictures don’t show any major damage like open
wounds, mutilation, missing limps or bleeding, so there can not be made a clear diagnosis
concerning the present state of the body and any clear reason for which could have lead to
death. The position of the body tells us more than other messages of its condition. The body
is tied up from its hands and right leg is twisted over the left leg. This uncomfortable and
painful position even without other use of violence should cause immediate response or even
woke up unconscious person. Also all the muscles seem to be languished. The face doesn’t
have any expressions while eyes are closed and moth slightly open. This non-responsiveness
transforms the sign of the body into the sign of the corps. The picture series doesn’t present
the existence of the body but the existence of death. In its most passive form the body has
become the object and sign of death.
Nudity has several meanings which are valuated in their relations to the context in which it is
presented. In this case they consider mostly status, humanity and taboo. These can be seen
much more clearly connected to the case than for example sexuality which is usually easy to
link to nudity. What is meant by the status is actually in this case the lack of signs which
could express the social group, nationality, wealthy and even the ethnic background.
Wresting the clothes and soiling the skin hides the symbols of status and power of the object.
56
Military uniform is a sign-vehicle for certain semantic units. It is a symbol of power. It places
the person carrying it above the civilians or illegal combatants because he or she is the
representative of sovereign power, institution which has power over individual freedom. It
may mean either protector or opponent and vanquisher depending of the situation. Either way
uniform usually gives a dominant role in relation to the persons without it and also creates a
hierarchy inside the ones carrying it by using status expressing symbols. Fabric presents the
monopolization and institutionalization of violence.
Wresting the uniform has also another meaning which has roots deeper in history than the
using of uniform. I call this practice symbolic skinning. In warfare the skinning of the enemy
appears as spectacle of violence but also as an ultimate act of power over the life of the
enemy and even his/her existence as a human. Nudity and dirt expresses uncivilised
behaviour, poverty, sickness and makes the nude person savage and animal-like. The sign is
even stronger because of the contrast to the crowd which is well dressed and almost all the
body parts are covered with clothing. That is how the nudity also separates the person from
the other people in the same context. Clothes are the other skin that is ripped of to diminish
the personhood.
If the viewer of the representation of the event is Western or Christian, nudity has a mythical
dimension originated to the Holy Bible. In the Creation man and woman where described to
be naked. Nudity meant belonging to the nature and to its moral sphere. Breaking against the
God’s command and becoming aware of their human existence nudity became a taboo.
Dressing up meant a creation of camouflage to hide ones presence, armour to protect one self
from the vulnerability of the body and to create a physical sign to identify human and
socially separate him/her from the animals. Nudity can be simplified to be sign of sin. Sin on
the other hand symbolises weakness, vulnerability, death, shame and separation. By showing
a naked body these culturally constructed cognitive models can be reawakened which
connects the event into wider historical and social context. The content of this specific
cultural cognition is completely negative which has a major impact to how the event is seen.
Especially the first picture is extremely difficult because it shows the genitals of the man
which highlights the totality of the nudity.
The relationship between the object (the body of the soldier) and the subject (the crowd) is
dominated by violence. What is seen in the pictures can be partly explained by looking to
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Michel Foucault’s work Discipline and Punish and its parts considering torture. Description
of the execution and preceding torture of Damien in 1757291 shows a practice of “thousand
death” where the life is maintained and subdivided292 to several acts of killing. This kind of
practice of punishment-as-spectacle caused confused fear293. Foucault defines it as an
exercise of terror and a policy of terror which makes one aware of the presence of the
sovereign power through the body294. The body has medically speaking already transformed
to a corps but the violence directed to it actually presents it still as a person who is punished
and humiliated. Foucault present similar example of “paradoxical ceremony” where it took
place after death as “magnificent theatre, the ritual praise of its force, on a corpse”295. Corps
has no sense of pain or emotional response but the behaviour of the crowd makes the clear
division between body and the corps wavering. This leads to a situation where the nature of
violence is symbolic and it produces the sign of vulnerability, pain and death to prove and
present the absolute power of the subject over the existence of the object as living or dead
being. As Baurdrillard argues “Violence in itself may be perfectly banal and inoffensive.
Only symbolic violence is generative and singularity.”296 The body/corps becomes a scene of
power usage.
The body is treated with both physical and mental violence. Because the transformation of
the person into corps leads to the situation where he is unable to response or reacts to mental
desecrating violence, it can be recognized to affect in the same symbolic level as physical
violence analyzed before. All the three photographs show dragging and the latter two of them
also hitting with stick or trampling with sandal. The one in the middle in the series also
shows a woman pointing the body with her middle finger which can be recognized as sexual
insult. In this non-sexual context it has rather a desecrating meaning, which is also
internationally easy to recognise because of its familiarity.
Findings of the symbolic violence lead to a question if the event has a ritual dimension. In
this case the violence directed to the body can not be seen purely as spontaneous burst but as
carefully and normatively regulated sacrifice. René Girard’s main argument considering
sacral and violence is that the social group needs to control violent behaviour which is
291 Foucault 1991a, 3–6.
292 ibid., 33–34.
293 ibid., 9.
294 ibid., 49.
295 ibid., 51.
296 Baudrillard 2003, 29.
58
natural for human species by targeting it to a suitable object, a sacrifice. This is necessary to
maintain the cohesion of the group. Choosing of the sacrifice is regulated by some main
rules. The victim has to be dispensable for the community so it wouldn’t cause any severe
harm to it297. On the other hand the sacrifice has to be at some level able to be identified to
the members of the community so that the replacement of the victims of violence doesn’t
seem unattached but the disconnection between the two can be linked and the feeling of
rational continuity between the secured object and sacrificed object exists298.
In the cases where the sacrifice is not a human, the features of the sacrificed object are
similar to humans. For example in the nomad communities animals are sacrificed because
they are closely linked to human life and the nature of relation between the herd and the
nomad community can be described as symbiotic299. The way the body is dragged on the
ground and how it is “skinned” brings it closer to the features of animal butchered or hunted
down, a similar notion which Foucault made considering mutilation of the body and
removing organs “as one does with an animal”300. The body of the man is transformed into
the body of sacrificed animal.
What is a curios and important detail is that the corps is never directly touched by the crowd
which is in the role of the subject. The corps is dragged by using ropes, hit with rods and
stomped with sandal301. There can not be seen any direct physical contact to the body. Two
arguments can be made considering this detail. First, if the nature of the event is seen as a
ritual it can be estimated through the concept of impurity. Contact with impure thing makes
one impure and this becomes a fortiori in the cases where the impurity is caused by acts of
violence302. The soldier as a subject carries the meaning of violence. As an object of violence
the body also symbolises the presence of violence. That’s why the direct contact must be
avoided, because touching the body of the sacrifice would lead to a physical spread of the
sign of violence in to the community which tries to close it outside. The person who touches
the body would become a sign-vehicle for violence and would then carry the meaning of
unwanted and negative behaviour. This is especially easy in the situations where the
297 Girard 2004, 18.
298 ibid., 61.
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sacrificial body is bleeding and the blood can leave a physical mark to skin or clothes
because the visual sign of blood carries already the meaning of violence. The instruments
that are used are contaminated but they allow the subject to have the necessary distance to the
object of violence.
The other argument is based on the idea of transformation of the object of violence to
inhuman. To be able to carry out the act of violence against another human being the subject
needs to avoid the humane interaction with the object. Direct physical contact and non-
violent act like touching, holding or moving are denied. Instrument cuts this contact and also
changes the experience of the contact because it happens through the instrument.
In terms of semiotics the sign of the members of community and the sacrifice are similar and
there can be made a symbolic exchange. As Jean Baudrillard put it “The symbolic is neither a
concept, an agency, a category, nor a ‘structure’ but an act of exchange and a social relation
which puts an end to the real”303. What can be taken from Baudrillard’s argument is that our
thinking is based on symbolic systems and that “the opposition between the real and the
imaginary”304 is actually misleading. According to Baudrillard’s theory it can be claimed that
in the case of Sgt. William David Cleveland we can not witness the death as an event but as a
myth. Myth is needed to identity formations which covers both the origins of the subject and
the end of the subject305. Still this doesn’t lead to a situation where the case in hand would be
meaningless in the analysis of symbolic violence and power over life. Baudrillard claims that
the death must be conjured up and localised precisely and that this place and time is the
body306.
The concept of the body as a sign-vehicle for sacrificial dying can be examined through one
of the most profound myths in the western and global context, the crucifixion of Jesus. By
looking closely the set of photographs some of its special features can be connected to the
ways, rules and regulations of representation in Western art considering especially the
suffering body as sacrificial object.
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The body is framed to the centre of the pictures which draws the attention to it. This kind of
representative balancing visually points out the dominating element and its message. It is
used commonly in church art to present the essentiality of the divine order. The position of
the body where the hands are raised over the head and the other leg is straight has similarity
to the body of a crucified person. The exception is that the body is in a horizontal not in a
vertical plane. Instead of nailing the body into forced position from its legs and hands it is
bounded with ropes. Nude or half nude and slightly externally injured body has similarity to
tortured and executed Jesus. Surrounding violent crowd and the road which takes the body
into unknown destination identifies with Via Dolorosa, the Way of Suffering.
Because of the perspective of the viewer the event gets a western analytical context. There
the sacrificial body carries the positive meaning and the crowd has a negative connotation
and it is seen as sadistic and demonic subject. If the sacrifice is understood as having a good
cause and meaningful end, it has a social content307 which draws a link between the social
causes and the myth/metaphor levels. Symbolic similarities between the religious and
historical myth and the news event causes a reflection from the cultural models in to the new
event and represents it in a wider temporal and spatial context. It is also typical that the
myths or their expression and presentation can change during the changes in history. The
process of representative practises and social reality are not in dominative but interactive
relation. For example the way how Crucified Jesus is presented changes during the time. In
Byzantium Jesus didn’t have a beard because being beardless was typical for emperors, and
later Jesus got a blond hair to remind less the people of the Middle East. During the plagues
in medieval time his body was also corrupted by the abscess to reflect the essence of
mythological suffering in secular context.
The sadistic nature of the subject is highlighted because of the emotional expressions of the
members of the crowd. Charles Darwin discovered in his work concerning expression of
emotions, that people are highly sensitive to identify with the feelings they interpret from
other persons face308. In the first picture there can’t be seen any expressions of emotions
because the crowd is backward to the photographer. In the second picture strong facial and
bodily expressions of furious joy is recognizable. Raised hand and closed fists in the air
express power and draw attention, and exposed teeth mean either a joy or rage. These
307 Girard 2004, 165.
308 Darwin 1965, 304.
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overwhelming feelings are at the same time distant and close to each other in the ways of
expression and in the picture where both are experienced in the same spatial and temporal
situation. This leads to confusions and a feeling of distance from the motives of the crowd.
The viewer in this case is not only in the role of a witness but also as a participator. When
Foucault describes the painting Las Meninas, he recognizes the relation between the viewer
and the picture. He claims that the images observe us309 and that the spectator is forced to
enter the picture which is privileged and inescapable310. The photographs where taken in the
middle of the crowd surrounded by the subject. Because of the physical perspective and
location of the photographer the viewer is taking part to the event. The feeling of ‘being
there’ is strongly built and sets the viewer to a role of the subject. The third picture is the
turning point of the roles. Two of the men in the crowd have directed their attention to the
viewer and the other one on the left has and expression of hate and rage in his face. The
viewer has become a possible object of violence. This potentiality of vulnerability at least
erases the impartiality and the fear of violence becomes real in the representation.
According to Edith Kurzweil, Claude Lévi-Strauss concludes that life and death are
fundamental and ultimate oppositions of structuralism. This claim was criticised to be based
on metaphysical assumptions and not to scientific analysis.311 Analysis used in the case study
of Mogadishu also seems opposite to Lévi-Strauss’s approach. Structure consisting of
semiotic signs and discursive representation systems actually shows that the difference
between presentation of life and death is extremely “thin” and that’s why the line between
the two is hard to draw clearly like when trying to draw the edge of a shadow. The spectacle
of symbolic violence creates a mixed message where the viewer is unable to discover the
reasons and causality because of conflicting signs. Distortion leads to the experience which is
obscure, strange and frightening. In the politics of fear the assault of the body reaches such
extend that the act of violence is not limited to the concept of life, but beyond it.
309 Foucault 1980a, 4.
310 ibid., 5.
311 Kurzweil 1980, 29.
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4.2 IMMORAL US
Picture 1 Picture 2
In the first statement of George W. Bush concerning the photographs of the event of
AbuGhraib he described it as “disgusting”.312 Short, simplified and immediate reaction
reveals in a useful way the litany level of the representation. Disgust is breeding from the
aggregation of sexual and violent behaviour, a break of cultural taboo. Pornographic,
homosexual, sadomasochistic and filthy visual elements draw a scene of perversion and an
emotional respond of disgust.
The event can be stated in three different ways, as an event of punishment, pornography and
torture. Aspect of punishment is formed based on the visual surrounding, the spatial
dimension of prison. This states the people in the picture as prisoners and prison officers.
Imprisonment is a consequence of crime which presents the prisoner as morally and socially
incapable person. Officer on the other hand is a representative of the law and order, with the
authorization to limit the freedom of others. What ever is presented in this context between
the officer and prisoner should be an act of legal punishment.
Pornographic scene is constructed of nudity. Nudity alone doesn’t make an event
pornographic; it could be as well and more likely interpret as sexual event. The lack of
intimacy which can be seen in the picture would make it an orgy but the photographing and
Butler 2009, 87.
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the publishing of the pictures turns it finally into pornography. Pornography usually includes
at some level dominance and violence and the scene is always built up and the event is
scripted. Instead of witnessing an intimate and spontaneous event the viewer witnesses a
breach of personal immunity and forced and manufactured scene. This makes the event
unnatural.
The event of torture is a fusion of the previous events. The unnatural and unpleasant sight
produced and commemorated by the officials who should produce order and protection,
transforms the clear line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ into something unrecognisable. This leads
to questions why are we torturing? Can it be allowed? What does it make of us? In simple
terms what are the social causes of the event?
* * *
Butler offers interesting point of views to the analysis of the social causes especially
concerning the normative and functional approaches. She sees the photographs as evidences
of war crimes and working in legal proceedings against those who have been blamed for acts
of torture and humiliation313. Here the photographs have revealing aspect and a documentary
value to the institutional proceeding.  Legal institutions can be estimated to have
exceptionally important position in the social causes level because it is communal by nature.
Opposite to Butlers notion of normative aspect which can be interpret as revealing is her
example of the Newsweek’s publishing policy which on the other hand presents “useful”314
hiding. Instead of jus in bello, the approach of political realism which has adopted the
discourse of fear, transforms the jus ad bellum into shape of the War on Terror. Legitimacy
of war becomes dominant compared to the legitimacy of means in war.
If there is a breach between usefulness and legality, another breach emerges between public
and personal. Butler claims that the photographs don’t have an effect only as evidence,
antiwar propaganda, but also as potential items for blackmailing. Social causes for the
objects of torture might be devastating if their families would see their public humiliation315
313 Butler 2009, 79.
314 ibid., 80.
315 ibid., 85.
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caused by forced breaking of cultural taboos, organized production of personal shame and
fear.
* * *
Discussion concerning the event and photographs of AbuGhraib is strongly based on the
moral and ethical evaluation. Even though the event seemed to be somehow unique, even the
photographs as original as they might have thought to be, seemed somehow familiar, like if
they would be carrying illustrative tradition within, as if they would be multilayered ‘texts’,
palimpsest where the images are actually imitating something which has already been seen.
The illustration of Abu Ghraib ‘talks’ with both the language of abandoned moral and
punishment of immorality. The discursive formation of intersecting historical fact and fiction
is named here according to visual orientation, interpretative frame and foreknowledge as the
illustrative practice of Salò.
Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom is a film written and directed by Italian director Pier Paolo
Pasolini. What makes reasonable to use the dramaturgy as a disposition and name a
discursive formation according to a single film, is based on the historical and cultural
background of the text, the central themes of the film, its critics and the public reactions
awoken by the film. The core of the script is a hybrid of two fictive novels which both are
cornerstones of the European cultural history even though the other is widely presented and
the other is marginal and usually kept in silence. Still both have similar effect. Themes and
elements of the film are based on the two novels but also to latter historical events which
have a strong political and moral background. The film includes highly controversial visual
material and has been banned in many countries. Provocative nature of film leads easily to
the conclusion that the film is cherishing the themes it presents instead of criticising them.
Calling this to an error in interpretation should be avoided, because in genealogical analysis
of the heritage doesn’t only consist of great stories and evolvement but as well of mistakes,
miscalculations and coincidences and doesn’t recognize a truth without a possibility to
criticize316.
The second part of the films headline and many central elements from the script comes from
the book of Marquis de Sade. His writings and personality where strong enough to give a
316 Foucault 1998, 74–75.
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name for phenomena which is called sadism. Sade’s main principle in his writings was to
abandon the conservative models of morality especially the norms of sexual behaviour which
he saw rather as an illusion and synthetic than as natural order. Sexual violence and
dominations are in important role in his storytelling. Where Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom
presents abandoned moral, The Divine Comedy from Dante Alighieri describes detailed,
organised and hierarchic punishment system based on divine order of moral norms. Even
though Dante’s inferno has a strong symbolic dimension and also the mental condition of the
punished is in some cases described, the core of the punishment is the body of human and the
production of physical pain which are very concrete by their nature. In the artwork and
illustrations of The Divine Comedy the inhabitants of hell are also nude which highlights
their loss of status and physical protection.
The film shows four fascist men who represent political, economical and religious power.
During the fall of Benito Mussolini's Italy in 1944 they kidnap a group of teenage boys and
girls and subject them to four months of extreme violence, sadism, sexual and mental
torture.317 The film is noted for exploring the themes of political corruption, abuse of power,
sadism, perversion, sexuality and fascism.
In the case of Abu Ghraib the place and time for the acts of violence can be specified. The
same thing exists in the case of Salò. The connecting elements are naming, isolation and
infrastructure. Where the photographing of torture happened in the prison of Abu Ghraib in
Iraq which came to publicity in 2004, the film takes place in the Republic of Salò a part of
Italy occupied by fascists in 1944. Both events (historical and fictional) are named according
to the physical location instead of the date of the event or the features of the acts.
In both cases the spatial dimension is isolated from the outer world. The process can be
related to Achille Mbembe’s description of occupation which requires seizing, delimiting and
asserting control over a physical area and creating new social and spatial relations318.   The
isolation is based on the infrastructure; in the case of Abu Ghraib it is the prison walls and in
Salò the walls of the mansion. Infrastructure and the architecture are needed to create and
maintain the physical isolation which allows also the social, political and normative isolation
from the outside world. Physical turns into mental. “You are beyond all laws. Nobody knows
317 Pasolini 1976.
318 Mbembe 2008, 164.
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you are here”319. Naming, locating and organizing transforms the event of Abu Ghraib into a
scene of power and a spectacle of violence. It is set, documented, framed and represented
through a specific interpretative practice where it stops to be just an event and becomes a
discursive monolith of fear.
Salò is divided into three parts which loosely refer to the structure of Dante’s Inferno. These
circles present also the dominating visual elements of the photographs of Abu Ghraib both in
direct and symbolic level. The circles are called the Circle of Manias, the Circle of Shit, and
the Circle of Blood. The Circle of Manias presents the obsessions, desires, experiencing and
emotions. Nudism (publicly nude and posing for camera), role play (dog on the leash),
sadomasochism (domination and humiliation), homosexuality and rape (penetration between
men) are different examples of denied and morally condemned sexual behaviour in certain
cultural and social contexts. The persons who are in the role of the object are forced to break
the binding social norms and taboos. The persons in the role of the subject on the other hand
are the one’s who are producing the spectacle and taking part to it. Their emotional
expressions are signals of joy and excitement which refer to a success of their acts and not to
a neutral and passive condition. The Circle of the Manias expresses break of the normative
line which divides pain (mental or physical) from pleasure.
The Circle of Shit works in the level of humiliation and animalization. In some of the
photographs a naked man is entirely covered with brown filth which is or at least is
interpreted to presents feces320. Where the perversion of different kind of sexual behaviour is
relative, the covering of entire body with filth is more likely universally recognized as such.
This shows that the Circle of Shit has a deeper negative connotation than the Manias. Filth
refers to physical and mental regression. Excrement describes loss of retention which refers
to infancy, old age and sickness.  Animal living in pigsty probably comes closest to the visual
nature of the man covered by assumed feces. Feces are also connected to insanity, to a lower
level of humanity where a human has lost one’s personhood and become more like an animal
but exists in the form of a human. Still the mental condition of animal leaves marks to the
physical appearance. A forced sign of regression expresses a great power over the
representation of mental and physical condition of the object.
319 Pasolini 1976.
320 Appendix 1.
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The Circle of Blood refers to visual elements of direct violence and killing which means
causing physical pain and physiological death. Because the question considers impression
constructed by representative technique and it is not tried to prove the actual nature of the
event as such, also the violent scenes are interpret as symbols of physical violence. Symbols
of physical violence are for example situations where the tension in the photographs lets the
viewer to assume that the event will lead to violence. Furthermore it is not only a question of
the causal model of predictive violence but the symbols are signs which can be interpret to
imitate physical signs of violence for example mutilation. “Blood” as such doesn’t have to be
seen in the picture but it works as a universal sign for death, a protosymbol321 as Vamik D.
Volkan argues. The Circle of Blood presents intentional and arbitrary causing of pain and
death, a power over one’s life.
In the analysis of power relations it is important to acknowledge the difference between
visible and invisible power which separates the instruments of power from the subjects of
power. Dramaturgic analysis of Salò can be used as a reflecting interpretative model for the
case of Abu Ghraib. In the photographs the setting of the figures, framing and retouching
forms the roles of the subject, the object and the viewer. In a wider discursive frame the same
roles are not coherent. According to the dramaturgy of Salò the subject of power transforms
into instrument of power usage and the subject of power becomes something that reminds
more the viewer than traditional subject, an invisible author which’s power allows or more
strongly argued passively constructs the whole event. This claim needs to be clarified via
closer look to the set of characters of Salò and Abu Ghraib.
The visual power actualizes in the instruments which are the representatives of power. In
Salò they are soldiers and female prostitutes, where the soldiers keep up the order by (the
threat of) physical violence and the prostitutes lead the activities of the objects and create the
visual elements of the event and partly produce them by their own central appearance. In Abu
Ghraib the male soldiers are participating in the event but the main constructive element in
the pictures is the female soldier who as the female prostitutes of Salò also is an important
constructive visual element especially in the Circle of Manias.
321 Volkan 2009.
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Relating a female soldier and a prostitute is not a unique phenomenon but more likely a
discursive practice. According to Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry a woman whose
sexuality is debauched and foul and who manipulates and corrupts is far deadlier than men,
and actually isn’t a woman at all322. Already Niccolò Machiavelli assumed that all women
within an army were prostitutes323. Also the female soldiers in Abu Ghraib where related to
erotomania324.
The instruments are in direct contact to the object which makes them visible and their role
recognizable. Because of the representation, the context shows them not just as the
instruments of power. Being in the same frame with the object of power in the context of
torture transforms them in to the instruments of violence and according to the theory of
Girard contaminates them and closes them outside their community. Instruments are not
source of the power of the subject but rather its replaceable tools.
In Salò the sexual experiments, torture and killing are done in the authorization of the rulers,
the subjects of power. Even their actions have produced the event they avoid direct contact to
the object especially in the Circle of Blood. Surveillance happens from the distance and
through window and lenses of binoculars, and the shedding of blood is done by the
instruments or by the nude rulers, where the concrete nudity symbolises anonymity and the
subject’s hidden real presence. The subject of power remains ‘pure’ and maintains its position
as a legitimate ruler of the community. As Foucault notes about Las Meninas “sovereigns in
so far as they stand outside the picture and are therefore withdrawn from it in an essential
invisibility, they provide the centre around which the entire representation is ordered”325.
Also the concept of pornography creates distance between the subject and the violence
directed to the object. When the event is interpret through the Circle of Manias a sexually
oriented physical and mental violence is stated as perversion, not as abuse of power. As
Butler claims the aesthetics of pornography protects the person behind the camera from
blame326. Here it is also vital to knowledge the difference between actual sexual act and
pornography where the first one is real act and the latter is simulated, synthetic and produced
322 Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, 5.
323 ibid., 8-9.
324 ibid., 11.
325 Foucault 1980a, 14.
326 Butler 2009, 86.
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unspontaneous act.  If the act of forced penetration is estimated in the context of legal system
it is stated as a rape but if it is seen through the concept of pornography it transforms into sex
fantasy or fetish.
The role of the subject reveals a great dilemma in the interpretation of the case of Abu
Ghraib. If the assumed subject of the event suddenly transforms into replaceable instruments
of power, the actual subject of power escapes the analysis and becomes invisible. The
‘distance’ or ‘lenses’ of Salò are the frames of the Abu Ghraib which are also the key to
finding and making the subject visible. The subject can not be located from the photographs
but behind them, it doesn’t appear in front of the camera but behind the lens. This leads us to
another dilemma which is, how can we separate the subject from the viewer in the context of
representation?
The confusion between the subject and viewer reflects in a very concrete way the third
culture-historical source of the discourse of Salò which is fascism. Fascism questions the
relation between morality and power. “We fascists present the only truth, anarchy. Only true
anarchy is the anarchy of power”327. Who has the power to act has also the legitimation for it.
The existence of such spectacle of violence as what happened in Abu Ghraib was not a
sudden and spontaneous act but it was made possible to happen by producing a certain
surroundings considering institutions, people and technologies and allowing it to happen
either actively or passively. What was condemned later in a juridical procedures and trial was
the acts of the military personnel who personally carried the consequences and the
punishment, not the system as such. If the subject of power which stayed untouched by the
legal process is seen as a representative, an image of the people, what does it make of ‘us’ the
people? It shows the present society as a moral vacuum, a state of exception as the Republic
of Salò where the human life is dominated by the perversions of the rulers which are selected
or allowed to exist by ‘us’. ‘We’ transforms into a threat to our own society and ‘the enemy’
rises from within, or as Butler refers to Sontag “the photographs are us”328. The fear is not
only manifesting in the bodies of the others but we have become the source and embodiment
of the politics of fear.
* * *
327 Pasolini 1976. Translated by the writer of the thesis.
328 Butler 2009, 99.
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In the semiotic analysis the first picture is divided into five metaphorical signs which are the
building blocs for the subject, the object and the viewer.  The metaphorical signs are gender,
identity, leash, nudity and value perspective.  This is done to reveal and clarify the power
relations and cultural conventions presented in the photographs.
The role of the subject in the first picture belongs to the female soldier.  The given name for
the subject already reveals conflict within the sign of the subject. Qualities with are given in
both Islamic and Christian cultural traditions to female are in many ways opposite to the
qualities identified with soldier. The question of the definition of gender concerning the
subject comes vital and the concept of gender as a sign-vehicle for secondarily qualities.
Womanhood (or female gender) is a sign for different social roles like mother, wife and
daughter. In the present context where the conflicting qualities are under analysis the roles
are chosen and named as caretaker and sexual object. As a caretaker woman is identified
with things as protecting, feeding and supporting. Here she is a subject and a producer of life,
creating it, maintaining it and securing it. This makes her an authority. In the role of sexual
object woman on the other hand is an object for desire and domination, a weaker sex.
Soldier presents violence and domination. Even soldier can be seen as protector but the
instruments and means are in both cases connected basically into the use of violence. The
privilege of violence is a dominant quality and makes soldier a subject of violence. The
soldier destroys life and protects life by destroying life of others, those who threat life.
In short statements the conflict between the dual roles could be described as following: Males
are soldiers. Females are not males. Females are not soldiers. Female as a soldier is not a
female. Female soldier is something different from a female and a soldier.
Uniform which the female soldier carries is originally designed for men and doesn’t anyhow
bring out the body shape or conventional clothing (in neither of the cultural spheres) which
expresses of being a woman. Also the hair of female soldier is short which refers more to
male gender than female and on the other hand it is not covered with scarf which breaks the
concept of female dressing code in many Islamic countries. Appearance and disappearance of
certain conventional features of manhood and womanhood makes the female soldier an
androgen, unrecognizable non-sex ‘thing’.
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The sign of the female soldier carries mixed messages of the roles of protecting subject and
destructive subject. In the case of androgen subject it is impossible to recognize the social
roles and to use stereotypes to recognize possible motives, patterns or capabilities. Emotions
as presumptive cognitive structures do not offer a consistent model for possible action which
leads to uncertainty and confusion which is emphasised especially in the situations where
there is a lack of information considering the existing context which is supportive element in
the process of constituting image of the subject. The signs of both female and soldier
connected in the same subject seems strange and unknown which can lead to uncanny profile
of the subject. Structural paradoxes of culture such as this play a significant role in the
formation of the objects of fear. The eventalized female body transforms into something
different from itself while still remaining practically unchangeable.
As noted earlier, according to Darwin the human face is central in the process of expressing
and interpreting emotions. Also the identification of person is based on the features of face in
the most common situations like recognizing a familiar person from the group of people or
more technical and regulated situation like proving nationality or age from passport. In the
process of identification the face becomes the semiotic sign of identity.
In the first picture the man who is lying naked in the ground is the object. His face is
censored by retouching the picture and making it partly blurry. The viewer becomes unable to
recognize and identify the man. The function of the retouching is explained by protection of
the victim’s dignity and security by hiding his identity. This is done because of the own good
of the victim. On the other hand if the photograph is analysed without the argument
considering the security of the victim by hiding or alternately depriving his face, it appears to
have some significant similarities with the symbolic violence. Censored face appears in the
visual aspect as a loss of face or head. Instead of taking the head off physically, the practices
representation creates an event of symbolic beheading. The identity and personhood of the
object is diminished, stolen or destroyed. Censored object is presented as non-person, a
faceless body.
Butler has similar outcomes about the meaning of face in representative practices when she
refers to philosopher Emmanuel Levinas.
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it is the face of the other that demands from us an ethical response, then would
seem that the norm that would allocate who is and is not a human arrive in
visual form […] our capacity to respond with outrage, opposition, and critique
will depend in part on how the differential norm of the human is communicated
through visual and discursive frames.329
Instead of protection of dignity erasing the face can be seen as an insult. Photographing is
immortalising of the presented person or event in a similar way as any other artistic method
of illustration. It has been usual to destroy the pictures of the opponent to erase it from the
culturally oriented collective memory. The most efficient and least consuming way is to
destroy the most recognizable signs which are usually the name and the face of the person330.
Presenting a prisoner and a possible terrorist in a world widely spread picture could offer a
face for the resistance and martyrdom.
Censoring the face also has an effect in relations to the montage. To be effective visual
storytelling requires possible targets for identification where the viewer can project and
replace one’s one experience. The missing face can be replaced in the process of montage
with a familiar face or even with the viewers own face. This leads to a situation where the
object can be identified with my husband, my father, my brother, my friend or even me. In
any case the montage connects the identification with the viewer’s personal relations which
are directly or consequentially connected to one’s own existence.
The leash has a multiple meanings in the picture, but first and foremost it is an instrument of
power. The function of the leash is to control the movement of the object which can be
produced as a mild twitch to a certain direction but also a strangling grip which then gets the
function of torturing and killing. What is peculiar is also the fact that the leash allows a
distance between the dominating subject and dominated object. This might have a similar
signification as in the case of Mogadishu where the direct contact to the sacrifice must be
avoided to prevent impurity produced by the sign-vehicle of violence, the tortured body. The
leash works as an instrument for violence caused by the subject but because it exists between
the subject and the object, only the leash becomes contaminated by the violence which the
329 Butler 2009, 77.
330 In the case of group, flag or other symbol.
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injured body presents but which can not be seen from the body of the subject if it is separated
from the context.
The third sign function that the leash carries is directly linked to the sign of nudity. Here the
nudity is also seen as part of the process of animalization but the leash gives even a stronger
signal transforming the body of a man into body of a dog. In the western world dog presents
the role of a servant but a negative connotation of the sign of dog exists especially in Islamic
cultural tradition. For example the dogs are not allowed to enter the house or to be kept as
pets because they are impure and after touching a dog religious activities are not possible
without washing oneself331. Also the position of the man is vital. He is lying on the ground
instead of standing with two legs and his bare skin is touching the ground. Incapability to
stand and stay off the ground signals inhuman behaviour and weakness or sickness.
Representation transforms a prisoner into filthy dog.
Even if the content of the event is interpret in the context of sexual act where the nudity and
the leash are understood as a signs for sadomasochism, the presented meanings do not
disappear but they get a stronger basis. The dominating subject is then seen sadistic and
achieves desire from causing mental or physical suffering for another person. The dominated
object in this case is masochistic and enjoys humiliation, binding and physical assault. If the
act is interpret to be done willingly the photograph presents a sexual behaviour but if it is
understood as forced act or as a set up for such an act it becomes a presentation of power in
the form of torture. The significance of the leash and nudity as a process of animalization do
not diminish, on the contrary it just ads the humiliation and fades the sexual identity of the
object.
Because the prisoner is laying on the ground and the framing cuts part of his body outside the
picture, he is notably lower and smaller than the female soldier. This detail can be interpreted
in the context of value perspective.  In this representative technique the figure’s size is based
on the social, political or religious status of the person which it presents, and not to the actual
physical size. The composition of the picture sets the subject’s value higher than the object
which is literally on the ground. The traditional Islamic culture (and also historical traditions
of Christianity) value men higher than women which highlights the subversion of the male
object and the breach against the social code.
331 Linjakumpu 1999, 200.
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The presence of the viewer in the picture is minimal. There can not be found any strong
connection of the viewer with the subject or the object. Such signs as an eye contact or
emotional expressions and responses directed to the viewer are totally missing. Possible
reason for this lack of contact can be partly produced by the censorship which erases the face
of the prisoner and hides possible facial expressions and communicative signs. The whole
photograph seems to be really ‘clean’ picture where the subject and the object are at the same
horizontal line and clearly visible from the background. The whole event doesn’t seem
spontaneous but rather the figures in the photograph are posing and the whole situation seems
staged. The feeling of ‘being there’ is weak; the viewer is just looking of a picture, not
participating the event. Instead of documented event the photograph becomes a statement.
The second picture has many similarities to the content of the first picture. Still there are
some important differences which either raise new messages or strengthen the previous ones.
In the case of the subject these consider personification of the female soldier, and for the
object’s repeated symbolic beheading and censorship castration. Also the role of the viewer
changes and it adopts qualities of the subject.
The viewer is not outsider anymore but it is participating the ongoing event and becoming a
part of it. The angle of the picture gives a strong impression of three dimensional spaces
which is constructed of the line of the naked men and the corridor where one of them is not
fully in the picture which creates continuity outside of the framed photograph. This visual
order sets the viewer in the middle of the spatial reality instead of looking the event ‘behind a
window’. There is also a clear and strong connection between the viewer and the subject. The
female soldier in the role of the subject is not only having a direct eye contact to the viewer
and a smile on her face but she also directs the attention of the viewer by pointing the genitals
of the men with her both hands. This is also the only act of the subject; it is not clear physical
assault but a bodily expressed message that affects to the framing and changes the tension
and balance in the picture which now concentrates on the suppressing relation between the
subject and the object, and the vulnerability of the object in the event.
The nature of the subject comes more clearly presented in the second picture. It is
constructed in physical being but also in expressional signs which were missing in the first
photograph. The qualities of the habitus of the subject are divided to male habitus and
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sadistic habitus. Male habitus is constructed of the form of the female soldier figure,
including short hair and male measured uniform, but also of smoking tobacco. Smoking
doesn’t have any clear and continuing norm or tradition in both Muslim or Christian religion
and culture. In some cases it is seen as a corruption of body and soul and in others all bodily
functions and needs are seen as subordinate for spiritual side which makes them meaningless.
Also division between the two genders is varying. Still the dominant tradition shows the
smoking as a habit of men and a smoking woman as a taboo. Smoking female soldier’s male
habitus strengthens while she also turns into a violator of cultural taboo. The cheerful smiling
face of the female soldier forms the sadistic habitus. The emotional message of the facial
expression is conflicting with the context of torture which highlight the wickedness of the
subject. The nature of the subject can be understood only by examining its relation to the
viewer which reflects the context and reveals the power relation between the subject and the
object.
In the photograph the men’s heads are covered by plastic hoods. This has a similar effect as
censoring the face but in a more assaulting way because the covering is done in the actual
event, not afterwards in the representations via media. Losing of a head leads to losing of
identity. The act of beheading in an actual or symbolic event is extreme because it plays with
the concepts of death, hostage taking, identification and sorrow.
While explaining the concepts of natural death and artificial death Baudrillard estimates the
effect and meaning of the hostage-taking332. Because the hostage is symbolically superior to
the accidental death and natural death based on its executive, political and collective nature,
it has more powerful message333. Baudrillard expresses the case of hostage-taking only as an
event for death and killing in relation to symbolic exchange of death but not the fact that it is
also an ongoing event where the situation between life and death is constantly chancing.
Potentiality to both exists, and the power to choose is in the hands of the hostage taker, not
only in relation to the ability to cause death, but also to allow life.
The connecting link between the hostage-taking and beheading is based on the concept of
grieve work in catastrophe psychology and violent practices of Taleban in Afganistan and
Pakistan. For the relatives of the dead person it is important to see the physical location of the
332 Baudrillard 1993, 164–165.
333 ibid., 165.
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place where the death occurred which allows to form a concrete starting point for the grief
work334. A sudden death usually means a lack of information and inability to form a
meaningful and understandable image of the event which makes the processing impossible to
achieve any positive results. Where the need for information is linked to individual
experience, the funeral rituals express a socially oriented way to express emotions335. Also
the possibility to see the body of the death person is extremely important in the cases where
the death has occurred fast and unexpectedly336. Again these notions connect the experience
and expressions of life and death to the sign of the body. If the event of death (especially in
the case of violent death) is connected to the body, (the identification of the body is
connected to the face of the death person and the burying of the body at one level ends the
event of death) what does it mean to have a body without a head?
Members of Taleban have been acknowledged in the cases when they have killed local police
officials to return the body of the death person but not the head which has been cut of337. The
returning of the body to the community is clearly a spectacle of violence which proves the
power and capability for violence, which is serious warning for the people. Keeping the head
on the other hand doesn’t purely present the ability to use force but also to stop or make the
grief process of the socially related people more difficult. There exist an unidentified body
and partly buried person which lead to an incomplete event of death.  In the semiotic sense
there is no complete sign mechanism to achieve a reasonable exchange. Taleban’s practice of
power is not only based on the ability to cause trauma but also to affect to the healing
process.
Similar way as the heads also the genitals of the men are censored in the second photograph.
As noted earlier the motive for censorship is to protect the victims of torture, in this case not
from recognition but from shame, and the audience from sexual sign which is seen as
immoral. As noted, the practice of covering genitals from sight can be understood as
community’s way to control the sexual behaviour and activity by stating it as a taboo.
Uncovered genitals are commonly understood as a sign-vehicle not only for sexuality but
also for vulnerability. The covering doesn’t necessary only mean protection from the sight
but also from physical contact, not in a sexually orientated context, but in the function of
334 Dyregrov 1995, 79.
335 ibid., 81.
336 ibid., 82.
337 Lebovich 2010.
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harming one’s health and physical condition. Genitals are relatively vulnerable body organ
and their function is crucial for the ability to produce offspring.
But does the censorship actually protect in the context of representation? If censoring the
face means loss of identity then doing the same for genitals would mean a loss of sexuality.
Protection of victim’s honour and vulnerability turns into censorship castration. The men
who by symbolic beheading have transformed into non-person, by nudity have turn into
inhuman now by symbolic castration turn into non-male. Personal, cultural and sexual
identity is liquidated by representative techniques. As Butler claims “’humanness’ is a
shifting prerogative”338.
Showing or making the sign visible repeatedly is not meaningless in the photograph where
the tortured men are almost uniformed in their visual appearance according to their nudity
and hooding. Regardless of the complex cultural formations of the prisoners they are
constructed through the torture and the anthropological texts and compelled to embody the
cultural reduction339. The appearance of the second time is not the same as the first time. It
isn’t a coincidence anymore but a pattern, a discursive practice and cultural formation. The
power of sign is based on the established, layered and unconscious nature and becomes one
only by repetition.
* * *
Violence and the threat of pain and death as such are causing emotional response of fear, but
do not necessarily make it a political phenomenon. Symbolic violence is not the same as
spectacle of violence and violation of the life of an individual. Symbolic level works on the
collective level of knowledge and that is where violence becomes political. Setting, framing
and presenting an event circling around assaulted human body makes violence political
because it doesn’t only happen, it is constructed.   In the process of symbolic violence the
subject affects not only to the ways, how the object is, but more over, what the object is. How
one is treated, defines what one is. It manipulates the appearances as being alive, in pain or
dying, even one’s appearance as a human being. The possibility to enter and transform one’s
existence reveals the true vulnerability of the object.  Manipulation of symbolic exchange in
338 Butler 2009, 76.
339 ibid., 126.
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the level of the representative double of the body changes it to something unrecognizable and
dreadful. This violates the fundamental core of humanity, the idea of human.
Furthermore it is not just a question concerning the object. If the subject can be captured and
recognised via it’s relation to the condition of the object inside or outside the physical frame,
it doesn’t remain neutral thing but becomes part of the formation of knowledge of the event.
When the event is understood as a form of violence the subject inevitably becomes part of the
process of the symbolic violence, and is contaminated by it. When the role of the subject is
related to our institutions, our politics, and our culture and at last to ourselves, the knowledge
is not concerning the existence of the object anymore but also the deepest forms of the
existence of us. The violence done in the symbolic level to the object also reveals the source
of the violence, the immoral us where the source for fear hides within. In the politics of fear
the events of violence via representation and symbolic appearance becomes histories of
violence, living and constructing myths of social reality.
5. THE SILENCE
A spectacle of symbolic violence and the silence have similarities in the ways in which they
can affect. Still for the empirical analysis they seem quite different, especially how the
silence can be approached. In the politics of fear a spectacle is something that is meant to be
seen if not understood, but the silence on the other hand is not meant to be broken, which in
that case would most likely to loose its effect. Symbolic violence is a multilayered text which
in the photographical document forms two dimensions, one interpretation inside the frame
and one supporting and directing discursive dimension outside the actual document. In the
case of the silence a direct documentation of its existence are hard to imagine. In the silence
the body is absent, the contextualising event does not take place and the object of fear can be
sensed but not seen or named. Here the analysis of eventalized body seems impossible.  How
can one see the invisible or hear the unsaid? In the socially constructed reality a phenomenon
which is capable to move politically can not exist as a closed system but it must come
perceivable in the process of interaction. These reflections are visible communicative signs
which express the existence of the silence, and the parrhesia, the fearless speech as a
resistant act under the risk of death.
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5.1 SUFFERING
“In the Orthodox church there are two places where you light candles,
depending on whether a person is alive or dead. Half of the group lit candles at
the place for the dead, and half went to the place for the living.” 340
 “I need to know the truth,” says the grieving mother. “Even if it would be too
bitter for me, it would be the end of my suffering.”341
Presented statements are given by a Georgian Keti Apridonidze, who works in the Tbilisi
office of the ICRC342 recalling a time when she accompanied twenty families of missing
persons to pray.343 The event is based on the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia in years
1992–1993 which lead to a ceasefire and situation where there are estimated 1,800 Georgians
and 135 Abkhazians missing, half of them civilians. This case as such is not the most radical
example which can be found when one needs to present a situation where the silence
becomes political. Still by using Foucault’s the method of eventalization a deeper meaning of
the case can be found. The statements of social practices connected to
mythological/metaphorical signs and individual and collective experience are the key factors
to describe the essence and effect of the silence. The event is analysed via categorizing signs,
fading existence and continuing dying which as an interpretations construe the semiotic and
affective system of the silence.
The religious institute of Christian Orthodox Church approaches anxiety and grief by a
practice where the conditions of person being alive or dead are located to two places for
prayer which are separated from each other. The division is not only metaphysical and
abstract categorization of life and death but a spatial line which constructs a physical sign of
the existence of these categories. As much as this division is fundamental, it is problematic
for the families of the disappeared people. The categorizing signs of life and death are
directly linked to the body where these conditions are located and which is the only
expressional sign and prove of such categories of existence. In the case where the body is
missing these categories are intact and do not allow a coherent way to deal with the social
340 ICRC 2007, 13.
341 ibid.
342 International Committee of the Red Cross
343 ICRC 2007, 13.
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reality and to form satisfying causal models or precede symbolic exchange. Disappeared
person can as well be alive, dead or in most extreme case one’s existence can be completely
denied as one had never been alive if there is no possibility to link one’s existence into
physical, temporally and spatially oriented world. This leads to a fading existence where
one’s personhood can’t moor into any semiotic sign-vehicle. Fading existence also concerns
situation where rituals, traditions and practices of memorising are silenced which stops the
process of reproducing the sign of the object and deconstructs the collective knowledge
concerning the disappeared person, his or her memory.
Disappearance is not just a violent act against the structures of knowledge, even though it
sets up a conflict situation, but for the people themselves. To know the truth 344 as a statement
expresses the lack of coherent information to be able to construct a meaningful picture of the
reality, but the end of my suffering 345 refers to real experience of pain. As noted in the case
of beheading, those who have survived and the families of the dead need to find an
explanation for what has happened and this processing might take a long time if there is no
access to relevant information346. Concrete place for the dead especially in the case of sudden
death, practical procedures concerning everyday life and the burial of the body347 are main
elements of debriefing in catastrophe psychology, which are missing in the case of the
disappeared person.
The suffering in this context is not just a rhetoric expression but a relation between the family
member as the subject, missing person as the object in the context of death. Like the montage
theory points out, fragmented information is combined and reconstructed with one’s own
experiences, memory and culture. The experience of suffering can be analysed as a causal
and social construction process where the subject reproduces and deconstructs the object
depending on the interpretation of the fragments. The subject doesn’t have any effect to the
medical condition of the object but in the case where the actual sign-vehicle of the object is
missing and out of reach, its existence for the subject is entirely dependent of the subjects
cognitive processing in relation to surrounding social reality. Where the connection between
the existing and missing person, the subject and the object, are socially and emotionally
close, the moods of hope and desperation are varying. This varying of existence and non-
344 ICRC 2007, 13.
345 ibid.
346 Dyregrov 1995, 37.
347 ibid., 79–82.
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existence, life and death in the context of violence refers to pain, which via empathy is also
experienced by the subject. Instead of fading existence caused by uncertainty, continuing
dying expresses an ongoing process of death and resurrection. This categorical line can not
be broken without pain (as in the process of birth and dying) which in the case of continuing
dying transforms the pain of the object into suffering of the subject.
Sarah Ahmed also describes fear as future oriented prediction of pain and damage which is
projected as an intensive bodily experience348. Her claim seems convincing and relates to the
experience of suffering, but at the same time while highlighting the future perspective it
seems to disqualify the time dimensions of present and past. This would disqualify the past
trauma as a suitable element in the analysis of the politics of fear. To be able to define fear in
a coherent way the presented question concerning time needs to be taken into closer analysis.
If the fear would exist only in a situation which is called present, it would more likely be an
immediate reaction, a reflex caused by some phenomenon of physical environment. This kind
of fear has no history and that is why it could only be recognized as biological, physical or
biochemical process without any social, political and conscious relation. If fear would only
concern the predicted events of future, one needs to ask, where these predictions comes from.
As Foucault notes in his analysis of Nietzsche’s genealogy, the origin, Ursprung is not clear
process continuity and unity but a complex system, and divides it into Entstehung,
emergence and Herkunft, heritage349. The analysis of the symbolic violence and
disappearance so far, and also Ahmed’s own claims considering fear existing in and between
the bodies and waking the past narratives, highlights the centrality of the body and the
histories of body350. In Herkunft the body carries the signs of the past events by combining
and dismantling its fragments, where the body also origins the desires, failures and
mistakes351. It can be claimed that the body in genealogy binds together past, present and
future (through motivation and drive) and that the origins of fear can not be located into
specific time and space. Fear appears as a chimera352, a hybrid of different conflicting
qualities which escape specific timing and locating when one tries to capture it.
348 Ahmed 2003, 192.
349 Foucault 1998, 72–73.
350 Ahmed 2003, 190.
351 Foucault 1998, 77.
352 Foucault 2007, 41. Foucault explains becoming a chimera as something which cannot exist and when it
exists it is unreal and artificial.
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Our understanding of causality and time are fully based on to our memory. I claim that the
concept of fear can only exist in relation to the concept of memory. Here the memory is not
limited only to consider the experience of an individual which then is saved into one’s
memory, but to the semiotic sign systems, to the discursive practices, and into the culture.
The culture is a collective memory which affects strongly to the experience and knowledge,
and constructs the ways of interpretation and representation which affect to our actions and
behaviour. Without the collectively shared memory, fear becomes a plain reaction of muscle
memory or an individual experience as non-social and non-political phenomenon.
5.2 RESISTANCE
“Here, Stalin!; Lie down! Play dead!” 353
“I didn’t love him [… ] but he had the right first name.”354
Mihail Afanasievits was a prisoner in BBK- camp and took part in the Stalin’s channel
constructions during the years of Gulag. He named his dog after the Soviet Union leader
Joseph Stalin “so we would never forget what that great criminal Stalin did” 355  as he noted
it. The naming is a part of memorizing process in non-narrative form356 where the event is
recreated in representation by expressing the central constructing sign, the subject of the
event. This claim for the motivation of the naming is made based on Afanasievits’ own
comments but they seem only to reflect one side of the function of the naming.
Relation between naming, sign and source is a disposition which can be found useful here
and it can also be compared to anthropological research of myths. In the case of dangerous
animal species they are usually given nicknames. In mythological sense this is done because
the animal recognizes its “true name” and would appear when it is called. To avoid this, a
nickname is needed to be able to talk without danger. In semiotic sense the name of the
animal becomes so strongly identified with the concrete animal that producing the sign has
similar cognitive and emotional response as the appearance of the source. Eliminating the
353 Oksanen S. 2009, 94. Translated by the writer of the thesis.
354 ibid.
355 ibid.
356 ibid.
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source or redefining the sign is more difficult process than naming which leads to a situation
where the original name needs to be forgotten or remained silent.
If Afanasievits’ statements are taken into a closer linguistic analysis it can be acknowledged
that they are all imperatives, commands in a simple and short form. A command is a speech
act which when taking place between two beings transforms the one who gives the command
into the role of the subject and the target of the given command into the object. A command
as such doesn’t necessarily have the power to change ones position but it constructs
precondition and potentiality for the relation between the beings or actors. Imperative
expresses a relation where the other one is in a dominant role.
Roles of the subject and the object are also dependent of the sign-vehicle in which the
qualities of Josif Stalin are connected in the naming and representing process. In this case a
dog functions as a sign-vehicle. What can be noted from the analysis of the symbolic
violence, a dog is not socially and culturally neutral being and that the transformation of a
human into an animal has many metaphorical and cultural meanings and linkages. What the
main qualities which this hybrid of a dictator and a dog has are on the other hand inhumanity
in the process of revealing transformation and controllability in the context of relations
between a man and a dog.
Calling a dog with the name Stalin doesn’t wrest the human qualities from the historical
person Joseph Stalin, but rather gives an interpretation of his true nature. An animal acts
without moral in conventional sense, and a dog is also related to wolf which categorizes it to
the group of beasts. The interpretation of Stalin’s political acts as inhuman represent him as a
violent beast and even more, as something different from us, a source for bad qualities which
can not origin from ‘us’, from humans. The dog embodies the nature of Stalin. The
transformation’s function is to reveal the true form of the person where the qualities are not
connected to the object but where the object exists as manifestation of the qualities.
A dog as a quality for controllability is based on the relation between the master and the
servant. Here the dog does not present the negative connotations of inhumanity and violent
beast, a mad dog, but a harmless pet, trustworthy companion and dominated servant, all
positive qualities of a dog. This might seem obscure and conflicting at first sight in relation
to the previous arguments, but it can be better understood when it is seen not only as a
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rupture but as continuity in the naming and representation process. Revealing of the true
nature is followed by de-demonizing, transforming the knowledge into manageable form. In
the naming process the silence is “broken” by making the source of fear visible by
connecting it to the sign-vehicle which by then becomes a sign of fear. Now the sign of fear
can be a target for further processing. The fear is localised and concretised but still remains
as fear. Yet, it is not as unmanageable as in the form of the silence and through certain
practices it can be de-demonized. These practices can be identified from the nature of the
commands.
“Here, Stalin!” as a command allows the subject to move the object, which in the case of
Afanasievits is a sign of fear linked to his dog. The ability to move the sign is to control its
appearance and disappearance. This command makes it possible to face the sign of fear every
time when the command is given. The dog is only a sign-vehicle in the naming process but
does not cause fear us such. The fear is faced every time when the name Stalin is said at loud
and when the unsaid norm of commanding Stalin is broken. “Lie down” is even more
powerful command because it allows one to transform active object into passive object. The
sign of fear does not appear or disappear but it changes form in front of the subject. This
power allows the subject not only to change when and where the sign of fear is but also how
it is. Lying down is also a sign of repression of a dog for its master which expresses the
importance of this physical gesture. To “Play dead” is the most powerful of these given
commands. It shifts from the passive condition of lying down into its extreme form. To
command one to die voluntarily (even though it is playing) proves an ultimate power of the
subject over the life of the object. “Playing” may not have only a neutral meaning in this
game of signs and meanings. It changes the seriousness of death into a play which also
allows reviving the dead because the event of dying wasn’t ‘real’.
According to Jehanne M. Gheith’s interview, Mihail Afanasievits took care and fed his dog
Stalin357. In the sense of analysing de-demonizing and violence this notion has great
importance. The relation between Afanasievits and the dog Stalin could be based on causing
suffering or death instead of taking care and maintaining life. Using violence against the
sign-vehicle of fear would in symbolic sense be the same as harming and desecrating Stalin
and revenging his acts. When the life of Stalin becomes dependent of the life of Afanasievits,
357 Oksanen S. 2009, 94.
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Stalin doesn’t threat Afanasievits’s life anymore and their relation starts to remind social
symbiosis. The sign of fear doesn’t disappear but it becomes manageable and the demonized
figure of Stalin transforms into vulnerable and mortal being, equal to Afanasievits’s
existence.
Taking care can also have another interpretation in relation to sign of violence and resistance.
For Foucault the power alone doesn’t determine history because power doesn’t exist without
resistance. The struggle is not a sum of these two but happens between them as continuing
process. A soul can be the outcome of the discipline of the body but only in certain event via
conflict relations.358 Resistance is a process of attack and counter-attack. Foucault shows an
example of resistance in the case of pastorate where the power of conducting men is method
which allows to direct and affect to the behaviour and how one conducts oneself.  Foucault
thinks that movement of resistance appeared in correlation with what could be called specific
revolts of conduct, where conducting is understood as ambiguous359.  Defining the way for
each to conduct oneself360 can be understood as resistance if the defining is done by the
conducted individual.
By using violence against defenceless Stalin, Afanasievits would act with the same way as
Stalin did and by then in a symbolic sense become Stalin himself. Compared to the act of
sacrificing, Afanasievits in the role of direct subject of violence would be infected and
contaminated by the violence and transform into a sign of violence and a sign of fear. Further
more his “pacifistic” act in relation to Stalin also can be interpreted as a resistant act. Power
doesn’t always have to be repressive but it can take a certain number of forms. Afanasievits
doesn’t approve Stalin’s methods of governing and controlling his subordinates, and by
taking care instead of repression he resist the practices of violence. By not repeating the
dominating practices and by promoting discursive practice of non-violence he deconstructs
the culture of fear in individual level and in relation to those who know and participate into
his representation of violent dictator Joseph Stalin.
Nina Ivanovna Rodina’s case is also strongly related to trauma of Gulag and is expressed in
the process of memorising, naming and resistance. Rodina named her daughter according to
358 Ojakangas 1998, 26.
359 Foucault 2007, 194.
360 ibid., 195.
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her dead mother Zoya Mihailovna who died in the siege of Kiowa. She also explained that
she decided to marry her husband Mihael because he had “the right first name”361 to be able
to give Mihailovna surname to the daughter. Gheith explains this act of naming as respecting
the memory of Zoya Mihailovna and protesting against her death362. Still the deeper meaning
of the act of naming in relation to loss of life under a violent regime and resistance (not only
protesting) against it stays unclear because the interview concentrates on the ways of
memorizing and experiencing without highlighting the political aspect and power relations.
Rodina’s ability to produce an offspring, a daughter is a power to produce life. This new life
is set to a context of future prospects. Humans have as biological beings the ability to
produce life but this is only possible in the event of giving birth and the continuity of life
exists in the genes. Giving birth doesn’t undo the event of death. When the act of naming is
set to context of social construction, symbolic exchange and cultural genes, the greater
variation of the concept of life appears. As noted earlier the name has a major effect in the
mythological context. The name is not just a way to express one’s relation to another being;
it is an access to the existence of the being; it defines the being. By marrying a man with the
right name and naming her daughter according to her dead mother, Rodina didn’t only create
life but revived or recreated life. The name Zoya Mihailovna became the sign of her mother
and by replacing the sign into newborn, her daughter transformed into reborn. The trauma of
loss as the sign of fear in the case of Rodina did not disappear but it became manageable. The
event of death doesn’t only present a rupture but also a continuity in Rodina’s and her
family’s life where also the death is part of Herkunft, the heritage which is represented in the
living body of Rodina’s daughter as a sign-vehicle.
Afanasievits’ and Rodina’s act of naming are complicated forms of resistance and as a
counterforce they can be interpret as a reflections and demonstrations of the existence of the
silence. The ways of resistance differs between them at some ways but in both cases it
happens in symbolic level where they redefine the construction of their social reality’s sign
system. Power is changed into vulnerability, threat into harmlessness, death into life, loss
into achieving and the relation between the subject and the fear into social symbiosis,
manageable memory. They both are also localized and represented in the bodies of a dog and
a human child in the event of naming. Afanasievits’s resistance is a protest against the regime
361 Oksanen S. 2009, 94.
362 ibid., 95.
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during the Gulag and by its nature it is more public and easily recognisable363 which also
makes him more vulnerable as a protestor. Still this act is more like a statement of disrespect
and mockery than for example a blame. Rodina’s case is more personal and doesn’t
necessary show any signs of resistance outside her private life. Still her act as a protest
against the lost of loved one364 seems quite weak claim in the frame of political resistance.
While expressing her loss she is also asking for atonement from the perpetrators. Blaming
someone from the loss of life is normatively, ethically, socially and politically powerful
statement and at this sense even braver than desecrating a dictator. The name Zoya
Mihailovna emerges as political resistance when the heritage is represented and recognised.
5.3 PARRHESIA
A non-event, as Baurdrillard defines it, consists of military force, bogus information,
technological deployment and brainwashing. It is an event that does not really take place.365
The military coup of Chile came in power in 1973 and its regime lasted 17 years. In 1996 the
National Corporation for Reconciliation and Reparation concluded that 3197 people died or
disappeared during this period and 1102 of these were classified as “disappearances”.366
Even though Baudrillard’s definition doesn’t originally refer to Chile, the concept of non-
event describes extremely well the special features of the culture of silence. Where the facts
are unreachable, the history of fear can only be approached and disclosed by creating,
representing an interpreting the event via fiction.
Cayetano Brulé [… ] skeptical and politically disenchanted [… ] He is devoted
to the search for truth and justice and to the investigation of violations of
human rights, although he acknowledges that members of the dictatorship have
remained in office during the transition [… ] Brulé distrusts the Chilean police,
whom he accuses of corruption and collaborating with the secret service during
the dictatorship.367
363 Oksanen S. 2009, 95.
364 ibid.
365 Baudrillard 2003, 34.
366 The Washington Post Company 2000.
367 Waldman 2009, 124.
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Heredia [… ] explores the city streets, suburbs, slums, and dens of iniquity and
comes across security services, torture houses, and other centers of corruption
in what is an ongoing dialogue with Chile’s political and social life. [… ]
behind the scenes are the guilty parties of yesterday, still unpunished. He
cannot become part of the new political project of the transition: he is not
moved by its new discourses because they fail to mention many names that he
has not forgotten.368
Noir genre as classical detective novels has a tradition in Chile but it was reformed to
question national history in Latin American countries after the end of military regimes369 and
became a counter discourse for the silence. In the analysis this is called the noir discourse.
Noir represents a society that is corrupted judicially, politically and morally, and where the
institutions are connected to the criminal acts.  According to María Cristina Pons this form of
new historical novel emphasizes the bumps, ruptures, and discontinuities in the history1
which are the targets of the archaeological method. What noir is first and foremost about, is
not legality, justice or atonement but a discovery of truth. To be able to flourish, the truth
must be produced via collective memory, politicization of time and parrhesia.
Quotes are descriptions of the characters created by Roberto Ampuero and Ramón Díaz
Eterovic. Nature of these characters is vital in political sense because they play central and
multiple roles in the representation. The political and representative power in the context of a
book becomes outside of its frames, from the writers who draw and describe a certain kind of
reality and also offer a growing ground for different kind of interpretations. This process of
creating a second reality consisting of experience and memory is not produced only by the
writer but in relations to the reader. Book in a shelf doesn’t construct a full scale
representation but it only happens in a reading process. As in the montage technique, the
reader is not outsider but a participator. In this role the writer plays the role of the subject,
where the reader has the qualities of the viewer but he/she also shares qualities of the subject.
Inside the textual frame the detective has a role of the subject but when the context is
extended outside the frame this role becomes problematic. It would seem like the character
has a life on its own without the existence of the writer and the reader. Here it is needed to
368 Waldman 2009, 125.
369 ibid., 124.
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return to the discourse of Salò in relation to the instruments of power.  When the subject
creates a fictional subject and sets certain qualities, motives and goals for it, it becomes
instrumental subject, an instrument which carries the role of the subject in a limited context,
a frame which the subject has produced.
The instrumental subject doesn’t only have the ability to act inside the frame, but it also
works as a sign-vehicle for Herkunft, a symbol for different historical events which brought
out in this form affects to the interpretation of the historical narrative.  Character Brulé and
Herida are both orphans and castaways of the society, which condition is interpret to be a
metaphor for the 1973 rupture which meant the end of the utopian values which they both
present370. Being orphan emphasises the alienation of the system but also the concrete lost of
family as captives, executed or disappeared.  Sceptical and politically disenchanted Brulé
emphasises resistance not only because of his quest to find truth and bring justice, but the
fact that he acknowledges that he is trying to do this in a situation where the members of the
dictatorship have remained in power. Same way Herida opposes the new political project
which targets the critic not only toward the past’s dictatorial authority but also to reveal the
latter fragile democracy371 which apart from the societal changes is still continuity of the
culture of silence.
By representing the military regime and post coup society as continuity the novels politicizes
time. Politicizing means deconstruction of the “natural” time372. Time in politics is always
relative and struggle of different kind of time orientations and models between the actors.
Time is also a tool in political struggles, not only consuming phenomena.373 Using different
concepts of time to legitimate certain type of politics is known as rhetoric of time374 but
Ampuero and Eterovic go even further. What “exists” refers in the context of time always to
what doesn’t exist and how things could be otherwise375. In Walter Benjamin’s thinking
political activities are explicitly connected to the problematization of chronology and
disconnecting the idea of continuity376.
370 Waldman 2009, 125.
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The novels play with the concept of time by reopening the past by memorizing.  Memory and
memorizing are a process as Gilda Waldman refers to Nelly Richards’s argument that
memory, as an open process of reinterpreting, events and understandings can be replayed
providing the static past with new open-ended meanings377. The subject is unable to enter the
past events to reawaken the forgotten memories but the instrumental subject which has no
real physical appearance because of its fictional nature, is not bounded to the present and can
be placed to historical narrative to change the dominating practices. The instrumental subject
questions the status quo maintained by the silence and politicizes the time of the military
coup and post coup society.
Entering the past and reawakening the memory is able to break the silence but doesn’t
necessary mean successful resistance against fear. It could easily reframe the past events as a
threat which roots still exists in the societal order and become part of the future prospects, a
future constituted by fear. Here for the characters’ aim to seek for the truth becomes
necessary to oppose the culture of fear. The instrumental subject resistant role transforms
into parrhesiast378. The parrhesia has in this context strongly political nature.
The noir genre provides a context with which to re-create and trace the criminal background
of impunity surrounding the dictatorial era379 but via the character of detectives also to speak
freely and to speak the truth.  Finding the truth and stating it at loud as such is not parrhesia
according to Foucault’s analysis. He states that parrhesia has a rhetorical nature where it can
arrange the elements of discourse380 but it differs from pedagogy because it can appear in
violent form381. Even more central and defining element of the parrhesia is “the relationship
between the truth-telling and the risk of death”382. In parrhesia the person who states the
truth accepts the risk383 which cost is unspecific384.
Parrhesia is not a form of the politics of fear. Still the definition is conventionally related to
the concept of fear. It differs from institutionalized freedom of speech385 because as an act it
377 Waldman 2009, 122.
378 Foucault 2010, 56.
379 Waldman 2009, 127.
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or its consequences are not protected but it shares a great risk, a risk which as an uncountable
is experienced as fear. To acknowledge the risk and still speak out is fearless speech. In the
context of noir it appears as a counter force which in that role expresses the existence of
suppression and the culture of silence where the parrhesia as a resistant act also becomes
political. In the noir the novel is the context where the parrhesia can take place as a form of
scene386 which is central element of its way of appearance.
The personal “history” and surrounding social and political atmosphere of the detectives are
the defining element in the transformation from the instrumental subjects into the
parrhesiasts. Those who have already experienced the power of the junta and the costs of
resistance, knowing the risk stand up and speak freely to express the truth. Parrhesia doesn’t
originate only from their statement and actions but they have become the embodiments of
parrhesia emphasising the silenced truth by their bare existence. Parrhesia may appear in
ways of being and behaving.387
A key to the collective memory in noir is the sign of the body. The bodies of murdered and
disappeared form the impenetrable silence where the defeated and exposed bodies of the
living are territories for the exercise of power and control388. To be able to penetrate the
silence the invisible disappeared bodies must be found and made visible, to recognize and
name them. The parrhesiast exercises parrhesia by hearing and solving the cases of
murdered and disappeared and revealing the truth in an antipathetic and violent environment.
Eterovic’s first novel, La ciudad está triste (1987), tells the story of the murders of Beatriz, a
university student, and Fernando, a student and activist who is opposing the regime389. By
naming and expressing the social status and political background the writer makes the object
of violence visible and a disappeared person transforms into murdered person. A murder has
a revealing function in the context of dictatorial past and it becomes a metaphor of organized
violence and repression390. The murder is central, not the way how it was committed391.
Presenting an event of taking life and describing it as a criminal act is extremely strong
statement when it is interpreted as metaphor for the past regime and surrounding social
386 Foucault 2010, 64.
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reality. It doesn’t only claim the existence of absolute power over life but also the illegality
and immorality of the system. Murder is classified as an ultimate crime which is motivated
by negative expressions of aggression or inhuman mercenary. The bodies stop to be
individual bodies and are redefined as the social body, disappeared society which is unable to
speak or act to affect its own condition because of the murderer regime.
As Reinhart Koselleck notes, the research of history is rewriting of history (Umschreibung),
which aims to deconstruct and revise the previous interpretations that also affects to the state
of experience392. Umschreibung breaks Jean-Paul Sartre’s graphic illustration of Temporality
and World’s Time393 where the past is shown as closed and the time as one directional
phenomenon. If the knowledge of history changes, it affects our understanding of present
which also has an effect to the formation of predicted futures. Still it must be noted that
Sartre doesn’t describe time as static but that the temporality, time and history are processed
in a conflicting context394.
When collective memorizing happens through art, it shifts into the discourse level where
historical narratives start to shape shared worldview via interpretation. Narratives are not
only a repository of memories of life under the dictatorship but they also construct alternative
forms of memory and exposing, emphasizing and giving names to experiences that could not
be voiced in the language of official truth395. Here the non-event is replaced by the process of
reconstructing the memory where the event can be localized and named, which makes it
possible to approach and becomes a true event. A fictional event might be more ‘true’ than a
real event if it expresses the social reality of that certain time better than any documentation.
Describing a person having a dinner based on a real experience does not necessary reveal so
much of his/her character than a tag or a phrase which expresses his personality but which
he/she never really said or did. A ‘false’ event which reflects the elements of the truth can
express the collective experience better than proving the existence of one separate
documented event.
* * *
392 Lindroos 2000, 61.
393 Subra 2000, 90.
394 ibid., 94.
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Naomi Klein argues that in the case of Chile ”disappearances turned out to be an even more
effective means of spreading  terror than open massacres, so destabilizing was the idea that
the apparatus of the state could be used to make people vanish into thin air”396.  According to
Waldman this paradigmatic mark of dictatorial terror is imposed in order to guarantee the
operation of the mechanisms of social control through the disciplining of the body397.  When
this is compared to ICRC protection coordinator Samuel Emonet’s notion of lacking dialogue
between Georgia and Abkhazia in solving the cases of missing persons398 the presence of the
silence in the institutional level is apparent. It is also a breach against norms of international
humanitarian law where Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions article 33 orders to
“search for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse Party” and “Such
adverse Party shall transmit all relevant information concerning such persons”399.   Many
people feel great need to talk about what has happened in relation to a catastrophic event
which also helps them to process and understand the situation400. By forcibly denying this, a
possibility to recover from trauma is made harder or even impossible. Forcibly forbid
collective consciousness of certain things closes them into unconsciousness where they can
transform into models of inner control, a governing of the self, shaped by mental violence.
While the destinies of disappeared remains unknown, it is like if the war would never had
ended. The suffering and dying continue while the silence is maintained.
How the relation between the formation of objects of fear and the silence should be
understood, is based on the maintenance. Which makes the silence in some ways even more
complex than symbolic violence are the non-event and the absence of the body, while it still
remains a question of eventalized body in relation to the objects of fear. The silence is a
phenomenon which hides, mutes and closes the political violence from processing as well as
from analysis, which maintains the status quo of fear. Still it is not just covering the objects
of fear but becoming the object of fear by itself. This can be clarified with an example which
I call the effect of the closed door. In dramaturgy of story telling a door closes a terrifying
and threatening secret behind it. This threat is sensed but the nature of it is unknown.
Because the door remains closed, so that the source of fear behind it could be avoided, the
idea of threat is connected to the door, the only existing sign which is related to the threat.
396 Klein 2007, 90.
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The door is the silence, which in this process transforms from secondary into the primary
object of fear. The silence as itself has become fear and it replaces the body and event, which
only now exist as the silence. Also if a name, word or gesture becomes dangerous and
transforms in a social context into taboo, not only the original source of threat remains
dangerous but the linguistic or visual sign as such becomes a sign of death and an object of
fear.
I claim that forbidding the speech by threat makes speech fearful, the object of fear. The
silence emerges from fear and becomes the secondary object of fear, a palimpsest. The
silence causes oblivion of the primary object of fear, where the silence adopts the
significance of the primary object of fear. The silence emerges as the primary object of fear,
as non-palimpsest origin. A non-event is responded as spectacle of violence. What does not
happen, what can not be heard and what remains invisible or non-existing can be interpret as
dangerous. The silence can be deconstructed by resistant act when it emerges as memorising
in political context, as fearless speech. Fearless speech bypasses the silence and by entering
the forbidding threat deconstructs the fear into palimpsest, a reflection of the object of fear.
The analysis of the silence can only be done by recognizing its existence from communicative
signs and entering the objects of fear via resistance and parrhesia.
6. UNREAL REALITY
The Malmö airport was closed, air traffic stopped and a bomb threat reported on the radio
because of an arrest of a female passenger. The arrest was caused by a situation where after
multiple transilluminations of small luggage the female passenger tried according to her own
words loose the atmosphere by asking if they were looking for a bomb from her luggage.
This led to immediate arrest and alarm, two hours investigation and accusation of causing a
false alarm. The news concerning a bomb threat caused serious worry and moments of horror
in the Stockholm airport among the people who where waiting for the arrivals.401 An event
where a joke appeared as a serious threat, where an act of lowering a tension suddenly
upraises it dramatically, seems in many ways absurd and strange. The female passenger’s
profile doesn’t obviously seem correct for a suicide bomber: 39 years old, Scandinavian,
blond and professional horse athlete. Here the context is the profound factor.
401 Pelkonen 2010.
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In the litany, the event is drawn as misunderstanding, overreaction, bad sense of humour and
bureaucracy, and in the social causes these statement are estimated as a conflict and breach
between the security institutions and individual liberties where the relation between social
etiquette and jurisdiction are in question. These debates and descriptions concerning dilemma
of individual rights and sovereign authority doesn’t really seem a correct base for the
interpretation of the obscurity and importance of the event.
The event as such doesn’t share any special interest in the field of research of politics but in a
closer look it is a good example of palimpsest of past events and their relation to present state
of political reality. Obscurities of this specific case can be seen as a Herkunft, a heritage, of
previous Entsthehung, emergences, which plays more significant role in the international
relations.   Here the analysis is based on the cases of Sana Khyadali as the shahidat and 9/11
terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center.
6.1 DANGEROUS ORDINARY
While describing the case of the first known female suicide bomber Lebanese Sana Khyadali,
Fatima Lahnait uses the expression of emergence of the shahidat, young women suicide
bombers,402 which importance as a statement is easily ignored. The emergence makes the
event of Khyadali’s suicide attack different from the continuity of earlier female fighters,
assassins and attendants. On 9th of April 1985 she targeted an Israeli military convoy with a
truck bomb403 in Lebanon killing five404 soldiers. Entsthehung expresses the moment and
principle of emergence405. Foucault notes that Entsthehung is often misunderstood as final
destination of emergence406, as a certain thing would have a static and primary function,
which would stay us such disregarding the surrounding phenomena. As if the female suicide
attacks would be described only as a new militant strategy or extreme religious act or as a
question of social status of women in Islamic countries. The emergence of the shahidat is a
402 Lahnait 2008, 74.
403 Joyner 2006.
404 The exact number of the dead may vary depending on how they are classified, as soldiers or as military
personnel of Israel.
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historical and unique event which can be quite specifically placed into the time and space,
but the shahidat can also appear several times, not only as continuity of several similar cases,
but as a new phenomenon depending of the context where it is presented. The dominating
discursive practices affect to the ways in which our knowledge of female suicide bombers is
formed.
* * *
“I can not take a shower, because it never downed on me, how vulnerable and
defenceless one is. It never entered my head, until I saw that.”407
Statement above was given by Janet Leigh the leading actress in Hitchcock’s film Psycho
concerning the famous shower scene. More precisely it is not a description of the filming
process but the moment when she actually saw the edited scene at the first time. This part
from the interview gives surprisingly efficient explanation of the strongly affective
experience which has made the scene so well known. Key words here are vulnerable and
defenceless, and expression of something entering one’s head which means to acknowledge
something, and to see something, as an expression for experiencing the representation, not
the original event which in this case is the filming of the scene. Also the effect of the
experience of the representation which leads to a change in one’s behaviour where one can
not continue as usual is a vital notion when the analysis is set into political frame.
How can one’s suicide be related to an attack? How can a death of a person become political
act of violence? Here we also have to take a closer look the Achille Mbembe’s concept of
necropolitics.  Necropolitics describes the relation between sovereign power, biopolitics and
death or “contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death”408.  In the case of
suicide bombers Mbembe estimates the difference between the use of war machines and with
one’s own body409 which is used here as supporting concept in the disposition.
407 Bouzereau 2003.
408 Mbembe 2008, 176.
409 ibid., 173.
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Slavoj Žižek uses popular culture, especially films, in his analysis to clarify the essence of
different theories and to structure of central concepts410. A film doesn’t function here as
evidential but as analytical tool. They are used as a disposition for dramaturgical analysis, the
aesthetics of drama, and to explain the order and affective nature which appears as an
experience of uncanny and fear. In the analysis of the Entsthehung of the shahidat the event
is interpreted through the theoretical framework of modern and post-modern horror movie
where the case research is based on the shower scene from Hitchcock’s Psycho411. The
affective nature of the both cases is based on the variation of the symbolic violence and the
silence which as dramaturgical elements manifests as closed and disclosed.  The inter-textual
scenery consists of stage, curtain, revealing, deceptive character, disappearance and
mutilated body.
The stage for the scenery is related to everyday activity so it can be understood as ordinary.
The bathroom and the military convoy are “targeted [… ] spaces of everyday life”412 for the
victims. Because the nature of the stage is related as ordinary it also expresses the
unexpected emergence of the unordinary. Here the nudity of a person taking a shower is the
metaphorical condition of the unprepared person. Where the ordinary is understood as safe, it
leads the object into defenceless condition. Sudden demonstration of destructive power
transforms civic social spaces into potential death zones413.
The curtain is an element of closed and in both sceneries it manifests as visual and audio,
material and immaterial element. In the bathroom the shower curtain is a visual object which
makes it unable to notice and identify the nature and predicted aims of the attacker in an
early stage and to be able to prepare oneself. A truck or clothing has the same function of
hiding the nature of the event; it prevents the becoming victim to recognize the bomb where
the attacker has “to come as close as possible to the body of the enemy” 414 without being
identified as one. In the shower scene the sound of the sprinkling water has as important
effect as the physical curtain. The water creates a sound barrier which mutes the sound from
the background. A crowd of people or traffic creates an element of closed which is disclosed
only by the explosion of the bomb. The physical curtain has also a normative function
410 Žižek 2009, 11.
411 Hitchcock 2003.
412 Mbembe 2008, 173.
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besides of protecting the room from water or the body from contact and changes in
temperature. It hides one’s nudity which is a social and religious taboo. In this context the
protector of modesty and special features of religious and cultural community transforms into
a sign of potential danger and death.
The attack is the revealing act, an element of disclosed. It is the actual emergence of the
event, Entsthehung which reorganizes the meaning and importance of the previous elements
and moments. Without the discovery of the revealing the event can not obtain its political
potentiality. Revealing is the element which penetrates the layers of social constructions from
the metaphor level to the litany where it is in time scale most easily noticed and recognized
as an attack. Revealing is the most important element in Entsthehung but it can not exist
without the previous element, the stage where it happens, or the curtain which separates the
moment of Entsthehung from other events. To be able to be disclosed one has to be closed in
the first place.
The deceptive character of the shower scene works in three metaphorical levels in relation to
the shahidat. At first, the attacker appears in the form of the Mother, an old woman, an
ordinary figure in an extraordinary context. Both qualities of woman and old are not related
to a violent actor, and when the sign of violence (the knife) is connected to the sign-vehicle
of an old woman, it leads to a situation where the signs are in conflict. It shows the expected
nature of the character as false and deceptive. The body is a mask that hides the soon-to-be-
detonated weapon, an invisible weapon carried in the shape of a body415. The analysis of the
conflicting signs also works in the case of the shahidat where a young girl is also qualified as
passive in relation to militant activity and extreme violence. Secondly, the real attacker
behind the figure of the Mother, is a man with an obsession which shows that the figure of
and old woman is a disguise. Still it plays crucial role because the man can’t fulfil his
obsession without the figure of the Mother. Compared to previous analysis of the Salò, the
Mother is the instrument of violence, not the real subject of power. In the case of suicide
bombings the attacker is not the subject of power, but an instrument for those who use
suicide attacks to achieve their politically oriented goals, their obsessions.
415 Mbembe 2008, 173.
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The disappearence appears in two levels, in physical bodily existence and in normative level.
When the detonation annihilates the body of the attacker, it conceals the weapon but also
transforms it into a weapon in ballistic sense416. In this total transformation the sign of bomb
overtakes the sign-vehicle, the human body, which after the explosion has become
unrecognizable. The person disappears both in semiotic sense and physically. It stops being a
human being in a single moment. This leads to the normative disappearance and
discontinuity in the social causes.  In the attack homicide and suicide are committed in the
same act417. The disappearance makes it impossible to condemn a person from the act and
exercise legislative power to maintain symbolic exchange. The signs of his/her existence
disappears and becomes one with the remains of the victims and they share the pain, death
and physical space and condition in the same event. The ability to produce the conflicting
signs of dead person and killer in one event are the core of the event of suicide attack.  The
suicide bomber possesses the power to decide not only of the lives of the others but also
one’s own life which is in the core of the necropower.
As in the case of murder, the body of the victim is the defining sign of the act and event, the
mutilated bodies of the victims are the scenery of the exercise of necropower. The bodies of
the victims become the symbol for everything that is under threat418 and the bodies of
individuals change in the language into numbers, status, location and time. This form of
bodies is not a group of individual bodies but one wounded social body, which leads easily to
a delimited group identity as a social cause for the event. Mutilated bodies present a form of
violence where “our own beds, ravaging the life we take for granted, staging the spectacle of
the ruined body”419. Murder cases are often named according to the victim, but in the suicide
attacks the event is named according to the attacker. The event which makes the body, the
physical sign of the instrumental subject, to disappear and mutilates the bodies of the objects
into unrecognizable as someone and rather recognized as something, allows one to reshape
the meaning of the event. “Stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus”420; Yesterday's
rose endures in its name, we hold empty names. This emptiness doesn’t mean meaningless
name, but a sign-vacuum which can be filled with chosen qualities in a representative act. As
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Lahnait notes, the shahidat has been glorified, but also a demonized, phenomenon421 which
endures emergence in many different contexts.
The question asked hear concerning the emergence of female suicide bombers doesn’t ask
what kind of image the event gives of the women who has committed it but, what kind of
image the women gives about the event. In the context of politics of fear the shahidat appears
as a change in the ordinary, a dual effect of hiding and revealing. It exposes vulnerability in
an event which is understood as ordinary and is transformed into dangerous.
6.2 RE-CUT OF REAL
Baudrillard classifies 9/11 as an absolute event, “the pure event uniting within itself all the
events that have never taken place” where the “play of history and power is disrupted”. One
can strongly agree with these arguments as an expression of culmination point of the heritage
of violent imagination and the emergence of the event of unreal reality. 9/11 plays so
important part in the modern political debates that it is correctly recognized as a rupture in
history, but it is not often carefully analysed what it ultimately changed in the construction of
social reality and which parts in this structure actually shows it as continuity instead of
discontinuity. The world may have changed, but there was already a world which to change.
* * *
There is a constituting difference between the first and the second plane contact to the World
Trade Centre’s north towers and south tower, but the second contact is different only because
of the fact that there was the one before. The first one in the actual event is a plane crash but
the second one is a plane strike which also ultimately changes the interpretation of the first
hit into strike. This difference is not simply a word game but a technique to provide culture, a
practice to transform the existing meaning of signs. The interpretation of the event’s effect to
the structural order of social reality differs depending on which CLA-level is in hand. This
provides different possibilities to approach the meaning of the event and also to criticize
them at some level.
421 Lahnait 2008, 74.
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The moment of first plane hitting the tower is a preparing act for the revealing of the hostile
act. It appears and is stated as a plane accident in the litany. The documentation of the first
hit is a filmed news report from the street view422. Here the picture is framed to the
interviewed person and is turned toward the tower just at the moment of the crash. In audio
the sound of the approaching plane can be detected in an earlier stage. The framing to
another target and its sudden change is the visual curtain which is lifted up to reveal the
accident on the stage of the ordinary daytime street view. The loud sound of flying plane
doesn’t necessary express the unordinary nature of the situation but rather a condition of low
flying plane, not crashing or striking plane. It also illustrates and frames the event as
ordinary before the exact moment of the hit and the turn of the camera.
The social causes in relation to the event draw the attention immediately to the human
casualties and material damages. How many passengers where there in the planes? How
badly are the towers damaged and can they be repaired? The news report expresses the
appearance of social institutions in the form of the media reporter and the fire fighter who is
captured in the frame in the moment of the first hit. They embody the social causes in
relation to the questions of responsibility of information and rescue operation. This question
of surveillance institutions and modern technology leads the analysis to Ulrich Beck’s theory
of world risk society423.
According to Beck “Risks are social constructions and definitions based upon corresponding
relations of definitions”424. In risk society the world is confronted with large-scale threats
which originate from modernisation and which do not respect the borders of the nation states.
The national institutions are incapable to manage the risks and they react by hiding or
denying them425. Conditio humane of twenty-first century is marked by incalculable risks
and manufactured insecurities426.  In his later work Beck also connects the concept of
terrorism into the debate of the risk society, which has earlier concentrated mainly on risk
relation between society and global environmental questions. Beck doesn’t claim that
terrorism is a by-product of worlds risk society or its manifestation but rather it can be
422 YouTube 2010.
423 Beck 2009, 191.
424 ibid., 30.
425 ibid., 30.
426 ibid., 191.
102
interpret toying with its symbols and metaphorical level, and producing an image of
permanent condition of catastrophe427.
If this relation is taken into a hypothetical experiment in Eco’s semiotic theory of sign-
vehicle, the situation can be more carefully explained. In the experiment a car is used as an
example of sign-vehicle and the transformation of meaning. A car expresses many qualities
but in the context of social order it can primary be seen as a sign of modernity. Wider range
of activity, greater amount of horse power where ‘horse’ in modernity exists only in
metaphorical sense, new technologies, materials and industries, and global trends and imagos
are semantic units which a car carries.
In the context of risk society a car will fail. A car transforms into car accident, produced by
the risk which exists in the relation between people, society and modern technology. This
risk has been tried to be managed by norms, pedagogy, surveillance and technology but still
it continues to fail and lethal accidents still happen. Furthermore the bare existence of a car
has transformed into environmental risk even without concrete accident because of limited
resources of fuel, pollution, global warming and in the future even the lack of agricultural
farmland for production of food consumed by production of biofuel. In any case the risk
produced by the symbol of modernity seems to escape all the possible answers by creating
new risks. A symbol of modern carries the sign of risk.
In the context of terrorism a car transforms into a car bomb. An explosion of a car bomb is
not an accident produced by high risk. It is produced by a person or group of people
intentionally to use fear, terror for political purposes. A bomb is not a by-product of modern
era but it is covered with the sign-vehicle of modern. It doesn’t only change our
understanding as a way to confuse an act of terrorism to accident, but also to recognize an
accident as a possible terrorist attack.
With this knowledge the vitality of the second plane contact can be explained. The second
plane changes our knowledge about the causes of the first hit and the nature of the entire
event. It was not an accident but a pattern, intentionally produced act of terror. The global
aviation and the twin skyscrapers are strong statements of modernity and material
427 Beck 2009, 40.
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manifestations of economical and technological supremacy, dynamic and monolithic
products of modernisation and globalisation. The deceptive character is hidden inside the
sign-vehicles of modernisation and is able to provide an interpretation of the event where it is
seen as a clash of risk society, where the semantic units of modern crash and collapse to their
own impossibility. Beck describes aims of terrorism to “transform the peaceful symbols of
civil society into instruments of dread”428 and Baudrillard as a use of “American everyday
life as cover and camouflage”429. Compared to the case of the shahidat and interpretation
provided by necropolitics, the attack of 9/11 transforms passenger airplane into a cruise
missile concretely and symbolically.
The totality of this transformation happens in the doubling of the sign430; two attacks to the
two towers in a multiple representation changed collective knowledge in irreversible way.
Establishing a new function, calling it with a specific way and recognising it according to this
function and name even without repeating its established use is a semiotic process where a
certain form of culture is born431. All these rules are accomplished in the event of 9/11 where
the planes crashed into the towers establishing their use as missiles, calling it as a terrorist
attack and repeating this multiple times via media.
Beck defines the event as spatially, temporally and socially fixed and having a well-defined
beginning and end432. Even his description seems accurate; it can be disagreed with Beck’s
notion of the clarity of the beginning and the ending. The event can be claimed to begin from
the first plane crash, a driving force which triggers the spectacle. In dramaturgical sense the
situation is more complicated. The beginning of the representation is sudden, dramatic and
culturally charged based on the myths and metaphors. These features change the
interpretation of the mundane into a supernatural, divine and apocalyptical. A sudden,
unexpected and implausible change in the story, deus ex machina, is driven by a divine force
which fundamentally changes the narrative. Deus ex machina as a supernatural appearance is
not a temporal and spatial phenomenon but a myth, disconnected from time and interprets the
event in a metaphysical level. A myth has an operational value because its pattern is timeless
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and by then it is able to explain as well present, past than future433. Deus ex machina is not a
well-defined beginning, but a mysterious, illogical, unclear and inhuman intervention and
rupture in the everyday reality. This considers the lack of meaning where no clear or
acceptable reason or motive is given for the event. Like Tony Magistrale describes
Hitchcock’s film The Birds “no apparent justification or logic associated with the sudden
ornithological assault [… ] in a God-abandoned universe where rational order and
benevolence [… ] replaced by an absurd principle of cosmic chaos”434.
The complete collapse of the towers can be seen as some kind of end for the event but there
also are some major problems to be able to explain it as closed end. The complete
disappearance of the objects of violence, the twin towers and the falling human bodies, and
the vanished subjects of violence, the planes and their pilots, can not provide a satisfying
ending. We do not see the mutilated bodies of the wounded towers or the killed people.
Everything is covered under a dense dust cloud. There is no clear point of reference for the
processing of the event, which makes the event to be able to approach only through the
repeated representation of the crashing planes, falling people and collapsing towers,
manifestations of continuing dying. As Butler comments the representation of Abu Ghraib,
the “image allows the event to continue to happen and, indeed, thanks to these images, the
event has not stopped to happening”435. This forms an open end, which was not closed even
in the killing of the embodiment of the attack, Osama Bin Laden. His represented death was a
non-event constructed of simulated stage, temporal and spatial distance as curtain, a
posteriori revealing, silenced identity of the characters, disappeared mutilated body and
forbidden photographical proves. As Beck himself notes of the representation of 9/11 “It
exploded everywhere, in every living room in the world”436 which separates the event from
its material location where the beginning and end could be permanently attached. Even the
naming the event as 9/11 doesn’t refer to a place or specific time because 9/11 takes place
every year, figuratively and literally.
* * *
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“The symbolic collapse of a whole system came about by an unpredictable complicity, as
though the towers, by collapsing on their own, by committing suicide, had joined in to round
off the event”437. Baudrillard’s argument seems absurd or even offensive and can widely be
accepted only in purely semiotic sense. Still his argument must be revaluated when the
collapse of the towers is equated to The Falling Man438.
The Falling Man is a photograph taken by Richard Drew at 9:41:15 a.m. on September 11th
of 2001 of an unknown man falling from the World Trade Center. Many people find the
image disturbing and horrific which has led to a situation where in most American
newspapers, the photograph ran once and never again because of hard criticism from the
readers. Still it is considered as digitalized Tomb of the Unknown Soldier which symbolises
also other victims of that event. 439 The fact that the identity of The Falling Man remained
unknown leaves empty space which can be filled with projection of personal experience and
knowledge, when the Unknown Soldier gets the face of familiar person or viewer’s own. The
ongoing representation of The Falling Man also captures the event of dying, a short moment,
where a living person who’s in a position where he’s inevitably going to die, could almost be
considerate as already dead. The object is in the process of continuing dying, without clear
beginning or end, a structural paradox between concepts of life and death.
One very important detail which must be noticed when the relation between Baudrillard’s
claim and the Falling Man is tried to be explained is that, the falling people where called as
jumpers440 in the news press. This expression presents that the falling people where not
actually falling off from the building but jumping from the windows. Difference is that
falling is a passive condition but jumping is active and is related to subjects own decision.
People who were trapped on the upper floors of the skyscraper apparently jumped rather than
suffocated to smoke and fire. Still their assumed decision of jumping would lead evidentially
to certain death which would be the same as committing suicide. An act which could be
interpret as suicide in the social causes would be false in the case of 9/11 where the outcome
would have been the same in a matter of minutes, but in metaphorical level it can be seen as
such. In the same level of deep cultural codes of Christianity, suicide is a taboo, a crime
against nature, community and God. Suicide has also normative consequences, because a
437 Baudrillard 2003, 8.
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person who had committed or tried to commit a suicide was or is condemned of crime and
possibly even sentenced to death. What makes the situation even more complicated is that the
act of terror escapes the social causes of normative rules in the context of symbolic exchange
where the victim has committed suicide and not being murdered by the attackers, who are not
contaminated by the act of killing.
The case of the Falling Man is a form of a forced self-destruction and breaking of a taboo,
similar to Baurdrillard’s interpretation of the collapsing towers and earlier notifications of
cultural taboos and power relations in the case of Abu Ghraib. It shows an absolute power to
transform the object into immoral character by presenting it as the subject which is willingly
destroying oneself. These victims are not martyrs but cowards and criminals without
sustainable moral and who have met their inevitable end just like the Western order and
domination which the WTC towers present. The interpretation of the attack represents it as a
revealing act of the vulnerability of the system which is based on inner construction of
spiritual emptiness. Falling of the towers symbolises the falling of the man.
Covering of the statue of falling woman441 in one way expresses the dominating framing of
the eventalized body in the context of 9/11. The nude female figure presents long tradition of
sculpturing and captures the traumatic vision of the event into bronze body442.
Conventionality makes it parallel to the long line of Western history of traumatic events and
their illustration. By concealing new artistic interpretation to the event, it is framed to the
official documentation, but also separated from the traditional narration. By conserving and
limiting the representation and interpretation, the event is clustered and emerges as a rupture
in history. This transforms 9/11 to the beginning of the new era of terror, an event which
ways of understanding are not allowed to evolve, it keeps repeating again and again, but not
emerging as new knowledge, only as the day the world stood still. It is not only about
representing the event, but formalizing and privileging one fundamental interpretation.
* * *
441 Roth 2002.
442 Appendix 2.
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Beck’s notion of the representative nature of 9/11 offers important glue to the event. He
describes the event as a media spectacle.443 This is also one conclusion where Baudrillard
ends up, that there is no interpretation for the meaning of the event and that it is purely a
spectacle of violence and cruelty444. Here it needs to be asked what is meant by spectacle. C.
R. Pramod identifies the specific features of a spectacle as sights which “appeal to the eye by
their mass, proportions, colour or other dramatic qualities” and it “ institutionalise the roles
of actors and audience, performers and spectators” appearing as “a dynamic form, demanding
movement, action, change, and exchange” awakening “a broad range of emotions”445.
Pramod refers to Foucault’s analyse of the spectacle as having a role in the reactivation of
power and creating order where for example the public executions have not been understood
only as a judicial but also as a political ritual446.
Pramod also refers to Guy Debord’s work Society of the Spectacle which is probably the
most famous interpretation of the concept of spectacle. According to his interpretation, a
spectacle provides justification for a specific programme, it differentiates and divides the
ruler from the ruled, and it express the practice of a particular economic and social formation
and the historical moment of being governed. Spectacle is not a collection of images but
social relationships mediated by images.447 In Pramond’s own application spectacle is shown
as a tactic or technology of governance and politics. Even his approach can’t by any means
be claimed as incorrect, it narrows Debord’’s works spirit which should rather be understood
as description of existing meta-reality, a fundamental change in experiencing social.
Debord claims that in the era of modernity the reality is experienced via representation448. In
representation reality transforms into images of reality, where they stop to be just images and
become real beings, but within the representation they are out of reach for interaction and
dialogue449. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the spectacle is opposite to the montage
which is an interactive process of formation of knowledge via representation, but rather the
spectacle sets a dominant interpretative frame. It is a centrepiece of drawing attention and
443 Beck 2009, 68.
444 Baudrillard 2003, 30.
445 Pramod 2008, 115.
446 ibid., 116.
447 ibid.
448 Debord 2005, 30.
449 ibid., 35–36.
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formation of knowledge450. First and foremost it is a structure of social relations which
should not be understood as intentional falsification. It is a worldview turned into material
reality and as such inseparable from the true.451 In a way a spectacle is real and to be apple to
talk about it, it is necessary to use a language which is part of the spectacle itself452.
The society which Debord describes and criticises is industrialized society without any other
goals than growth453. His work seems to be criticism of materialization as a form of
production and knowledge. Still his argument concerning representative experience and
accumulation of spectacle454 seems beneficial even outside the original context and reminds
in many parts discursive formations which determine ways of speaking and areas of
knowledge. Also his remarks of what could be called as meta-reality instead of spectacle, is
something that should be taken into consideration when the effect of the representation of
9/11 is estimated. His theory of Society of the Spectacle is examined and evaluated here
together with Baudrillard’s concept of simulations.
“Simulation is no longer [… ] a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by
models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.”455 Baudrillard’s simulation has also a
representative nature which constructs hyper-reality via artificial resurrection of referential in
sign systems456. Reproduction is made possible by construction of multiple different memory
units457 which can be artificial memories like linguistic, visual or audio documentations or
informal models of practices. Simulation is “substituting sign of the real for the real itself
[… ] to deter every real process by its operational double” 458 and even Baudrillard doesn’t
consider it as true power it is the object of social demand459. This complicated relation of
power and reality is well drawn into concrete in Baudrillard’s example of Iconoclasts.  If the
icons, the pictures of God would become a source of divine power, a god themselves, the
existence of God would be captured into these produced visual signs, artificial gods. When a
God becomes just a picture, he exists as a simulacrum of himself.460 This doesn’t mean that
450 Debord 2005, 30.
451 ibid., 31.
452 ibid., 32–33.
453 ibid., 34.
454 ibid., 30.
455 Baudrillard 1983, 2.
456 ibid., 4.
457 ibid., 3.
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God is unreal, but a simulacrum461, something comparable to Debord’s concept of spectacle,
where the concept of real and unreal, true and referential, original and simulation becomes
recognisably inseparable. This process of production of reality must be taken into more
careful and critical analysis of its visual nature by using Foucault’s concept of discursive
formations of archaeology of knowledge and genealogy’s Herkunft and Entsthehung.
Baudrillard highligts to uniqueness of the appearance 9/11 as the pure event462. Still there is
one important detail that can be captured from the litany, and which ultimate changes the
whole representative nature of the event. People who saw the event from television wondered
why they are showing movies in the morning. This actually expresses that something that was
beyond our imagination to happen, was actually something we had already seen before, but
in a different context, as fictional event. Baudrillard claims that “we have dreamt of this
event”463 but he means it as envy, glee or resistance against hegemonic power. More
important notion is when he refers to the series of disaster movies as reflections from this
fantasy464. To be able to fully understand the symbolic meaning of the event, discourse and
worldview must be captured from the most widely produced and spread form of public
imagination, different from the images of international news media, which is popular culture.
High ground, a borderline and linkage between earth and sky, temporal and eternal, secular
and divine, is in mythologies crucial crossing points, end and beginnings for mythological
eras. Žižek calls these as Things, manifestations of libido, the energy of our mind465.
Mountains, hills, towers or high trees are stages for central events. They present the relation
between continuity and discontinuity. In Christian cultural sphere the tower of Babylon and
the battle of Armageddon are probably the most well known examples and which the event
of 9/11 and the destruction of WTC towers is commonly referred. The man trying to reach
the sky (separating oneself from the nature) and the battle between the true believers and
forces of evil (Manichean worldview) transform into the risk of modernisation and the clash
of civilization.
461 Baudrillard 1983, 11.
462 Baudrillard 2003,4.
463 ibid., 5.
464 ibid., 7.
465 Žižek 2006, part 3.
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What these examples lack of is representative power in modern word. That is why the
influence of these myths must be analysed in relation to popular culture. One of the oldest
examples is a classical adventure and horror movie King Kong (1933). The most well known
scene is the one where the gigantic gorilla has climbed to the top of the Empire State
Building holding a blond woman as prisoner while the airplanes are battling against it466.
Here the high tower is the final stage for the epic battle where the embodiment of human
beast, King Kong a hybrid of man and nature, human’s primitive and violent form is fighting
against modern technology surrounded by artificial environment. Witnessing this conflict
between primitive and secular subject and civilized superman subject (breaking the
biological and geographical boundaries by flying and changing the landscape) is the object in
the role of a vulnerable victim, who on the other hand is trying to be saved and held, but
whose life is at the same time put into a great danger. The body of the victim is the second
battlefield of the scene. The object of the white female is identical to the role of the Falling
Man, a body in which according to Ahmed’s Freudian analysis the fear is projected467 and
has become a symbol for everything that is under threat468.
Fail Safe (1964)469 is a political thriller which presents a situation where in the safe system of
nuclear deterrence fails and accidentally activates the nuclear war between the parties of the
Cold War United States and Soviet Union. Story leads to a situation where the Empire State
Building is chosen to be the ground zero for the bombing of New York. The ground zero, a
military term related to the targeted explosion point of a bomb, became a name of the ground
where the WTC twin tower used to stand. The complete destruction of the metropolis was
culminated on one building which used to be the highest at that time, destruction which scale
is supernatural. The story expresses that the material loss was not comparable to the symbolic
loss, which is strongly present in the event of 9/11 and which both Beck and Baudrillard
emphasises.
Towering Inferno (1974) is a classical catastrophe movie where a fire burst wild in a
skyscraper, causing a situation where its height becomes the major problem for the rescue
operation. The film describes a situation where a modern groundbreaking building
technology turns into uncontrollable risk and a spectacle of death, horror and destruction.
466 Appendix 3.
467 Ahmed 2003, 195.
468 ibid., 207.
469 Lumet, 1964.
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The most important connection between 9/11 and Towering Inferno is purely their visual
appearance where a high tower building is on fire under the upper floors capturing the people
into a situation where they cannot escape470. Both films Towering Inferno and Fail Save
reflect the idea of techno-horror film even they cannot be purely categorized as such.
Techno-horror has only appeared in Western civilization and Japan, and it reflects anxieties
related to transformation driven by technological advances with uncontrollable speed471. This
type of fear is similar to Beck’s vision of uncontrollable risks.
“YIPES! IT’S HEADING FOR MY BREAND-NEW TWIN OFFICE TOWERS! LOOKS
LIKE YOU JUST LOST TWO RENTAL PROPERTIES! HM …  BUT MAYBE I GAINED
A NICE TOURIST ATTRACTION?”472 Presented dialogue happens between comic book
characters Uncle Scrooge and Donald Duck in a story Attack of the Hideous Space-Varmints
(1997) from Don Rosa in a situation where a floating money bin controlled by alien
technology hits the middle part of twin tower buildings destroying them. The look of these
towers is almost identical to the WTC –towers with their minimalistic architecture. What
makes this even more important example of popular culture related to the event of 9/11 than
Fail Safe (symbolic naming and targeting) and Towering Inferno (catastrophic nature of high
profile architecture) is that these fictional presentations where shared by a limited amount of
people based on their age. Comics of Donald Duck are not abandoned from children and they
present mainstream of popular culture unlike many other examples. Still it forms as strong
cultural recognition of the possibility of destruction even though the comic presents the
office tower as empty which lefts the casualties purely material, but the risk for high human
suffering remained. Even in the story artist has emphasised the spectacular nature of the
event by highlighting the words ‘LOST’ and ‘TOURIST ATTRACTION’ where the event is
a process of symbolic exchange. Lost of something is turned into a collective experience.
The crossroads of news event and popular culture leads our understanding of reality into a
puzzling situation. Where the simulation and spectacle, a representative phenomena which
have slowly replaced the real and direct experience and as such have became inseparable
from each other, in the interpretation of precognitive visual culture, the reality seems to
simulate fiction.  Even so, the concept of simulations does not have to be abandoned but
470 Appendix 4.
471 Magistrale 2005, 82.
472 Appendix 5.
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rather estimated its reversible potentiality. The relation between what is seen as real,
simulation and fiction, has to be seen as interactive process where it is not simply semiotics
but where the politics is involved.
The political intervention into presentation can be examined via two examples. The original
cover of a popular hip-hop group The Coup's upcoming album was replaced with a new
design. In the original cover “morning skies, the towers of the World Trade Center stand
engulfed in flame from the impact of twin explosions. Clouds of smoke spew from the upper
stories” 473. The design of the cover was done much earlier than the event of 9/11 happened
but the actual printing was going to start on that specific day. The release date of the album,
entitled Party Music, got pushed back in the light of 9/11 and opinions of several who took
contact considering the cover.474 Spider-Man movie's original trailer was released in 2001.
After 9/11 it was removed from theatres. The trailer showed a group of bank robbers
escaping with a helicopter, but they get caught into a giant spider-web between the two
towers of the World Trade Center.475
Politically provocative cover image was either self-censorship, condemned by public or
prohibited by authorities as where several unreleased movie scenes where the WTC towers
where shown. This could be partly explained by appealing to the ethical questions of
offensive material. On the other hand many scenes are not showing WTC towers in
unordinary way, mostly just on the background. This shows another example of extending
control over the representation of an event and monopolizing it where also the time becomes
political. If the fiction is linked to real, to be able to control the reality, the fiction needs to be
set under control too. Simulation is not a stabile order of signs but related to complicated
political processes.
How does this change experience of social reality and how it turns into political? Debord
argues that the spectacle erases the borderline between me and the world, the presence and
absence, real and unreal. People are condemned to accept the strange everyday reality
passively, a form of insanity where the possibility to affect one’s own existence is trying to
473 Glasner 2001.
474 ibid.
475 Marvel database.
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be controlled by magical technologies.476 Magistrale calls the post-9/11 time as culture of
paranoia where the source of threat is in distance but the consequential impact is felt among
our cities, citizens and us directly.477 Beck talks about unknown unknowns and the collapse of
ontological security in relations to terrorism478.  These arguments from Debord, Magistrale
and Beck include some valuable notion of socio-political transformation. Debord expresses a
situation where the subject loses it autonomy and transforms into the object which existence
is defined in relation to abstracts. Magistale’s culture of paranoia and Beck’s indefinable
sources of threat on the other hand expresses disrupted social order where there is a lack of
trust and security, and where the experience of exceptional situation is politically confronted
with exceptional measures.
Giorgio Agamben in his research on the State of Exception relates this historical concept into
the post 9/11 era479. Benjamin Morgan summarises Agamben’s State of Exception not just as
a connection with the state of war and particular law, but as a suspension of the juridical
order itself480. Agamben also opposes Carl Schmitt's claim of the state of exception as a
dictatorship but sees it more likely as an empty space and anomie in law where common
oppositions between norm and application, justice and violence, public and private are
erased481. In short the distinction between law and life disappears and every human action
suddenly acquires legal significance482. As in Debords spectacle, me and the world can not be
clearly separated anymore and where the control over concrete of life, the everyday reality, is
based on normative abstraction of exception, controlled by magical technologies. Both
Mogan and Erin Kruger highlight Agamben’s claims that after 9/11 attacks the state of
exception has reached its maximum planetary dispersal, a permanent state of exception483.
How this relates to the politics of fear depends on if there exists a normative state of jus in
bello, in which case the politics is understood as warfare, censorship and propaganda; or a
state of emergence during peace time when it can not be included in jus in bello. When a
state of war becomes rhetorical and discursive practice without a coherent referential object it
can be understood as the politics of fear where the knowledge and experience of war is
maintained in civil life. When exceptional becomes permanent it can no longer be understood
476 Debord 2005, 179–180.
477 Magistrale 2005 ,101.
478 Beck 2009, 40.
479 Agamben 2005.
480 Morgan B. 2005, 264.
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as exception but as a replacement in social order. It can’t be seen as a referential being
anymore but a model of a real, a hyperreal production of simulation484 a process where
normal is replaced with exceptional which then becomes normal.
* * *
The event of 9/11 pictures to us as complex relation of real and unreal, as an experience of
being awake and dreaming. The question is about the moment of shift between these two, a
rupture in ontological. While interpreting a structure of moving image story telling Žižek
described this middle space as nightmarish and ontological perversion485. The interpretations
of the effect of the event also vary greatly and there can’t be formed a homogenous analysis.
The event must be interpret in relation to it’s own dynamics within the event itself but also to
later socio-political phenomena and estimate them as a possible heritage from the event and
as spaces for the emergence. Also the understanding of the past knowledge and the
imagination of violence related to the elements of the event should not be left untouchable.
The dynamics between knowledge and experience of past and present is something where we
should look analytical tools from psychoanalysis and its theory of temporality, causality and
memory.
Through his works Sigmund Freud used the concept of Nachträglichkeit486 as a central
element of psychoanalysis487. Freud’s main question was to understand how the temporality
is constructed in relation to causality and memory. Because of this complex relation, the term
has been found most difficult to translate (for example to afterwardsness) without giving a
false or narrowing meaning to the concept. Freud’s basic arguments are that the events from
the past are estimated and interpret via later experiences. Here the time is not a linear model
but more likely a spiral, bidirectional causality, and by then an ongoing process.488 This is
also the reason why the influence of an event to the understanding of past and present can not
be explained only as Herkunft or Entsthehung, because in Nachträglichkeit an emergence
changes understanding of the nature of heritage which by then doesn’t only manifest as
heritage but also as a form of emergence, a new way to understand the meaning of the past.
484 Baudrillard 1983, 2.
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Not only the influence of old experiences are under examination but the new ones which
affect to the ways of remembering past experiences. Memorising is not historical reality but a
process of constructing memory in the present moment489.
The effect of Nachträglichkeit can be traced inside the dynamics of the event of 9/11 and also
in a wider time spandex. As noted in the very beginning the chapter, there is a fundamental
difference between the crash into first and second tower. The first one is a manifestation of
the risk society and the second one of the clash of civilizations490. Here the first traumatic
event doesn’t remain static but the interpretation of the second strike transforms it also to a
becoming of the remaking of world order491. But as claimed, the causality is bidirectional and
also the clash of civilizations transformed into something different, something close to the
clash of risk cultures492.
Nachträglichkeit happens also in relation to fiction, reality and simulation. In 9/11 at that
exact escaping moment when the tip of the airplane pierces the glass and steel wall structure,
the clear and thin difference between what is understood as real and what as imaginary
shattered. What used to be understood as harmless imagination became a possibility and a
forecast for a serious threat. The catastrophic events and mythical conflicts of western
imagination transformed into reality which led to a state where what could be imagined,
could also be dangerous. The distance which allowed one to see something frightening but
which could not happen in reality disappeared in 9/11. The politics of fear is not based on the
countable risk but to the possibility, where possible is limited and divided from impossible
only by imagination and retrospective knowledge. In the politics of fear real and unreal are
overlapping entities as the cases of the dangerous ordinary caused by the shahidat and noir
discourse as parrhesia also emphasises.
489 Saraneva 2008, 2.
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7. TRAUMATISED BODIES
The etymological meaning of the word trauma is a wound. The word is used to describe both
the physical and the mental condition.493 It is also defined regarding to following features
where a person:
1. have been exposed to an extreme event that lies beyond usual human
experience,
2. repeatedly re-experience the event or parts of the event
3. attempt to avoid stimuli that give rise to recollections of the event
(avoidance) or experience general emotional numbing, and
4. continuously be in a state of psychological alertness (arousal ).494
Definition of trauma seems to share some of the main elements of the study of politics of fear
so far. These are eventalization as a method for the analysis of the sources of fear,
representation as a formation of sign, montage as interpretative process of the event, the
silence as avoidance of the threat and the knowledge of the state of vulnerability in the
ordinary. In this study it is estimated how a trauma caused by violence can actualize as
individual and collective behaviour and where the actual political impact of fear into people
can be discovered.  Trauma is a condition caused by an event where the knowledge becomes
materialised in the body, diagnosed genealogy of fear.
7.1 GHOSTS
We saw a man, who was still moving, even thought his organs where falling
out. We saw so badly burned bodies that one couldn’t be sure in which side the
face used to be.495
Around us was silent … actually it was terrifying silence, as if all the people
and all the trees and even plants would have been dead. [… ] Hands where in a
terrible pain and the only way was to keep them raised in front of us as ghosts
493 Montgomery 1998, 8.
494 ibid., 11.
495 Hautamäki 1988, 14. Translated by the writer of the thesis.
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have, so that they wouldn’t touch our body … everyway around the people
looked ghostly.496
Everybody looked like the same, everybody heard like the same [… ] Half or
completely naked they walked with strange, slow steps [… ] They looked white
[… ] their faces where like masks. It felt like I would be seeing a dream when I
looked these terrifying ghosts passing by slowly. [… ] If there would have been
only few of them, it may have not affected so strongly. But I met them
everywhere – I can still see them – walking ghosts [… ] I couldn’t make any
specific decision … I followed the others … I lost my self and drifted away … 497
Man with deadly injuries but who is still alive, a living environment without sound, human
formed beings with unnatural appearance and bodies without mind. These impressions are
collected from psychoanalyst Robert Jay Lifton’s interviews of survivors of the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki atom bombs after 17 years of those events498. Nuclear bomb explosion targeted
against civilian population problematises again the relation between the politics of fear and
warfare. Even further the descriptions of the event questions the fundamental structural
division between life and death when it is related to human experience and semiotics. Even
how different they might look, the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have many similar
constructive elements as presented in the case of Mogadishu, Abu Ghraib, Shahidat, the
silence and 9/11, which are not just direct violence and death.
The appearance of badly injured people was shocking. The living could not be recognized
from the dead499 in a situation where their physical appearance was identical. The only
difference was that the others where still functioning under a collective pattern of behaviour,
as living dead, zombies without own mind. The living where related to dead not only by the
observing outsiders but also in their own experience500 because there was no clear
understandable causality why the people who experienced the same mystical flash pika
don501 had different destinies. The diseases caused by the radiation led to the death of others,
when the others survived without any separating visual sign. The difference between living
496 Hautamäki 1988, 15. Translated by the writer of the thesis.
497 ibid., 16.
498 ibid., 11.
499 ibid., 14.
500 ibid., 35.
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and dead stayed unrecognisable because of “an invisible and sneaking radiation death”502.
How this differs from the case of Shahidat is that the mutilated bodies did not disappear but
remained as living sign-vehicles of death among the living. These people are called
Hibakusha stigmatized by keloid scars from the fires503. Word Seizonsha, a survivor, is not
used because the Hibakushas are socially related permanently to the status of victim. The
social causes are seen in the discrimination and belonging to the lowest social group.504
Other stigmas appear also in later generations. Most important symbol besides keloid scars is
microcephaly, a malformation of small head which also leads to lower mental capabilities.
Mutilated and deformed bodies form the genealogy of fear and where the heritage has
become both social and genetic phenomenon.
Discrimination of Hibakushas can be explained as socio-cultural phenomenon related also (at
least in the level of speech) to economical reasons505. It is also strongly related to semiotics
and anthropology. People didn’t only die immediately when the atom bombs exploded but
they kept dying506 during the next hours, days and years. Victims of the explosion shared
almost identical resemblance and Hibakusha’s carry same physical signs. The descriptions of
the witnesses of the event of Hiroshima and Nagasaki express that there didn’t exist anymore
individuals but a one body of Hibakusha, a mass of clones which kept on dying. In collective
sphere of bereavement which is caused by radiation appears as continuing dying, as the
heritage of pika don. In a way continuing dying exists at least as long as the generation of
Hibakusha’s is alive. Hibakushas have transformed into sign-vehicles of semantic units of
pika don which is done via recognizing, naming and numerous repetitions.
The cloning of the Hibakusha body began in the moment of explosion. Shock wave denuded
the clothes of the victims and burned their skin. The result can be seen in the descriptions of
eye witnesses of the endless lines of nude and burned bodies, the ghosts, where the individual
differences and social status is lost. Repetition makes the illustration technique special.
Repeating creates rhythmic line, where the open-closed or light-dark binomials erase the
material appearance and strengthen the abstractive and associative meanings507. It can be
compared to the symbolic violence presented in Abu Ghraib as symbolic beheading (loosing
502 Hautamäki 1988, 25–26.
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ones face) and animalization which also appeared in the case of Mogadishu (nudity), an act
which wretches all the semantic units of social status and personal and collective identity,
forming a model of one body.
The explosion transforms the people into a state which Agamben calls bare life both in
symbolic and material sense. The word bare is related to Greek hapl?s, philosophical term of
pure Being508. Bare life is something which is excluded from politics509, something which is
pure of politics and what transforms from nature to culture, from zo? to bios510 when it is set
under sovereign power and becomes politicised. Their later emergence as Hibakusha sets
them into a form of homo sacer, where they are partly considered as outsiders but where they
still remain within the social order511. Agamben defines it as “Life that cannot be sacrificed
and yet may be killed is sacred life”512 The logic of the impurity of life513 can be better
understood in relation to Hibakusha if it is related to what has been told about Girard’s
claims concerning sacred and violence. Hibakushas are impure because they have become
the sign-vehicles of semantic units of violence and death, blood and wounds, and by then
contaminated by violence. Homo sacer is character of the double exception514. On the one
hand Hibakushas where given medical care but on the other hand they have remained
discriminated in the society.
The explosions did not only led into loosing one’s social status but also loosing oneself.
Soili Hautamäki notes that after the recovery many people still had the permanent feeling that
their bodily functions had for some reason become distorted and strange for them515. Also the
reflections from social relations affected to this feeling of strangeness. A young woman
abandoned by his husband, and a girl whose parents where unable to recognize her from her
face516 are examples of a situation where one’s appearance has changed so dramatically that
she is not understood as the same person one used to be. The shattered image of self was by
own experience and social environment changed from me to a stranger. Here bare life
appears as a fundamental condition, as a pure life without identity, social relations, normative
508 Agamben 1998, 102.
509 ibid., 11–12.
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support or secured future. It also shows the ultimate form of repression in a form of
psychological, physical, social and normative regression, bare and wounded life.
Traumatic event may lead to a victimization and identification as the other which is
conformed by naming. This process doesn’t necessary mean a process of marginalization, a
social amputation where the wounded are violently cut off from the society. It may also lead
to a formation of new group identity. Volkan’s empirical study shows an example of five
Palestinian children survivors from the Sabra and Shatila massacres in Lebanon on
September 15th in 1982 committed by the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia. The
children’s real identities were unknown, so they where given the last name Arafat, which was
used in the orphanage. The children’s behavior appeared as what is understood as normal
when they acted together as a team. When one of them was separated from the others, he or
she would behave abnormally; either becoming extremely agitated or hallucinating. The
abnormal behavior disappeared when the children where reunited. In Volkan’s analysis this
showed a difficulty in their sense of personal identity and that individual identity was
replaced by team or large-group identity517.   Similar to the case of the Hibakusha, traumatic
event causes serious human casualties and leads to a formation of a group of survivors and
victims which then are named according to their status and identified as one homogenous
being, not as individuals. The shared experience of traumatic event and the following
recognition and social interaction constructs a social body, where the physical boundaries of
individual body has disappeared and one can only be normal as a part of something, without
experiencing distortion and strangeness
Blinding …flash divided the sky [… ] I saw gigantic cloud mass […] it looked
like a monstrous mushroom [… ] the shape …the colour …the light …it lived
and changed constantly.518
I saw that the Hiroshima had disappeared [… ] Hiroshima didn’t exist – I didn’t
see anything else – Hiroshima didn’t definitely exist.519
517 Volkan 2009.
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The explosion of atom bomb, pika don was something that was not experienced ever before
in such a massive scale. The impressions comes very close to the Thing, a gigantic object of
power which seems to have a mind of its own, and that it really present the energy of our
mind in its most terrifying and lethal form. It presents the spectacle in its purest form
appearing as mass, colour, dynamic form, change and awakening range of emotions520. What
here really appears problematic is that the impressions of the explosion do not seem to reflect
pure terror. What was experienced on that moment was something unbelievable, a grand
rupture in normal even it took place during the war. There was no clear sign or knowledge of
such a possibility in the case of Hiroshima, in a city which didn’t have any special strategic
importance and which happened in a day time in a clear sky where the destruction was
brought only by single plane. Atom bomb appeared as deus ex machina, unpredictable
intervention of divine power which as in dramaturgy, also orders the outcome of the conflict.
If we look the emotional range of spectacle and the divine and exceptional nature of deus ex
machina together we end up to a concept of Thambos. It is a term known from the era of
Antiquity where it expressed holy fear, a religious feeling, and respective fear aroused by
supernatural power or being.521 A source of thambos appears as unreachable for human
understanding and control. It can not be approached or entered because it is not humane from
its nature, it can be arbitrary or schematic and regarded only with fatalism. The source is out
of reach but the feeling remains, the knowledge of possible and uncontrollable destruction.
The original term of ground zero was taken into use after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombings. It seems suitable name not only as a coordinates but also in the scale of
annihilation. The areas targeted as ground zero became the spaces of total disappearance.
Like in the case of the twin towers of World Trade Center there was no referential object left
of the cities which inhabitants as the only sign of the explosion after the disappearance of the
mushroom cloud had transformed into unrecognizable homogenous group of ghosts. Entire
space of social relations, economy and living had vaporized away in a single moment.
Agamben argues that the sphere of the domus is the originary political element which defines
the very model of natural life and life exposed to death522. The disappearance of domus
means a fundamental rupture and discontinuity in social reality and political space. The lack
520 Pramod 2008, 115.
521 Flacelière 1995, 182.
522 Agamben 1998, 55.
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of referential object and possibility to understand the sudden and extremely radical change
was also reflected in the death silence, the silence which expressed the total emptiness and
incapability to process such an event523. Total disappearance of visual sign appeared as non-
existing vocal-signs. The visual and auditory spaces become referential objects to the
traumatic event.
7.2 RESPONSIVE BODIES
Similar results of change in homely spaces can be found from the research concerning the
effect of war and political violence in post-traumatic stress disorder. Living in the midst of
fighting including bombardment and home demolition, which takes place in own well known
environment, has led into severe and widespread post-traumatic reactions.524 Post effects can
appear as super-memory which reproduces the event back to knowledge via all senses.
Memories can appear in situation where a person is awake or sleeping as fragments or as
complete event. To be activated these memories sometimes need a trigger. For example a
survivor from flight accident had two fragments of memory considering the event. The first
was a visual memory where a line of trees are passed by with high speed when the plane was
falling, and the second was a smell of fuel in the plane after the crash. These memories could
return automatically but they where also triggered by driving though forest roads and while
refuelling. Also audio memories can spontaneously appear as banging, shouting, screaming
or unnatural silence.525 In the context of trauma the representation of the event is not brought
directly but re-experienced by a sign-trigger, conditioned reflex526 reconstructing the event
from the memories.
The two oldest children [… ] sleep poorly at night, and wake up with frequent
nightmares. Furthermore, they panic when they hear shooting from the military
training camp nearby or the sound of aeroplanes.527
When the girl sees a weapon or a person in uniform, she thinks her family is
going to be killed. Sudden sounds startle her, a reaction that her parents feel is
related to the bombings during the war.528
523 Hautamäki 1988, 15. Translated by the writer of the thesis.
524 Thabet, Abed and Vostanis 2002, 1803.
525 Dyregrov 1994, 29.
526 Pavlov 2010, 136.
527 Montgomery 1998, 74.
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An Iraqi man who had been imprisoned three times because of political
activities. [… ] He has difficulties falling asleep and staying asleep and has
frequent nightmares about the torture. He suffers from anxiety attacks,
palpitation, and a feeling of suffocation, often triggered by the sight of
policemen in uniform or by certain sounds. 529
Described situation are from Palestine, Kuwait in a time of Iraqi occupation and Iraq, which
all message a breach of human rights and also humanitarian law which recognizes civilians
as a group under special protection. These are reactions to bullets which are not targeted,
aeroplanes which do not carry bombs and officials who are not ordered to kill or torture.
They are reflections of previous violence which doesn’t exist in their present position but
which is still experienced as potential threat. Fear as future oriented phenomenon is
problematic when it is related to trauma where the expected pain and suffering is not traced
from the future but from the past. Repressing violence transforms a human, the political
subject, into bare life a produced objects of fear. In the culture of fear, trauma is a
structuring element of self-governance.
Trauma reminds in many ways internalized form of discipline and punishing. Panopticon530
does not locate in surveillance technologies but in technologies of the self. It is not formed
between monitoring subject and monitored object. In internalized panopticon the object
becomes the subject of self-governance. When the emotional memories are traumatic, they
become permanent; dissociate fears toward everything which could remind from the
traumatic situation. Traumatic stress maintains the symptoms by preventing their
processing.531 The sensors (eyes and ears) of the subject form the physical part of the
panopticon, where the passive sign-vehicles of power (visual or vocal) trigger the
punishment mechanism which is based on the knowledge, either conscious or unconscious.
Here trauma doesn’t appear only as medical question but as an instrument of power,
produced by the subject of power and governed by the self. A situation where a visual sign of
governance, a uniform can produce either, a knowledge and strong possibility of being
treated with serious violence or actually physically experiencing violence where the subject
528 Montgomery 1998, 77.
529 ibid., 34.
530 Foucault 1991a, 200.
531 de Mause 2003, 97.
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and sign of violence remains passive, shows an ultimate form of governance, violence
without violent act. As in panopticon, the whole idea of governance is based on the
knowledge of possibility of being noticed, captured and punished532.
* * *
Study on trauma verifies certain elements of the politics of fear and it also have brought out
some new aspects. One is the concept of materialized social body the one-body, a form of
group identity which in its purest form overtakes personal identity and which is not only
social but also as bodily experience, a stage where the mental becomes physical and the
knowledge transforms the body. Social body in its most fundamental form as experienced
limits of one’s existence can only be reformed from bare life, a form of human life which
exists without recognition and socio-political status. The social body is real in the sense that
Foucault argued the kings body to be, not a metaphor but a political reality. The social body
is constituted not by the universality of wills but of the materiality of power operating on the
bodies of individuals.533 In the context of politics of fear the will of the social body exists,
but in the way which Foucault also abandoned, not as universal consensus, but as repressed
reaction caused by material power which has entered the bodies of individuals treating and
operating them as one being. Social body is the manifestation of genealogy of fear, a rule for
the formation of the objects of fear. Fear can be constructed in collective memory only if the
eventalized body can be acknowledged also as a social body, a representation of one’s own
existence.
The other phenomenon is a process where the body and knowledge transforms into
panopticon, an internalized surveillance and punishment mechanism constructed of
conditioned reflexes activated by sign-vehicles of violence. This shouldn’t be recognized
only as self-governance but also as a silent casualty, disabling mechanism which is not
commonly recognized as such in the political debates. Producing fear is not recognized as a
crime and there doesn’t seem to be any effective international treaties or practices controlling
this type of indirect violence. Serious negative effects on mental health of children in the
conflict areas534 are not related to problems such as land mines as a threat for civilian
532 Foucault 1991a, 200–202.
533 Foucault 1980b, 53.
534 Thabet, Abed and Vostanis 2002, 1803–1804.
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population. In both cases the acts of violence, either direct or indirect, are causing harm for
health and prosperity which actualises the silent casualty as a regression of the population.
Foucault interpret the assertion of Carl von Clausewitz that war is politics continued by other
means in the context of political power and understands it as a form of unspoken warfare in
social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language and in the bodies themselves535. This
concludes very well the nature of trauma in relations to political power. In trauma the
knowledge of fear materialises in the body as experience of violence and patterns of
pathological behaviour, which socially emerges as seclusion and repression.
8. CONCLUSION: THE UNHEIMLICH
“One is curious to know what this peculiar quality is which allows us to distinguish as
‘uncanny’ certain things within the boundaries of what is ‘fearful’.” 536 In the light of the
research so far, Sigmund Freud’s question or note seems most important. What can be
summarised from the case research is the appearance of ordinary things which are set under a
context, frame and interpretation which makes them fearful. Freud’s note concerning
uncanny and fear are part of his research on the Unheimlich537, a German term which comes
close to the meaning of the uncanny and is usually translated this way. Research on the
Unheimlich is a question considering the subject of aesthetics, where it is understood as a
theory of the qualities of feeling, not as purely visual subject538.
The German word unheimlich is obviously the opposite of heimlich, heimisch,
meaning “familiar,” “native,” “belonging to the home”; and we are tempted
to conclude that what is “uncanny” is frightening precisely because it is not
known and familiar. Naturally not everything which is new and unfamiliar is
frightening, however; the relation cannot be inverted. We can only say that
what is novel can easily become frightening and uncanny; some new things are
frightening but not by any means all. Something has to be added to what is
novel and unfamiliar to make it uncanny.539
535 Foucault 1980b, 90.
536 Freud 1919, 1.
537 Also written as Das Unheimliche and Unheimlichkeit.
538 Freud 1919, 1.
539 ibid., 2.
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To avoid confusion is must be clarified here that the word uncanny is used to describe the
feeling itself where the Unheimlich is the expression for the concept which appears to be
more complicated.  Freud relates the impression of uncanny to the objects and events which
depend on how well one is oriented to this environment540.  Freud admits that the uncanny
can be understood narrowly as “nothing else than a hidden, familiar thing that has undergone
repression and then emerged from it, and that everything that is uncanny fulfils this
condition”541. According to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, everything is uncanny that
“ought to have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to light”542 which makes it already
much more complicated phenomenon related to process of appearance and disappearance.
Freud finds it possible to approach the Unheimlich by “proceeding to review those things,
persons, impressions, events and situations which are able to arouse in us a feeling of the
uncanny in a very forcible and definite form”543.
It is reasonable and useful at this point to compare the findings of the symbolic violence, the
silence, breach in social reality and trauma to the concept of the Unheimlich in terms to form
a coherent understanding concerning the politics of fear and possibly to summarise the
various phenomena under this concept. The supplemented new hypothesis is: The modern
politics of fear is similar to the appearance of the uncanny. In the concluding section the
elements of the Unheimlich are estimated in relation to case studies. After testing, the new
hypothesis is put under question in which ways one can approach the concept of politics of
fear.
* * *
Ernst Jentsch originally used the story of E. T. A. Hoffmann The Sand-Man to describe the
experience of the uncanny 544. He and Freud divided different elements which they presumed
to cause the feeling of uncanny. Freud also complemented these according to his own
experiences and previous researches. These elements are used here as structuring concepts to
formulate a hypothetical theory of the politics of fear in relation to the Unheimlich.
540 Freud 1919, 2.
541 ibid., 15.
542 ibid., 4.
543 ibid., 5.
544 ibid., 5.
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The characters of Olympia is a reference to animism which will be presented as the first
model of appearing as the Unheimlich. This feeling is produced by the uncertainty whether a
lifeless object might be animate.545 If the content of Olympia is generalized, the argument
could consider any object which holds the potentiality to appear to be something different to
its present appearance. Animate doesn’t only refer to life but also to movement and imitating
life. This would mean that the animated object can have motivation to move in relation to
other objects and that imitating appearance is covering the prediction of this movement
which leads to the conclusion of the deceptive nature of the object. The potentiality to appear
as something extraordinary and different also moves the animated object to the role of the
motivated subject. The concept of animism can most closely be related to the shahidat where
a passive female figure or a lifeless automobile achieves a radical and explosive movement
unexpectedly and changing the subjects via necropower into the objects of violence. The act
of violence alone does not establish the concept of animism but the knowledge which is
achieved concerning the possibility of the object to appear as the subject. Same knowledge
affects the experiences concerning aeroplanes and luggage as penetrating missiles and
exploding accessories. Olympia expresses a hidden potentiality to emerge as a rupture in the
order of the object and the subject.  It is radical, sudden and unpredictable which makes it
destructive and impossible to control, a phenomenon of the Unheimlich.
Furthermore the animism can be interpret to appear in a more complicated process, in the
simulation. An event which takes place on the silver screen, a projection of film which is the
representation of an event which didn’t ever happen as such, suddenly invades reality.
Olympia, a doll as a referential being of the woman, becomes real being when it moves. It is
the same process as where the simulation becomes real, a breach in social reality.
Another concept in tracing the Unheimlich which relates to simulation is the double.  There
are two different ways to approach it where one is presented by E.T.A. Hoffmann and other
by Otto Rank. For Hoffmann the double expresses identical visual appearance. Here one can
identify him/herself so closely to his/her double that they transfer mental processes as in
telepathy. Less dramatically expressed one possesses knowledge, feeling and experience in
common with the other which leads to a situation where one identifies oneself with another
person.546 At least two links can be drawn to the case studies; to the prisoners of Abu Ghraib
545 Freud 1919, 5.
546 ibid., 9.
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and the lines of Hibakusha’s in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Abu Ghraib presented a situation
where the uniformed representation of the prisoners and complicated identifying made them
possible targets for identification. Hibakusha on the other hand produced identical biological
and visual appearance which then became similarity in social status. The victims of the
explosion transformed into the double of each other where the identification to group
appeared as collective pattern of behaviour immediately after the explosion. Completely
disappeared surrounding social order, a space of bare life, lead to shared identity and
formation of the social body. For outsiders their visual presence as endless lines of
wondering ghosts also was like looking a copy or a double of one person, one-body.
For Otto Rank the double is a reflection in the mirror, one’s own shadow, guardian spirit or
soul. It is regarded as part of ones own existence. The most concrete ones, reflection and
shadow, are natural signs of our physical appearance where the light reacts to our existence
and forms an image. The abstract ones are as Rank calls them “reinsurance against
destruction to the ego” and “energetic denial of the power of death” where the soul is the
double of the body. This argument is compared to the ancient Egyptians and their art of
making images of the dead in lasting material.547 What is not noted here is that also the
destruction of these images was an absolute act against the person which they presented and
in the case of seizure of power the faces and names where destroyed from the wall paintings
and statues to prevent their resurrection and to erase their existence and access to power
completely. The violence against the double has to happen in representation where the
symbolic process affects the collective memory, exposing the one who’s related to the double
to symbolic violence.
In the case of Abu Ghraib this destruction of the double was done in erasing the faces of the
prisoners. Furthermore the double can be transformed into “ghastly harbinger of death” what
in history has happened to characters of previous religions. In Abu Ghraib the representative
double, physical and social image, is corrupted in the same way. Classical example which
Freud doesn’t use is Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray. In the story artificially
produced double of Dorian Gray is the portrait made of him. In the story all corruption
caused by age, sickness and immoral life doesn’t appear in the subject Dorian Gray but in his
double, the picture. The picture projects the real nature of the subject and his actions. As in
547 Freud 1919, 9.
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the story when the subject and his double are set into same context, the corruption will
transfer back to the subject.548    The immortalized part of human being, the knowledge or
idea concerning oneself is corrupted producing the image of immoral us.
In Abu Ghraib the prisoners where forced to participate event which representation, double
of the event, corrupts them by breaking of the moral and cultural taboos and repressing them
by symbolic violence. Here the direct violence transforming the person into the object of
violence is not relevant in relation to the double but the way how the representation
transforms it to the immoral subject. Žižek notes that in idealistic tendency of hylozoism
death doesn’t exist as such but it appears only as deconstruction of certain system or
structure of living particles when life itself continues. He also argues that Sade’s absolute
crime deems to destroy this second part of life.549 It can be claimed that this second part of
life is the manifestation of the double and that the illustrative and interpretative discursive
practice of Salò presents them in the context of this absolute crime which corrupts and
destroys their double, which can be understood here as their public image, their social status
and their understanding of oneself.  The immortal nature of the double can also be seen in
reversible role in the case of Rodina’s daughter. Here the name of the dead mother remained
as her double which was then via naming transferred to her grandchild which became then
the sign-vehicle for her double, indestructible biological and cultural form of life, a living
picture.
Representation doesn’t appear as part of the Unheimlich only in the context of the double. It
should first and foremost be related to involuntary repetition550. “That factor which consists
in a recurrence of the same situations, things and events [… ] what I have observed, this
phenomenon does undoubtedly, subject to certain conditions and combined with certain
circumstances, awaken an uncanny feeling, which recalls that sense of helplessness” 551.
Continuing representation constructs the even as endless or reoccurring. Images are related to
memory and the representing images activates the same conscious an unconscious
experiences which occurred in the actual event or when the representation was seen first
time. Relation of involuntary repetition to trauma is obvious where the representation does
not have to come from some outer source but were it can reactivate from one separate sign.
548 Wilde 1982.
549 Žižek 2009, 90.
550 Freud 1919, 11.
551 ibid., 10.
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The omnipotence of thoughts is imagined situation where one’s wishes come true. Freud
argues that “an uncanny effect is often and easily produced by effacing the distinction
between imagination and reality, such as when something that we have hitherto regarded as
imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full functions and
significance of the thing it symbolizes”552. In this context it doesn’t recall any effort from the
subject but the wishes appear spontaneously.553 In the case studies this concludes two
different phenomena, the Circle of Manias and the breach in reality. The Circle of Manias
illustrated an immoral space of sadism and perversion, a manifestation of uncontrollable
desires, which break all the conventional norms. In this context the sexual fantasies appeared
as violent pornography and change from personal to public which appears as a repressive
power relation. Žižek descripes this phenomenon as the id-machine, a place, subject or
situation which makes the unconscious dreams come true but where they will evidently tier
away from one’s hands and drift into a conflict situation with ones ego554. A Breach in reality
in relation to omnipotence of thought forms a catastrophe fantasy, where an ability to
imagine impossible threat makes it possible which comes close to Baudrillard’s harsh
argument that we have been dreaming of the destruction of WTC-towers. The ability to
imagine destruction and illustrate it in the context of fiction can turn into reality. This claim
can be completed by the arguments of Žižek concerning the nature of real.  According to him
we forbid our real desires and fantasies. When they emerge the social reality becomes fragile,
which can be tier down by the intervention of the real.555 Here the real stands for the reality
in it’s most bare form without mitigating images, ideas or believes, a space which exists
without society and norms. Žižek continues by arguing that the emergence of real
exterminates the borderline between reality and the real.556 The danger of the omnipotence of
thought seems to lay in the discovery of the real nature of human being, the immoral us and
in the potentiality of harmless imagination to change into nightmarish reality.
The character of Sand-man is the leading element in Freud’s analysis of the Unheimlich. As
in animism the real existence of Sand-man remains unknown; his presence or appearance can
be projected to living subject but the actual being seems only to exist in the idea or myth
552 Freud 1919, 15.
553 ibid., 12.
554 Žižek 2006, part 2.
555 Žižek 2009, 19.
556 ibid., 21.
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level. This makes impossible to enter his character. Real Sand-man exists only in the level of
text also in the Hoffman’s story but even so knowledge concerning him has a great effect to
child’s behaviour.557 Sand-man can be described as violent, sadistic and malignant. His aim
to steal the children’s eyes558 is the vocal sign which activates the narrative and causes the
projection of the semantic units concerning Sand-mans qualities and transfers them into sign-
vehicle.  This can be recognized as the same phenomena as the child’s fear fantasy of
Cannibal Negro where the visual sign of dark skin triggers the qualities presented in
negro/necro discourse. Both are narratives of extremely negative stereotypes which do not
exist as such but which live in the level of text and may emerge in various situations. Also
the characterization of the female soldier can be identified as Sand-man-effect in the context
of the Unheimlich.
Sand-man also appears as deceptive character. In the story the Sand-man is presented in a
form of different men. Here the dramaturgy of appearance is similar to the shahidat because
of the deceptive nature, but also because the men in the role of Sand-man disappear and
leave mutilated bodies after them and as in the case of the Falling Man the madness caused
by Sand-mans last appearance leads to a suicide of the main character559. Explosion, loosing
one’s eyes and jumping down from the tower are all related to Sand-mans appearance.
Dramatic event related to the textual origin of the character makes Sand-man a form of
palimpsest fear, a discursive formation of unexpected and intervening death and violence.
Sand-man as a concept or thing is something that exists in memory and culture as a cognitive
model and discursive formation. Freud notes that we can call a living person uncanny when
evil motives are ascribed to him/her but only in the case where we believe that this person
possess some special powers to achieve his aims560. A suicide bomber possessing
necropower or imagination which can change planes into missiles could be considered as
such powers. Its ability to cause suffering also relates Sand-man to responsive bodies which
experience the terror and physical pain by only sensing the signifying sign of the source of
threat, where Sand-man exists as a trauma. Because Sand-man exists as a text, also the
resistance happens in the level of naming. In Afanasievits’ case the dog carries the linguistic
sign of the uncanny Sand-man, Stalin, and where his demonic character is transformed into
form of a familiar dog.
557 Freud 1919, 5–7.
558 ibid., 5.
559 ibid., 7.
560 ibid., 14.
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The fear of loosing one’s eyes Freud relates to both rational fears of injury but also to fear of
castration561. At first sight such an idea feels difficult to relate to the politics of fear but still
both features can be captured from the second photograph of the case of Abu Ghraib, earlier
described with terms of symbolic beheading and censorship castration, connects these both
in the same frame. Censored faces and genitals are the expressions of vulnerability which by
covering them actually makes them more visible and more vulnerable. Power to expose the
vulnerability is a constructing element of the politics of fear.
“Many people experience the feeling in the highest degree in relation to death and dead
bodies, to the return of the dead, and to spirits and ghosts”562 More commonly recognized
fear connected to bodies of the death doesn’t appear so important in relation to the
Unheimlich. In the case studies a clear representation of death in its purest form does not
exist. How ghosts and returning of the death should be understood here is done according to
their relation to structuralism where they appear as structural paradoxes of the condition of
life. The dead body of the soldier in Mogadishu under public punitive violence is an example
where the behaviour of the subject shifts the concept of the object between corps and body.
Another example is the disappeared people who do not fit either the classification of dead or
alive because the sign of the body is missing. These people who are assumed to be dead
could really return if it would be discovered that they are still alive. Also The Falling Man is
a structural paradox; in the short moment where the man is falling he is very much alive but
as good as dead, captured into an event where his life can not be saved. Clearest example of
ghosts concerns the Hibakushas, people who appeared looking like corps but were still
moving in mechanic pattern without individual mind, and who kept on living but could still
get sick and die any moment. Hibakusha’s resurrected from the ashes of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki but could return to death all the sudden. Also Rodina’s resistant naming act has the
uncanny appearance as the returning of the death mother. The cases show the paradox of life
and death which lies in Levi-Strauss’s constructivism. The concept and efficacy of
necropower is also strongly built on the lack of political capabilities in relation to this
paradox. Observations done here bends the illustrating line of life and death into a circle
where they are not in the extremes of the line but only separated by thin borderline which can
be crossed in semiotic sense and by means of symbolic exchange.
561 Freud 1919, 7.
562 ibid., 13.
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“Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut off [… ] all these have something peculiarly
uncanny about them, especially when [… ] they prove able to move of themselves in
addition”563. Freud interprets these as associations of castration-complex564 which in the
context of politics of fear could be seen accumulating from the vulnerability and structural
paradox.  On the other hand this would make no difference to these previous concepts. Here
one should look to a case which Lotman presents in his work concerning the problems of
framing. Lotman describes the experience of young educated Russian woman who saw a film
first time made with montage technique. She was chocked and told that they showed people
who were torn into pieces. Similar reaction happened in movie theatre in Hollywood where a
close picture of face was shown first time. The audience fell into panic when they saw that
the ‘cut off’ head started to smile.565 In the context of representation (film or picture) what is
seen is considerate as real because of their identical visual appearance. When the
representation is in conflict with the knowledge of how these visual objects should function,
they appear as an element of the Unheimlich. This confirms the importance of the framing in
the representation as interpretation. Only by gaining knowledge of framing technique enables
one to question what is shown.
Freud concludes his research by saying that his collection of examples is certainly not
complete566. But what it does is that it reveals the multiplicity of the surfaces of emergency of
the phenomenon which is called fear. It also shows the objects of fear as palimpsest or
layered phenomena, where the origin of the fear is hidden and where the sources are
identified with the signs and these signs as a simulation replace the source.  How the body
turns into object of fear is not a question of simplicity, but multiplicity. Thereby I claim that
the appearance of politics of fear as the Unheimlich is a continuity of separate emergences
and fixations of heritage. In this way one can understand the unity of differences, the
archaeology of genealogies. Versatile topic such as the politics of fear is easily
misunderstood if one tries to describe it based on the assumed origin. It should rather be
understood as field of phenomena which by limiting and oversimplifying analysis loses its
meaning and significance. The analysis on politics of fear is not to understand it as an sich,
as ontological, but a process of episteme.
563 Freud 1919, 14.
564 ibid., 14.
565 Lotman 1989, 36.
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* * *
Furthermore than collecting different forms of fear under the same concept, the Unheimlich
as originally psychological analytical tool offers some crucial remarks for the formation of
the object of fear. It highlights the role of aesthetics, narratives and context, but most
importantly the experience. If one tries to draw a line of rules of formation for the objects
fear, some hypothetical principles can be concluded here to be used and tested in further
research.
Risk or threat an sich does not constitute the existence of fear.
Uncanny threat, acknowledged as unclear and uncontrollable, leads to fear.
All that is related to threat for human’s life, health and status can not be directly referred as
fear. Threat is a specified object and the risk is the measured or estimated possibility for
threat to emerge. When the threat becomes existing and evident, but not clearly recognizable,
the subject looses the focus and the ability to handle the threat.
Fear is an experience, and as such considerate as real.
Fear is localised and materialised in the body.
Fear as an experience, feeling or emotion can not be stated as real or unreal, true or false.
Experience of fear exists as real fear. Emotion is located to the body, where the effect can be
verified. Strongest statement of materialized fear is the trauma, embodied fear and enforcing
control. Even though the fear can be localized to the body it emerges between the bodies567
as knowledge. Fear, when reflected from individual to collective level, becomes social.
Body expresses the conditions of life and death, the vulnerability.
Non-existing body is a structural paradox, an ongoing disturbed process.
The origin and demise of human exist in relation to body where responding body expresses
life and non-responding body death. Predisposition of the shift between these conditions is
567 See e.g. Ahmed 2003, 191.
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the vulnerability which is expressed in the context of the body. Disappeared body fulfils
neither one of these conditions. When the physical sign of the body does not exist it exists
only in the level of knowledge. Knowledge as a process is continuing where the
understanding concerning the condition of the body is unstable. Referential object for
knowledge can replace the missing body, such as marked grave, identified clothes or spoken,
written or illustrated narration.
Representation of the body is a simulation, replacing sign of the object, the
double.
The simulative double is a unit of collective memory.
Projected identification to the double forms the social body.
Body appears as a representation of the collective.
The body exists not only as a direct observation but as a document, a representation
considerate as real. The simulation of real, the double of the body, forms the knowledge
concerning the body. As a representative, reproductive and repeated unit the double forms
the existence of the human in the level of collective memory. The existing body and the
simulated body are identified as expressions of the same existence. The double is an
expression of ‘us’ where the one’s existence can be projected and identified and it becomes
the representation of the collective.
Represented violence exists as symbolic violence toward the referential body,
the double.
Symbolic violence affects the collective in the level of knowledge.
Presented subject in violent event is associated with violence.
In the representation the violence can not be considered anymore as direct violence but as a
simulation of violence. Because the simulated violence is targeted to simulated body,
violence emerges as the symbolic violence against the double. The symbolic violence
deconstructs and transforms the double and constructs the knowledge of vulnerability. It also
transforms the double of the subject into the subject of violence. Because the subject appears
as similar body compared to the object, the representative social body, but because it
deconstructs the object, it is acknowledged as something different from the object. The
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violence separates the subject from the social body, while it still reminds ‘us’. This makes
‘us’ potential objects of fear.
Negative connotations as histories of violence are located to the body, the
surface of emergence for heritage.
Power as practices form the relation between the subject and the object where
fear becomes political.
The body transforms into the object and the subject of the politics of fear, the
body of fear.
Different semantic units of negation are situated to sign-vehicle which can appear for
example as symbol, name or sound. When located to body, these myths reform the subject
into demonic character of the Sand-man. Practices control the processes of identification and
power forms the relation between the subject and the object.  This process should not only be
understood as a reflection of myths but also as a relation which creates and reform myths
continuously and interactively. As political phenomena power and practices which affect to
formation of the objects of fear, makes fear emerge as political. The politics of fear affect to
the representative body, body as a social being and bodily functions. The body also appears
to produce fear. It reaches the potentiality of both the subject and the object of the politics of
fear and becomes the body of fear.
The paradoxical existence of the body of fear can be at some level be examined by
Flacelière’s writings of thambos. He notes that the gods of ancient Greece transformed into
polytheistic family of gods after the period of animistic gods568. When the knowledge as
science debates and common experience started considering human as primary subject,
inventor of god, creator of modernity, the nature of war and the cause for changes in the
environment, he/she also became the biggest threat for one’s own existence, uncanny for the
self. When the object and the subject share the same existence, what is considerate as
familiar appears as the Unheimlic, the body of fear which nature is revealed in the moment of
emergence, something which ought to have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to
light.
568 Flacelière 1995, 182.
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If the politics of fear is described as use of power, one must also look for the counter force,
the appearances of resistance. The body of fear must not be understood as purely repressive
phenomenon but as well as the ground for the conflicts which finalizes the political nature of
fear.
The resistance emerges in context of the double as practices of representing,
naming and memorising.
The resistance of the politics of fear appears as normalizing, coping and
expressing the existence of fear.
The strongest statement against the politics of fear is parrhesia which
transforms the object into the parrhesiast.
Opening the meaning of parrhesia instead of hypothesis can be done maybe better by the
voice of a parrhesiast.
This is pre-eminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and
boldly. […] So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we
have to fear is fear itself -- nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which
paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.569
569 Roosevelt 1933.
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